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Pertanika is now over 33 years old; this accumulated knowledge has resulted in Pertanika JSSH 
being indexed in SCOPUS (Elsevier), EBSCO, DOAJ, CABI and ISC. 
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Preface
This special issue of the Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (JSSH) 
comprises 11 revised and extended manuscripts based on papers originally presented 
at a workshop organised by the Faculty of Law, Universiti Kebangsaan Malayia on 
25 – 26 May 2011 at Puri Pujangga, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.  The workshop was 
aimed at advancing legal publication and citation among members of the Faculty who 
closely collaborate with other researchers from various disciplines.  The theme of this 
workshop is “Facilitating business through a vibrant and equilibrium environment for 
business law.”  The papers published in this special issue of Pertanika JSSH underwent 
strict editorial processes as expected from its status as one the leading research-based 
internationally recognised journals.
The law should serve as a facilitative tool to business community driven by innovation. 
Higher learning institutions should follow suit and this publication effort is part of the 
long-term strategy to promote the concept of “Entrepreneurial University” and “academic 
entrepreneurship”, a concept which is driven by the Malaysian innovation initiatives, policy 
and system.  One primary concern in the development of innovative community and the 
urgent drive of commercialization is the possible neglect of the concerns of the primary 
stakeholders – the public.  This collection of papers specifically addresses the socio-legal 
impacts of the development by incorporating various business law-related issues including 
consumers’ protection, traditional knowledge documentation, Islamic finance, other issues 
on Shariah, as well as ethical and regulatory aspects of medical law.
Last but not least, special thanks and appreciation go to the Fundamental Research Grant 
Scheme (FRGS), project code FRGS/1/2011/SSI/UKM/45 research group and Projek 
Pemacu GPP-2011-017 which have inspired the initiative to collate papers for the purpose 
of this publication.
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INTRODUCTION
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Social 
Sex Selection (PGD for SSS) has been a subject 
of criticism on various grounds.  One of the 
concerns raised is the potential harm that the 
technique may cause to the child’s physical and 
psychological welfare.  These allegations trigger 
the calls to prohibit PGD for SSS on the grounds 
of protecting the welfare of children born from 
it and thus defeat the parental autonomy to 
procreate (The President’s Council on Bioethics, 
2002; King, 2003).  A crucial issue, therefore, 
arises on the extent to which parental autonomy 
to use PGD for SSS to procreate a child of their 
desired sex should be respected.  This forms 
the crux of this paper where the concerns about 
the potential harm of the PGD for SSS on the 
child to be born are critically analysed in order 
to determine whether they can sufficiently 
outweigh the parental autonomy to use the 
technique to produce a child of their desired sex. 
First, however, the science of PGD is briefly 
discussed.
PGD FOR SSS: THE STATE OF THE ART
PGD or Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis 
requires the usage of two techniques; In Vitro 
Fertilisation (IVF) and genetic testing (Taylor, 
2008).  Embryos are fertilised in vitro and 
screened, normally three days after fertilisation. 
Selected embryos are then implanted into the 
uterus (Taylor, 2008).  PGD is primarily used 
to screen embryos for genetic diseases, to find 
embryos with tissue-match for organ/tissue 
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ABSTRACT
The use of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) to select the sex of unborn children for social reasons 
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transplantation and to identify the sex of the 
embryos (Braude et al., 2002).  The use of PGD 
to select the sex of embryos is usually performed 
to avoid the transmission of sex-linked diseases 
which affect male children, such as Haemophilia 
and Dunchenne muscular dystrophy (Chung, 
1999).  The sex-linked diseases are normally 
transmitted to the male child through a mother 
who is a carrier that passes the defective X 
chromosome to her son (Tasca & McClure, 
1998).  Using the genetic analysis method, the 
Fluorescence in situ Hybridisation (FISH), PGD 
determines the sex of embryos produced via IVF, 
and allows for female embryos to be selected 
for implantation in order to avoid the passing of 
these diseases to male children (Chung, 1999). 
Its use can also be extended to the non-medical 
or social reasons, where a couple wishes to 
conceive a male or female child for reasons 
other than avoiding the transmission of sex-
linked diseases such as to balance the family or 
for cultural or religious reasons that require the 
birth of a child of a particular sex.  However, 
this raises concerns about the acceptability of 
performing the PGD for social sex selection such 
as on the safety of the technique on the child’s 
physical and psychological welfare which is 
explored in this paper.
PHYSICAL WELFARE OF CHILDREN: 
HEALTH RISKS TO CHILDREN BORN 
FROM PGD FOR SSS
Concerns over the welfare of the child to be born 
following PGD for SSS include the potential 
health risks as a result of being born through 
the procedure (Larcher, 2007).  This concern 
arises because the procedure involves producing 
several embryos through IVF and extracting the 
cells for the purpose of screening for the X or 
Y chromosome which determines the sex of the 
embryo (Flinter, 2001).  There is a possibility 
for the IVF to increase the risk of producing 
defective babies (Hansen, 2002), and there is 
also cause for concern on the implications of 
embryo biopsy for the child born through the 
technique (Genetics and Public Policy Centre, 
2004).
Nevertheless, concerns on the potential 
adverse effects of IVF on the child born cannot 
be the basis for prohibiting the PGD for SSS.  If 
IVF has been accepted and legally permissible 
for infertile couples, despite the risks it poses, 
a qualitative difference needs to exist for a 
different stance to be adopted regarding PGD 
for SSS (Snelling, 2008).  For example, a study 
conducted by the Centres for Disease Control 
and Prevention has shown that babies born 
following IVF are highly likely to suffer from 
health problems and “genetic flaws” (BBC, 
2009; Leake, 2010).  Thus, prohibiting PGD for 
SSS on the grounds of the risk to the health of 
the child born following IVF cannot be defended 
without a similar prohibition being placed on the 
IVF. Although the motivations behind the use of 
IVF for infertile couples and its use combined 
with PGD for SSS are different where the former 
is undertaken to produce a pregnancy that would 
not otherwise occur whereas with the latter the 
IVF is only used to enable the subsequent use 
of PGD for SSS, the crucial point is the risks 
involved in the IVF are within a magnitude that 
can be consented to by individuals. As explained 
by the United Kingdom’s House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee (2005):
“In terms of assisted reproduction, 
it could be argued that the drugs 
used to stimulate egg production and 
the risks associated with multiple 
pregnancies are such that they justify 
state regulation. While these risks 
are real and significant, however, 
they do not obviously fall beyond 
the level of risk which people are 
legally permitted to assume. For 
example, a valid consent to surgery 
such as heart transplantation (which 
carries a significant risk of harm) or 
to involvement in non-therapeutic 
research projects, is regarded in law 
as valid so long as it has been taken 
by a competent individual.” (House 
of Commons, Science and Technology 
Committee, Human Reproductive 
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Technologies and the Law, Fifth Report 
of Session 2004-05, vol. I (London: The 
Stationary Office Limited, 2005), p. 20, 
para 40. Emphasis added). 
Similarly, if the autonomy to opt for other 
‘non-compelling’ medical procedures such as 
cosmetic or hormone replacement therapy is 
respected, the same attitude should be accorded 
to individuals exercising their autonomy to use 
PGD for SSS.  Studies on hormone replacement 
therapy have shown that it can increase the 
risk of breast cancer (Ross et al., 2000), but 
women are, nevertheless, allowed to opt for 
the treatment.  Cosmetic surgery such as breast 
enlargement is also allowed despite the risks it 
carries, because it has been argued that, “patient 
autonomy dictates that the individual may 
willingly undergo risks for the attainment of 
their perceived benefit from such procedures” 
(Klipstein, 2005, p. 1352).  Indeed:
“The state will only go so far to protect 
people from themselves, and will 
intervene only when the risk is deemed 
unacceptably high or grave. The risks 
of assisted reproduction, if explained 
to and understood by, the individual 
concerned seem to sit firmly within 
those which can be consented to in 
law” (House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee, 2005).
Moreover, scientific evidence has been 
advanced on the safety of the procedure of PGD, 
including when used to determine the sex of 
the embryos. The European Society of Human 
Reproduction and Embryology (The ESHRE 
Task Force, 2003) has reported that there is no 
evidence indicated that the process of embryo 
biopsy required in PGD affects the health of the 
embryo.  In addition, it has been reported that 
there is no evidence pointing that PGD babies 
are more likely to encounter neonatal problems 
or defects than babies conceived without 
assistance (The ESHRE Task Force, 2003).  It 
was also reported that in 2004, more than 1000 
healthy babies were born using PGD (Verlinsky 
et al., 2004).  In any event, even if the embryo 
is damaged from the process of biopsy, it will 
be “non-viable,” and unsuitable for implantation 
(Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
2004), and thus will not result in a child that 
is affected by the damage (Deech & Smajdor, 
2007).  Concerns over the health of the child 
to be born from PGD for SSS, therefore, are 
insufficient to justify overriding parental 
autonomy in using the technique to conceive a 
child of their desired sex.
Furthermore, the clinical risks involved in 
the use of PGD for sex selection on medical and 
social grounds are the same, as both uses involve 
the same methods and procedure, and as such:
“Talking up the risks of PGD and sperm 
sorting in order to justify its prohibition 
in social sex selection, could undermine 
patient and public confidence in those 
techniques when they are performed for 
medical sex selection (or in the case of 
PGD, for the detection of single gene 
disorders (Tizzard, 2004).
Given this, concerns over the safety of 
PGD on the physical health of the child born 
should be dealt with by scientific evidence, 
and by obtaining the informed consent of the 
couple, not by a total prohibition of the technique 
(Savulescu, 1999). This is because:
“We enter a dangerous realm when 
we regulate so personal and intimate 
an aspect of our lives as reproduction 
because of fuzzy claims about sexism or 
nebulous fears for the health of yet-to-
be conceived children” (Stock, 2001).
PSYCHOLOGICAL WELFARE OF 
CHILDREN: THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
PGD FOR SSS ON PARENTAL LOVE
Concerns have also been raised about the 
psychological welfare of the child as possible 
grounds for State intervention in restricting 
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the parental autonomy to procreate using PGD 
(Roberts, 2002).  This concern stems from 
the argument propounded by the opponents 
of the procedure that the practice endangers 
the unconditional parental love that parents 
should have for their offspring, and that 
this may have damaging consequences on 
children (The President’s Council on Bioethics, 
2002; King, 2003).  It has been argued that, 
traditionally, parental love has been assumed to 
be “unconditional” where the purpose of having 
children is for parents to love and care for them 
regardless of any traits including his/her sex 
(Stankovic, 2005).  For instance:
“Children are not made but begotten. 
By this we mean that children are the 
issue of our love, not the product of 
our wills.  A man and a woman do not 
produce or choose a particular child, 
as they might buy a particular brand 
of soap; rather they stand in relation 
to their child as recipients of gifts” 
(The President’s Council on Bioethics, 
2002).
Allowing parents to select the sex of their 
children grants them a sense of control over 
the reproduction process, and hence alters the 
traditional concept of parenthood where parents 
are usually satisfied with any child that is born 
to them (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002). 
This, therefore, fundamentally challenges the 
traditional notion of procreation and parenthood 
by apparently rendering parental love conditional 
upon the child fulfilling the desire of the parents 
(The President’s Council on Bioethics, 2002, p. 
759). As King (2003) argues:
“By choosing the characteristics of 
our children, we turn reproduction into 
just another consumer experience and 
this degrades its profound existential 
significance.  Because babies are 
human beings, not things, it is critical 
that much is left to chance in their 
process of coming into being.  The act 
of choosing tends to turn them into just 
another human-designed consumer 
object. When we choose or design our 
children, the relationship becomes one 
of designer and object, where the latter 
is inevitably in a subordinate position.”
Selecting the sex of one’s child is, therefore, 
claimed to be morally wrong because, “children 
should be accepted and loved unconditionally” 
(British Medical Association, 2004).  This 
apprehension over the practice of PGD for SSS 
is also shared by members of the public, as is 
evident from the public consultation exercise 
held in the United Kingdom in 2003.  Here, 
PGD for SSS was criticised by the members 
of the public surveyed for treating the child as 
a means to an end that “…interferes with the 
unconditional love owed by parents to their 
children” (Human Fertilisation Embryology 
Authority, 2003).  Suzie Leather stated (when 
she was the chair of the UK Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority) that, “the public 
view was really that great value should be put on 
the unconditional nature of parental love (BBC, 
2008).”  There is an intuitive belief held by the 
public that parents should simply “…accept any 
child that comes along,” and ought not to “pick 
and choose” their children (Herrisone-Kelly, 
2007).  An issue thus arises as to whether this 
intuition is well-founded.  On what basis can 
the intuition or notion that parents should accept 
any child that comes along and not choose the 
characteristics of their child such as its sex, be 
defended?  More importantly, can this claim 
of violation of unconditional parental love 
undermine the parental autonomy in using the 
PGD for SSS?
QUESTIONING THE NEED FOR 
‘UNCONDITIONAL’ PARENTAL LOVE
The notion of unconditional parental love 
suggests that parental love has to be based on 
the mere fact that the child is biologically theirs, 
and parents cannot choose any trait of their 
child such as its sex, as the basis of parenting. 
However,  it is questionable whether and why 
parental love has to be of this nature.  Selecting 
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the traits of children prior to birth implies that 
the love that parents have for their child is not 
unconditional, and is instead dependent upon 
the child fulfilling the chosen trait (Watt, 2004). 
Indeed, Watt (2004) states that:
“Central to the notion of good 
parenthood which many of us share is 
unconditional acceptance. Parents who 
make their love and care conditional on 
their child displaying certain features 
are seen as unparental in the way they 
behave.” 
However, merely taking steps to actualise 
their preference of a child’s sex is insufficient to 
accuse these parents of not having unconditional 
love towards their child because what matters is 
the unconditional acceptance shown by parents 
to the child after he/she is born regardless of his/
her characteristics such as sex.  Unconditional 
parental love does not mean that parents should 
merely accept any child they engender, and 
should not take steps to select any particular 
trait that they prefer in a child. Parental love 
need not be ‘unconditional’ in the sense that 
parents should not be precluded from selecting 
the sex of children, because there is no reason 
to suggest that parents who select the sex of 
their child only love the child if the child has 
the desired sex, and will not otherwise do so. 
Supporting this argument, Davis (2008) makes 
the following analogy:
“Many parents use infant safety seats 
to protect an actual child, and many 
pregnant women avoid alcohol to 
protect a potential child. There is 
no reason to think that making the 
possibility more remote makes it more 
likely that, if C had trait U, you would 
not love C as much.” 
Love is still unconditional if parents accept 
and love a child once born, even if it does not 
exhibit their chosen traits.  Taking Davis’s (2008) 
analogy again:
“Even now the odds that your next child 
will become severely brain-damaged 
due to injury, or a quadriplegic in a 
car accident, are extremely remote.  
However, parents would not be less 
inclined to continue loving their 
child simply because the undesirable 
condition was unlikely before it 
materialized.”
Moreover, before the advent of modern 
sex selection techniques such as PGD, attempts 
to conceive children of a preferred sex by 
various traditional means, such as timing, and 
the position adopted during sexual intercourse 
was not uncommon.  Yet, parents who practised 
these techniques were not accused of lacking in 
genuine unconditional love for their child.  Given 
this, “does that mean that the moral judgment 
or lack of justification of a social and medical 
attitude depends more upon its efficiency than 
on the underlying principle?” (Sureau, 1999).
There is nothing inherently wrong with 
parents attempting to select the sex of their child 
prior to birth through PGD because:
“If it’s not wrong to wish for a bonny, 
bouncing, brown-eyed baby girl, why 
or how would it become wrong if we 
had the technology, the choice, to play 
fairy godmother to ourselves and grant 
our wishes” (Harris, 2007).
Furthermore, if the use of technologies 
such as PGD, ultrasound, or amniocentesis to 
ensure the birth of a healthy baby is accepted, 
and managed to escape the claim of the breach 
of unconditional parental love, it is difficult to 
defend the discriminatory attitude expressed 
against the practice of selecting the sex of 
children through PGD.  As stipulated by Green 
(2008):
“[T]hese fears underestimate the 
power of parental love.  The panels of 
prenatal tests that are commonly used 
today do not seem to have eroded the 
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quality of parenting. Parents seeking an 
able child love a disabled one.”
Thus, there is no basis upon which to 
question the parental love of those who select 
the sex of their child, because there is no reason 
to believe that parents who do so only love their 
child for his/her sex.  As such, McDougall’s 
attempt at defending the traditional notion of 
unconditional parental love is refuted. Arguing 
from a virtue ethics perspective, a virtuous 
parent, according to her, should exhibit traits 
that are conducive to the “flourishing of the 
child” (McDougall, 2005).  Included in these 
virtuous traits is the “trait of acceptance,” 
which, according to McDougall, relates to the 
requirement for parents to accept any child 
that is born to them due to the unpredictable 
nature of children’s characteristics.  In her view, 
without this trait, parents would cease to love a 
child who, for example, was born healthy but 
later developed a disease or a child whose hair 
was brown at birth but subsequently darkened 
(McDougall, 2005).  McDougall offers the 
following hypothetical scenario in support of 
her view:
“Reflection indicates that sex is indeed a 
characteristic that falls within the scope 
of the parental virtue of acceptance. 
Imagine, for example, that there exists 
a particular type of bacterial infection 
that results in a complete change in a 
child’s sex. On infection, girls become 
normal boys and boys become normal 
girls...It seems intuitive that parents 
who rejected their daughter once she 
became a son, or vice versa, would act 
wrongly, just as parents who rejected 
their child once some other medical 
condition had radically affected his 
or her characteristics act similarly 
wrong” (McDougall, 2005).
I concur with McDougal’s hypothesis that 
good or virtuous parents should have the “trait 
of acceptance” which is essential in securing 
children’s development, but question whether 
this trait of acceptance should preclude parents 
from having preferences about their child’s 
characteristics, and in turn forbid them from 
acting upon those preferences before the child 
is born. It is conceded that parental love towards 
a child should not cease upon any changes in 
the child’s characteristics or features after the 
child is born, as described in the examples 
given by McDougall above. However, that 
should not necessarily prevent parents from 
choosing the traits of their child before he/she 
is born.  Rejecting a child due to a change in 
his/her attributes after the child is born cannot 
be equated with choosing not to have a child 
with the undesired attributes in the first place. 
It is erroneous to assume that just because it 
is wrong for parents to stop loving their child, 
for example, once the sex of a child changes 
due to an illness, or when a child initially born 
healthy later develops a serious disease, as in 
the examples cited by McDougall, it is equally 
wrong for parents to attempt to prevent the 
undesired characteristics such as the sex or a 
disease.  The crux of the matter is that there 
is an underlying difference between accepting 
the child’s characteristics after the child is 
born, which McDougall argues strongly for, 
and choosing the desired characteristics before 
birth.  The latter does not necessarily imply that 
parents who attempt that action are guilty of 
not acting virtuously, or of not genuinely loving 
their child. For this allegation to succeed, it 
must be supported with concrete evidence that 
those parents do not intend to love and care for 
the child if the child turns out contrary to their 
expectation, that is, not having the desired sex, 
which is refuted below.
Additionally, theory on the need for 
unconditional parental love on the basis of the 
unpredictability of children’s characteristics is 
now irrelevant in the context of sex selection 
because:
“Claims that  parents  ought  to 
accept children of any hair colour, 
level of intelligence, or height may 
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(currently) be justified, because those 
characteristics remain at present 
unpredictable…But how are we to 
justify the claim that parents ought 
to accept children of either sex now 
that the sex of our children is not 
unpredictable?...[W]hy is the general 
parental virtue of acceptance still 
taken to be applicable to the specific 
case of sex in the wake of the discovery 
of reliable sex selection techniques?” 
(Herrisone-Kelly, 2007)
PGD has been hailed as a “more reliable 
way” of identifying the sex of children when 
compared to other methods such as sperm sorting 
(Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
2003).  It is stated that, “When performed by 
skilled clinicians and scientists sexing embryos 
by PGD has a relatively low misdiagnosis rate 
(less than one per cent on average)” (Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 2003). 
In the light of this, McDougall’s argument that 
parents ought not to choose the sex of their 
offspring on the grounds that those who do so 
might not love the child if he/she does not live up 
to parents’ expectations, is flawed.  With PGD, it 
is unlikely that parents will not get a child of the 
chosen sex due to the reliability of the technique.
Nevertheless, concerns have been raised on 
the ‘fate’ of the child in the event PGD fails to 
deliver one of the desired sexes:
“If I choose or design a child with 
certain traits, won’t I feel pleased 
if I succeed and disappointed if the 
child fails to live up to specification? I 
may not give my failed product up for 
adoption, but won’t our relationship be 
tarnished by my sense that this is not 
what I ordered?” (Green, 2007)
However, even if PGD fails to deliver 
the child of the chosen sex, it is unlikely that 
parents will reject this child because “Parental 
Love Almost Always Prevails” (Green, 2007). 
Equally, some parents will not ever love their 
child regardless of his/her attributes.  It cannot, 
therefore, be assumed that parents who, for 
example, choose to have a girl only love her 
because she is a girl, and would not have loved 
her if she had been a boy.
Glover (1995) argues that in ‘normal’ 
reproduction, parents may wish for a child of a 
particular sex but, in some events, their desire is 
not met.  In this situation, the disappointment that 
these parents may feel at first will normally be 
extinguished with the arrival of their new baby. 
The frustration that parents may feel when the 
child turns out not to be of their desired sex may 
be stronger for parents who undergo PGD, due to 
the burdens and ordeal that they must go through 
from the procedure rather than conceiving 
without assistance.  Indeed, “how parents might 
look upon offspring when they enter the process 
with the belief that a certain kind of child is owed 
to them and after they have paid a high price for 
that child?” (Ryan, 1992).  However, to suggest 
that parents who resort to PGD to select the sex 
of their child will only love their child if he/she 
is of their chosen sex is implausible, especially 
when they have spent much time and money 
on an expensive and burdensome procedure. 
Additionally, given their experience with PGD, 
it is arguable that these parents may not wish 
to undergo the procedure again simply because 
their first attempt failed to deliver a child of their 
desired sex. On this argument, I differ with Davis 
(2009) who opines that:
“The more time, money, and travel that 
a parent invests in directed procreation, 
and the more inconvenience, physical 
discomfort, and medical risk that the 
parent bears, the more I fear that parent 
will feel entitled to the desired result. 
As market forces and medical research 
make such investments relatively 
trivial, the less I fear the effect…If 
choosing the sex or any other trait 
of one’s children was as simple and 
inexpensive as choosing a bar of soap, 
I would be much less worried.”
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If sex selection methods were to become 
simple and inexpensive, parents may be inclined 
to ‘reject’ the child that fails to conform to their 
expectation, because they can attempt to produce 
another child. The Ethics Committee of the 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine 
(2001), in evaluating the concern on the welfare 
of the child born from sex selection, concludes 
that there is insufficient evidence to prove that 
parents will treat the child badly if their attempt 
at sex selection fails.  In any event, the likelihood 
of untoward parental attitudes towards their 
child if sex selection fails can be mitigated 
by appropriate counselling in order to prepare 
parents for any possibilities.  It is, however, 
conceded that there are parents who may react 
negatively towards their child if he/she fails to 
meet their expectations or for any other reasons, 
but ‘bad’ parents exist in every society which can 
be manifested in many different ways.
There is no reason why parental love should 
remain ‘unconditional,’ in that there is no reason 
to suggest that parents should merely accept 
any child that is born to them and be precluded 
from choosing the sex of their child.  What 
matters is for parents to accept and love their 
child regardless of his/her sex, after attempting 
to select its sex through PGD. Just because 
parents have selected certain traits does not 
necessarily imply that they will love their child 
any less.  Indeed, even when the child’s sex is 
not selected prior to birth, there is no guarantee 
that he/she will be ‘unconditionally’ loved 
by his/her parents because, “[n]ot all parents 
forge good relationships with their children 
whose personality, for example, they may find 
difficult, and many parents will bond best with 
those children whose attributes they particularly 
value” (McLean & Mason, 2003).  Even if social 
sex selection defeats the unconditional parental 
love that parents should have for children, the 
accusation itself is not sufficient to legally 
prohibit PGD for SSS.  Without sufficient proof 
of harm to children, parental autonomy is a more 
persuasive argument in favour of PGD for SSS 
than the counter-argument that allowing PGD is 
destructive of unconditional parental love.  As 
argued by Gavaghan, it is pertinent to uphold 
parental autonomy in using PGD to select 
children’s characteristics because such decisions 
are meaningful to the individuals involved and 
indicate the, “...values and priorities or view of 
what it is that makes life important” (Gavaghan, 
2007).
CONCLUSION
Concerns about the welfare of children born after 
PGD for SSS may qualify as sound justification 
for state intervention to override parental 
autonomy in selecting the sex of their unborn 
child, if supported by sufficient evidence.  This 
stems from the argument that the state has an 
important role in protecting the vulnerable from 
harm arising from the conduct of others.  In the 
context of PGD for SSS, children born after the 
technique represent the vulnerable people whose 
interests need to be adequately protected by the 
state from the conduct of parents choosing their 
sex through PGD.  On this basis, this paper has 
reviewed the claim that PGD for SSS endangers 
the welfare of the child born after the technique, 
due to the risks of the technique and concerns 
about the psychological implications on such 
children.
The authors have argued that the risks to 
the safety of the child born after PGD for SSS 
are not sufficient to outweigh parental autonomy 
in utilising this technique to produce a child of 
their desired sex.  Although there are risks, their 
magnitude is such that parents should be allowed 
the choice of whether they wish to undertake the 
procedure and run the risks.  Meanwhile, claims 
about the adverse consequences on the child’s 
psychological state are similarly and largely 
speculative as well as unsustainable.  In reaching 
this conclusion, the notion of unconditional 
parental love, which forms the main basis upon 
which the use of PGD for SSS is opposed as 
being detrimental to the child’s welfare, has been 
analysed and refuted.  It is concluded that there is 
nothing inherently wrong with parental conduct 
in selecting the sex of their child through PGD, 
as such an action does not imply that the love 
that parents have for the child is conditional and 
dependent upon the child fulfilling the parents’ 
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desires.  In the light of these findings, it is 
concluded that parental autonomy to produce a 
child of their desired sex through the use of PGD 
should be respected.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE  
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Although traditional knowledge plays, a vital 
role in the daily lives of the vast majority 
of people, the international community has 
only recently sought to recognise and protect 
traditional knowledge.  Such protections were 
established under the United Nations Convention 
on Biological Diversity 1992 (CBD).  The CBD 
sets out principles governing access to genetic 
resources and the knowledge associated with 
them, and the sharing of benefits arising from 
such access (ABS).  In addition to ensure the 
ABS, Article 1 also establishes the two further 
objectives of the CBD, namely, the conservation 
of biological diversity and the sustainable use of 
its components.
Article 8(j) of the CBD is an important 
provision in the context of protecting traditional 
knowledge.  The provision is specifically 
concerned with the traditional knowledge and 
recognises indigenous peoples’ status as both 
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providers of knowledge and as conservers 
of biodiversity.  Due to indigenous peoples’ 
contributions in both the knowledge and 
conservation of biodiversity, Article 8(j) states 
that their contributions must be “respected” 
and consent must be sought before such 
knowledge can be disseminated or used, as 
well as ‘encouraging’ the equitable sharing of 
the benefits.  The provision calls upon states 
to include such communities in negotiation for 
benefit-sharing and prior, informed consent 
(PIC) mechanism.  Even though a state is not 
obligated to unilaterally dictate how benefits 
should be shared in private transactions, the 
state has an obligation to facilitate the equitable 
sharing of benefits.  Article 8(j) seeks to 
protect traditional knowledge, by establishing 
obligations for the recognition of traditional 
knowledge and requirements concerning PIC, 
as well as attempting to ensure equitable ABS.
The relationship between the intellectual 
property rights’ (IPR) system under the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS Agreement) and the ABS 
principles of CBD, in the context of traditional 
knowledge, are of particular importance.  While 
many scholars argue that IPR is theoretically an 
important method of protection for traditional 
knowledge (Combe, 1998; Brush & Stabinsky, 
1996; Anuradha, 1997; Bengwayan, 2003; 
Tobin, 1997), the existing IPR system was 
not designed for the protection of traditional 
knowledge in its original form, often consisting 
of  undocumented and oral knowledge.
Before proceeding further, it is worth 
mentioning here that the relevant IPR protection 
issue is patent under Article 27 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  Article 27(1) mandates patent 
protection for all new products and processes 
generated using any fields of technology, 
including biotechnology.  Pursuant to Article 27 
TRIPS, an invention is patentable upon fulfilment 
of three conditions, namely if it is new; involves 
an inventive step; and is industrially applicable. 
The three aforementioned conditions are 
currently applied to any invention under section 
11 of the Malaysian Patents Act 1983 (MPA). 
An invention is only considered to be new if it is 
not anticipated by prior art.  The term ‘prior art’ 
applies to any worldwide disclosure of a work 
to the public through written publication, oral 
disclosure, by use or in any other way, before the 
priority date of the application for patent.  The 
contents of a domestic patent application having 
an earlier priority date are also considered to be 
prior art (MPA, S14(2).  The MPA also provides 
a list of inventions that are not patentable, despite 
meeting the above mentioned prerequisites 
(Azmi, 2000, 2002).
The existing IPR law does not explicitly 
protect traditional knowledge, but it seeks to 
prevent acts of misappropriation of traditional 
knowledge by inventors.  Any inventions created 
based upon the existing knowledge, including 
traditional knowledge, are not patentable 
because it is said to be anticipated by prior art. 
However, the nature of traditional knowledge 
in its original form, often undocumented and 
oral knowledge, makes the determination of its 
existence as prior art by patent officers difficult, 
if not impossible.  As a result, patents have been 
granted on inventions that were based upon 
existing knowledge, rather than new knowledge 
(Prakash, 2005; Devraj, 2000).  Arguably, the 
existing patent application legal framework can 
be viewed as ‘facilitating’ biopiracy.
The “turmeric” and “basmati” cases in 
India reflect the weaknesses of the existing IPR 
system when patent protections are granted to 
‘new’ products of biotechnology that are based 
upon existing knowledge, rather than new 
knowledge. A lthough contemporary provisions 
in the patent system provide possible revocation 
of such patents (Article 32 TRIPS & Section 33C 
MPA), the patenting of products arising from 
the existing knowledge, particularly indigenous 
knowledge, is almost impossible to prevent 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
2002).  In the absence of any accessible written 
record, a patent examiner is often unable to 
access any information that would challenge 
the inherent novelty or inventiveness of an 
application based on traditional knowledge.
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Furthermore, the existing IPR system does 
not have requirements for benefit-sharing as 
provided in the CBD.  As a result, an ongoing 
debate exists regarding the amendment of the 
TRIPS Agreement in order to impose PIC and 
benefit-sharing; and strengthen the link between 
the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD (Nordin, 
2010a, 2010b).  During the review of Article 
27(3)(b) at the TRIPS Council Meetings in 1999 
and 2000, many developing states recognised the 
conflict and demanded that explicit provisions 
should be included in the TRIPS Agreement 
to: (i) prevent the grant of patents to existing 
traditional knowledge; and (ii) ensure the sharing 
of benefits derived from the patents granted to 
new inventions based on traditional knowledge. 
In response, the developed states argued that the 
existing provisions on patenting are adequate 
and the problem arises from the absence of 
properly documented traditional knowledge are 
readily available to patent officers in order to 
perform searches regarding the existence of such 
knowledge as prior art (Gopalakrishnan, 2005).
The debate continued during the WTO 
Ministerial Meeting in Doha, resulting  the WTO 
requested the TRIPS Council to consider the 
potential conflicts between Article 27(3)(b) and 
the CBD; and to provide express provisions in 
the TRIPS Agreement stipulating the disclosure 
of the information in the patent specification, 
including the origin of the genetic resources and 
the traditional knowledge associated with them, 
and the benefit-sharing requirement. Developed 
states opposed this proposal, on the basis that it 
would require new conditions for the grant of 
patent and the identification of the source; and 
geographical origin of genetic resources was 
not always practical. Even though the European 
Union agreed to the need for disclosure of 
information, it joined the USA in arguing that it 
should not be made a condition precedent for the 
grant of a valid patent (Gopalakrishnan, 2005). 
Although the debate is still on-going amongst the 
states and the international organisations, many 
states view documenting traditional knowledge 
(TKD) as a crucial interim tool to overcome the 
shortcomings of the existing legal standards 
domestically.  India is among the states which 
have engaged in extensive domestic efforts to 
combat biopiracy and engage in TKD projects.
This article will consider whether TKD 
is a crucial interim tool to overcome the 
shortcomings of the existing legal framework 
and can ultimately be utilised to prevent 
biopiracy.  This article will conduct the analysis 
by first looking at the objectives and form of 
TKD.  The legal framework to support TKD 
is then discussed, with a focus upon the status 
of collective knowledge.  The analysis later 
examines various TKD projects to identify 
potential lessons learned from the various 
experiences.  Finally, this article considers the 
TKD effort undertaken by the Sarawak Authority 
in Malaysia.
TKD: OBJECTIVE AND FORM 
The purpose of providing TKD is to provide 
information regarding traditional knowledge as 
prior art.  The assumption is that patent examiners 
will consider the information provided by such 
documentation and prevent mala fide patent 
application or infringement after the completion 
of the patent process.  TKD also assists in the 
identification of the indigenous communities 
with whom the benefits of the commercialisation 
of such knowledge is to be shared.
In India, TKD is typically compiled in 
electronic databases and digital libraries such as 
the Community Biodiversity Registers initiated 
by the Foundation for Revitalisation of Local 
Health Traditions and Centre for Ecological 
Sciences at the Indian Institute of Science and 
the People’s Biodiversity Registers of the non-
governmental organisations (NGO). An effort 
was also initiated by the Science and Technology 
Department to set up the Traditional Knowledge 
Digital Library (TKDL) to establish a national 
database containing the details of medicinal 
plants that allows the inventors to search the 
database to determine whether they can patent 
their product (Stanton, 2004).  Establishing such 
databases within the registers necessitates taking 
into account the international classification 
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standards such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) International Patent 
Classification (IPC) system which requires the 
proof of prior art and a system easily accessed by 
patent examiners.  The potential use of traditional 
knowledge databases is being examined by a 
specialised task force of WIPO with the aim 
of determining how traditional knowledge 
databases can be integrated into the existing 
search tools by patent officers (Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, 2002).
A further initiative of the Indian government 
is known as the National Innovations Foundation, 
led by the NGO SRISTI that seeks to recognise 
and reward the folk healers, farmers and artisans 
for grassroots innovations and outstanding 
contributions to traditional knowledge (National 
Innovation Foundation, 2005).  The Indian 
government has also joined the NGO Kalpavriksh 
to establish the National Biodiversity Strategy 
and Action Plan, whose aim is to develop 
participatory plans for sustainable use and 
equitable sharing of public domain biodiversity 
resources at the district and national levels.
At the grassroots level, the registration 
effort takes place in the form of a peoples’ 
biodiversity register (PBR). PBRs contain 
documents periodically updated by local 
school teachers, students and NGO researchers 
concerning peoples’ knowledge; practices of 
use; and conservation of bioresources, both wild 
and domesticated (Gadgil, 2006).  The PBR is 
not undertaken purely for IPR, but also serves 
as a social process and a historical record of 
knowledge and knowledge holders.  Consensus 
has been reached concerning the documentation 
process of PBRs, which includes: (i) clarifying 
project rationale and obtaining peoples’ approval; 
(ii) identification of knowledgeable individuals 
and potential users; (iii) interviews, field visit 
and mapping of project area; and (iv) public 
discussion.  Furthermore, it is agreed that the 
documentation should remain within the control 
of the community at the local level.  Aside from 
functioning as a preventive tool for biopiracy, the 
registration also assists in the identification of the 
knowledge holder by the bona fide potential user 
of the knowledge (bioprospector/researcher) to 
facilitate the benefit-sharing.  The registration 
of traditional knowledge therefore becomes 
guidance for bioprospecting or research in 
traditional knowledge.
However, research in traditional knowledge 
also raises questions on the benefits to local 
and indigenous communities.  Some of the 
research projects are seen to encourage or 
facilitate biopiracy, since they typically seek 
to further corporate interest.  Among the 
examples of governmental entities and/or private 
collaborators attempting to procure IPR on 
traditional knowledge for their own gain can be 
demonstrated by events in Thailand and Nepal. 
In Thailand, a collaborative effort between the 
Thai government and Portsmouth University to 
collect marine fungi from mangrove and coastal 
areas in southern Thailand for study resulted in 
a legal battle when the sample was kept in the 
UK and requests by the Thai government for 
its return were refused.  In Nepal, samples of 
the life-saving fungi, asco mycetes collected 
from the Gurung Community of Chhamdila 
were taken to the US by a professor without 
any arrangement for benefit-sharing in case of 
commercialisation (Kalpavriksh, 2002).
LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO  
SUPPORT TKD
Although the IPR requirements concerning prior 
art are met by having TKD, the documentation 
is not sufficient to guarantee benefit-sharing 
with regards to profits.  Statutory regulation 
is still necessary to establish benefit-sharing 
mechanisms at the national level.  PBRs have 
been recognised by the Indian Biodiversity Act 
2002 (IBA, S19-21) as prior art documentation 
to be scrutinised for patent applications, 
as well as the basis for equitable benefit-
sharing. The relevant provision in the act 
requires consent to be sought from the National 
Biodiversity Authority (NBA) for any access 
to biological resources and knowledge, and 
to ensure benefit-sharing.  The provision also 
mandates the NBA to oppose any infringement 
of Indian biodiversity and knowledge and 
prevent biopiracy.  The Indian Patent Act (IPA) 
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reinforces such provisions of the IBA, requiring 
applicants to disclose information on the source 
of origin of biological resources and knowledge 
(Utkarsh, 2002).  Patenting of any innovation 
resembling traditional knowledge is prohibited 
and biodiversity registers, such as PBRs, can 
serve as evidence of such prior knowledge.
The IPA has undergone various amendments 
to provide protection on traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources. Section 
3(p) of the IPA expressly states that traditional 
knowledge is not an invention in an effort to 
prevent patenting of traditional knowledge in 
India. A further provision was added, providing 
that the knowledge available within local and 
indigenous communities, oral or otherwise, and 
within India or elsewhere, will be treated as prior 
art (IPA, S25&64).  By expressly noting that oral 
knowledge within communities is recognised as 
prior art, the government seeks to ensure that the 
largely undocumented knowledge of Indian local 
and indigenous communities cannot be patented.
A further amendment to the IPA concerns 
disclosure.  The provision obligates the 
applicant to disclose details of the source and 
geographical origin of the biological material in 
the specification in order to determine whether 
traditional knowledge was used in inventions 
related to generic resources.  The requirement 
in S10 for technical details to be included in the 
specifications of the patent application arguably 
necessitates the inclusion of the person or 
institution from whom the material is obtained 
and the details of the information regarding the 
material, including the details of the traditional 
knowledge associated with the material and its 
holder.  Furthermore, the IPA explicitly states 
that the patent application can be opposed or 
revoked if the information provided is erroneous 
or omits certain details.
However, there is no obligation on the 
patent applicant (for inventions based on 
traditional knowledge) to obtain PIC to use 
the traditional knowledge or share the benefits 
derived out of such use before filing a patent 
application. Section 6 of the IBA makes it 
obligatory for the patent applicant to obtain PIC 
from the NBA for an invention based on genetic 
materials of Indian origin.  Failure to obtain PIC 
or satisfy the conditions stipulated in the PIC is 
actionable under the act.  Although the obligation 
exists to obtain PIC, failure to obtain PIC has no 
impact on the grant of patent or enjoyment of the 
patent rights.  While the obligation for a patent 
applicant to obtain PIC exists in legislation, there 
are no obligations under IBA or IPA to produce 
evidence that PIC has been obtained prior to the 
grant of patent, nor are there provisions to oppose 
or revoke the patent once issued for failure to 
obtain or satisfy the conditions of PIC.  The 
failure to include enforcement mechanisms in 
the legislation renders the provision meaningless 
(Gopalakrishnan, 2005) in preventing an 
applicant from utilising traditional knowledge in 
a patented invention without due recognition of 
the holder of the traditional knowledge.
However, unlike India, Malaysia does not 
have a provision in the MPA obligating the 
applicant to disclose details of the source and 
geographical origin of the biological material 
or traditional knowledge used in the patent 
specification.  Furthermore, the MPA does 
not contain provisions explicitly recognising 
TKD as evidence of prior art or that traditional 
knowledge does not qualify as a patentable 
invention. Malaysia has no other law that 
regulates the use and promotes protection of 
traditional knowledge.  Although Malaysia is 
legally bound to incorporate into the national 
policy the set of commitments under the 
convention following its ratification of the CBD 
in 1994, Malaysia has not yet enacted national 
access and benefit-sharing (ABS) legislation 
regulating access to biological resources.
Limited legislation exists in the states of 
Sabah and Sarawak, that have enacted the Sabah 
Biodiversity Enactment 2000 and Sarawak 
Biodiversity Centre Ordinance 1997 (Kate & 
Wells, 1998; Osman, 2001) respectively, but 
broader reaching national measures have not 
yet been implemented.  The process to develop 
national ABS legislation began in 1994 and 
culminated in the adoption of the final text of 
the first draft Access to Genetic Resources Bill 
(AGR Bill) by the Task Force on Access to 
Genetic Resources in October 1999 (Carrizosa 
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et al., 2004).  However, there has been no further 
progress regarding the ABS legislation since 
the adoption of the draft bill over a decade ago. 
If PBRs were established in Malaysia, such 
databases would prove ineffective since the 
existing legislation fails to recognise traditional 
knowledge as prior art and no mechanism 
exists to guarantee benefit-sharing on the basis 
of the use of traditional knowledge.  Due to 
significant distinctions between relevant Indian 
and Malaysian legislative acts, the use of TKD as 
an interim tool to protect traditional knowledge 
in Malaysia would lack effective legal effect in 
practice in Malaysia.
STATUS OF COLLECTIVE 
KNOWLEDGE 
Another relevant issue related to TKD is the 
claim to rights over knowledge vis a vis collective 
rights of the traditional knowledge.  The issue 
is important since most traditional knowledge is 
considered to be held by the whole community 
or a group of individuals.  Thus, all members 
of such community or group are considered the 
owners or holders of the knowledge, retaining 
collective rights, rather than individual rights, 
over such knowledge.  In order to adequately 
protect collective rights, distinct models from 
those already presented may have to be utilised. 
Although legal propositions have been made, 
no legal norm has been implemented.  The most 
debated proposition is the creation of a national 
register of either traditional knowledge or plants 
belonging to everyone involved in the use and 
conservation of traditional knowledge or plants, 
registered or not, and could be conceded to the 
local community, or tribe, in a generic manner. 
The community would then be the owner of 
a modality of IPR. All community members 
would have the right to exploit such knowledge 
according to their traditions.
Costa Rican law establishes community 
rights, providing protections regarding 
inventoried existing knowledge of each 
community.  The existing IPR system also 
does not apply to community rights as it is not 
possible to identify an individual inventor due to 
the collective nature of indigenous knowledge. 
Though idealistic (the cost of such a complete 
inventory makes it unrealistic), the legal system 
has demonstrated flexibility and an openness 
to adapt to difficult issues.  A problem that is 
left unresolved, however, is the situation where 
two distinct groups hold identical knowledge, 
as dual ownership is not permitted.  From an 
anthropological point of view, it is completely 
possible that two different communities utilize a 
plant in the same way or use the same methods 
to conserve a natural space.  In the context of 
multiple indigenous peoples with credible claim 
to traditional knowledge, the issue arises on 
which party should be entitled to give consent. 
According to Vandana Shiva, a moratorium 
on access to traditional knowledge should be 
declared until this issue is resolved (Tobin, 
1997).
In Malaysia, the draft AGR Bill (Carrizosa 
et al., 2004) provides the exclusion of three 
contentious issues.  One of the issue concerns 
the collective rights of the indigenous peoples. 
The establishment of a system of community 
intellectual rights for the purpose of the 
recognition of ownership rights of communities 
over their knowledge and innovations, the 
protection of the communities’ knowledge and 
innovations, and for ensuring the equitable 
benefit-sharing is channelled back to the 
communities (Carrizosa et al., 2004).  As a 
result, the indigenous communities in Malaysia 
are responsible for the setting up of a collection 
system and registration of traditional knowledge 
and innovations, establishing technical 
institutions, and registering indigenous and 
local communities’ organisations themselves. 
It will not be the responsibility of the national 
competent authority that shall be established 
under the proposed law.  Unlike the position in 
Sarawak, for Peninsula Malaysia, the Federal 
government has rejected any responsibilities 
towards management of communities’ traditional 
knowledge.  This position will leave the 
communities with insufficient skills and the 
appropriate financial resources in managing 
their knowledge.
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TKD: CRITIQUE AND LESSON 
Contemporarily, debates exist as to whether 
TKD should be published or maintained in a 
state of secrecy.  A prominent argument is that 
traditional knowledge can best be protected, 
both from erosion and biopiracy, i.e. through 
publicity but not secrecy.  Unique knowledge 
may best be fully registered through refereed 
databases, while PBRs make claims to such 
knowledge, alongside public domain knowledge 
and resources (Utkarsh, 2002).
On the other hand, unlimited and unrestricted 
accessibility to this documentation leads critics 
to question whether TKD would effectively 
prevent biopiracy or facilitate biopiracy and the 
further exploitation of traditional knowledge. 
While many indigenous people have made 
their traditional knowledge available to the 
public in an attempt to protect their traditional 
knowledge, concerns, based upon both cultural 
and economic arguments, have been raised that 
such acts have left the indigenous peoples open 
to exploitation.  A report entitled, “The Role of 
Registers and Databases in the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge” was prepared by the 
United Nations’ expert Brendan Tobin, who 
argues that “obliging indigenous peoples to offer 
public documentation of traditional knowledge 
for intellectual property protection purposes is 
insensitive to cultural practice in many places 
and may lead to injustice”.  Tobin’s argument is 
principally concerned with the refusal of patent 
offices to accept oral evidence and the scrutiny 
of evidence of prior art by personnel in the patent 
offices (Kirby, 2004).
Tobin argues that legal systems should 
be able to prevent the piracy of traditional 
knowledge without jeopardizing the cultural 
integrity and ways of the indigenous peoples. 
For example, while Inuit communities maintain 
a very high level of secrecy, the government 
officials are allowed confidential access to 
their traditional knowledge.  At the same time, 
international law should be amended to provide 
oral evidence of traditional knowledge in 
confidence and access to confidential databases 
should be restricted.  While registers and 
databases developed and held by the indigenous 
peoples’ groups, museums, botanical gardens 
and universities are essential for protecting 
traditional knowledge (Kirby, 2004), as the 
existing institutions lack a common code of 
conduct such as an obligation for the explicit 
acceptance of the rights of the indigenous 
peoples over their knowledge a pre-condition 
to the access of such information.
Economically, some view that by putting 
the information on public domain would actually 
facilitate biopiracy, since the existing IPR law 
is inadequate to detect biopiracy; and ensure 
patents granted are genuine and not based on 
the existing knowledge (Barsh, 2001).  Further 
arguments suggest academic publications 
focussed upon indigenous knowledge make 
indigenous medical knowledge readily 
accessible in the public domain, in turn posing 
a greater threat to biopiracy of the indigenous 
knowledge than the patent system.  Using 
statistical evidence, Barsh (2001) showed that 
few patents derived directly from indigenous 
medical or ecological background.  On the other 
hand, most patents with origins in indigenous 
knowledge were inspired by data or information 
readily available in the public domain (Barsh, 
2001).  Therefore, according to Barsh’s study, 
TKD will only facilitate biopiracy, thus should 
not be encouraged.
Others argue that indigenous peoples should 
be pragmatic and cautious of the government’s 
real intention in such projects, as the recognition 
of TKD should not be linked to decision-making 
processes on benefit-sharing and other issues 
related to traditional knowledge.  Contemporary 
government initiatives are often viewed as token 
gestures attempting to accommodate traditional 
knowledge within biased IPR systems, rather 
than a means to guarantee collective rights to 
such communities (Barsh, 2001).  The argument 
closely follows Michael Dove’s argument 
that the politico-economic elites of a state 
will ultimately be the beneficiaries of such 
initiatives.  Issues concerning the protection of 
the indigenous knowledge should be resolved 
by the state, through the creation, modification 
and implementation of national laws concerning 
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traditional knowledge and genetic resources. 
Further arguments have been put forward 
stating that in order to protect the traditional 
knowledge, innovations and practices of the 
indigenous peoples’, one has to protect their 
right to land (Sharom, 2006).  The indigenous 
peoples’ resources and knowledge are closely 
associated to their land, so if the land rights 
are not protected, than neither are the resource 
rights.  Therefore, the indigenous knowledge 
associated with resources that are not protected 
is also not being protected.
The Filipino government has made a sincere 
effort to empower indigenous communities by 
recognising their rights over their ancestral 
land in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. 
Similarly, the Indian Constitution recognises 
the decision-making power of village bodies 
(Panchayats) on biological resources.  Therefore 
in India, not only their resources and knowledge 
are protected, their autonomy and self-
determination is also receiving due recognition 
by the government.  Further, national law should 
recognise indigenous peoples as negotiation 
partners to be heard in consultations.  The ability 
to negotiate on their own and their possession 
of lands are pre-conditions for empowerment, 
which is a crucial element for managing their 
knowledge and resources efficiently.
Finally, the TKD project requires new 
technical skills and adequate financial resources. 
Most communities possessing traditional 
knowledge are marginalised, living in a state of 
extreme poverty.  Thus, an efficient TKD project 
requires collaboration between the respective 
indigenous communities and the initiator (state 
government). Ultimately the success of this 
project will require the state government to 
provide its full commitment in the provision 
of adequate and continuous resources, required 
skills and freedom of the indigenous people 
in deciding; (i) whether to participate in the 
project; (ii) the rationale of this project; and 
(iii) the preservation of the document according 
to the respective lifestyle and tradition of the 
indigenous communities.
TKD PROGRAMME BY  
SARAWAK AUTHORITY
Sarawak is the first state in Malaysia that 
formulated laws regulating ABS, namely the 
Sarawak Biodiversity Centre Ordinance 1997 
and Sarawak Biodiversity Regulation 2004. 
Despite the criticisms and lack of clarity on the 
status of TKD at the international level, Sarawak 
established a local TKD agency, the Sarawak 
Biodiversity Centre (SBC), in 1998.  The SBC 
maintains a library of extracts of biological 
resources collected; undertakes studies, research 
and documentation of traditional knowledge use 
of biological resources by native communities in 
the state; and provides the facilities for screening 
of bioactive compounds.  The SBC also facilitates 
the TKD of communities’ use of biodiversity; and 
the development of biodiversity-biotechnology 
databases for Sarawak. Other functions of 
the SBC include the regulation biodiversity 
research in Sarawak through the use of a research 
permit system and research agreement scheme 
(Chua & Yen, 2000), and the implementation 
of bioprospecting programmes on Sarawak’s 
indigenous biodiversity (Nordin, 2008).
The main objective of the TKD programme 
carried out by the SBC is to facilitate the 
indigenous peoples (natives) in the state in 
preserving their traditional knowledge through 
proper recording or documentation techniques. 
The SBC’s efforts regarding this have included 
capacity building workshops to provide the 
indigenous communities with the necessary 
skills, such as documentation techniques, 
propagation and management of useful 
indigenous plants (SBC, 2011).  The programme 
was introduced in 2001 which involved 12 
ethnic groups in 25 locations.  SBC has begun 
its own pilot project in compiling a log of 
medical knowledge among the Bidayuh Dayaks. 
The communities that opted to document their 
traditional knowledge are free to keep the data 
to themselves, while possessing information that 
serves as a basis for claims, financial rewards, 
or other future benefits.  The immediate benefit 
is that such communities have documented 
and preserved their traditional knowledge for 
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future generations (Chalmers, 2001).  Similar 
to the Indian PBRs, SBC’s documentation 
project is participatory in nature.  However, 
while the Indian PBRs are published as prior 
art information, the SBC’s documentation 
is currently maintained in secrecy.  While 
the objective of the SBC’s TKD project is to 
facilitate the preservation and protection of the 
indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge, it 
is not clear whether the documentation project 
will be converted into databases that contain 
information on prior art in a fashion similar to 
the Indian PBRs.  However, the Patent Unit, 
MyIPO Malaysia is currently working on the 
establishment of the TKD databases.
The SBC’s documentation project has in 
2006 prompted the United Nations Development 
Programme Global Environment Fund to 
nominate the SBC as a centre of excellence for 
TKD for the Asia Pacific Region (Star, 2006). 
SBC stated that there were two reasons for 
documenting traditional knowledge: “firstly, it is 
our heritage for future generations and secondly, 
it is for the sharing of knowledge for mutual 
gain.”  What was not clear from the statement 
was whether the TKD agency was to serve as a 
means for the indigenous communities to pass 
traditional knowledge on to future generations 
or whether they perceived it as a potential tool 
for commercialisation.  This is very crucial 
because as a facilitator, the SBC should allow 
the communities to decide the rationale for 
the documentation.  For many communities, 
it is imperative to ensure that their traditional 
knowledge are preserved and respected, rather 
than  to obtain monetary compensation or profit. 
While it may be said that they are ignorant of the 
potential monetary value of their knowledge, 
the decision by the communities have to be 
respected.
The SBC has also confirmed that almost 90 
percent of researches in the SBC’s laboratory are 
guided by traditional knowledge.  As in 2006, 
“SBC has collected more than 1,500 plants 
from a dozen ethnic communities in 27 villages 
and they have performed bioassays on nearly 
200-plus plants and more than 35 percent have 
shown good activity against cancer cell lines 
when tested” (Star, 2006).  The centre further 
views that they should assign the rights back 
to the communities.  In this respect, it may 
be assumed that the approach to traditional 
knowledge used by SBC was premised upon 
contemporary notions concerning the PIC of 
the respective communities.  The process, 
however, has raised concerns about the potential 
commercialisation of traditional knowledge 
related to bioprospecting.
Part VI of the Sarawak Biodiversity 
Regulations 2004 provides that no person shall 
undertake ethnobiological research except with 
a permit issued by the council and the permit 
holder shall sign a research agreement with the 
Sarawak government.  Further, the permit holder 
may be required to make payment to the natives 
as rewards for the knowledge or information 
provided in connection with the ethnobiological 
research, regardless of whether the research 
results in commercial development of any 
medicinal or other products.  If the research leads 
to commercial development, the patent or IPR 
shall be shared with the natives who supplied the 
knowledge or information.
The precise role of the SBC in relation to 
ethnobiological research, however, is not clear. 
As a multi-tasking agency, the SBC functions 
as: (i) a facilitator of the TKD; (ii) an end 
user of such knowledge (bioprospector); and 
(iii) a regulator which exercises its regulatory 
function via research permit system and research 
agreement scheme.  As a result, the SBC’s 
functions seem to overlap and it is unclear 
whether the SBC requires the explicit permission 
of the Sarawak Biodiversity Council and 
the Sarawak government when it conducts 
ethnobiological research.  If permission is 
required, the SBC is obligated to get a permit 
from the Sarawak Biodiversity Council as a 
bioprospector sign a research agreement with 
the Sarawak government, which is normally 
represented by the SBC for the conclusion of 
such agreements.  A subsequent issue which 
would then need to be resolved is whether 
the SBC is required to make payments to the 
communities affected by its ethnobiological 
research activities as required by the provisions, 
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as well as what form the benefit-sharing.  The 
final issue is whether SBC makes payment to the 
respective natives for the use of the knowledge 
as required by the provision and in what manner 
and form the benefit-sharing shall take place 
(benefit-sharing mechanism).
In short, the activities and issues associated 
with the SBC could serve as further fuel 
for debates regarding the effectiveness of 
the TKD projects, such as databases and 
libraries, in safeguarding traditional knowledge 
against biopiracy or exploitation by politico-
economic elites in power in the state government 
(Kalpavriksh, 2002).  Therefore, the SBC’s TKD 
initiative may be seen as the successful means of 
protecting and preserving traditional knowledge 
only if the above issues are resolved accordingly.
CONCLUSION
It is important to stress that the IPR regime does 
not protect traditional knowledge via patents. 
It should prevent the potential exploitation of 
traditional knowledge that arises when traditional 
knowledge is used in inventions without the 
owner(s) of such knowledge receiving any 
benefits/profits from the commercialisation 
of such knowledge.  However, the existing 
legal framework in the CBD and TRIPS 
Agreement do not provide adequate protection 
for the indigenous peoples’ rights on their 
resources and knowledge.  Many communities 
now have been influenced or encouraged to 
document their resources and knowledge so 
that the documentation of their traditional 
knowledge may serve as a tool to prevent future 
misappropriation of their knowledge, as well 
as an effort to ensure benefit-sharing in the 
event the knowledge is used for research.  The 
communities also believe that the documentation 
of traditional knowledge is as a mean to preserve 
the knowledge for future generations.  For these 
reasons, parties like national/state governments, 
private entities and NGOs have initiated such 
projects all over the world.
On the other hand, local communities and 
indigenous peoples (the traditional knowledge 
holders) often find themselves disagree with 
their governments because of the fundamental 
difference in their perception of traditional 
knowledge and the need for its protection.  By 
and large local communities and indigenous 
peoples are averse to the privatisation of 
traditional knowledge, while interested parties 
and the government themselves are interested in 
the commercialisation of such knowledge.  As a 
result, the government initiatives are often seen 
as adversarial on issues related to the protection 
of traditional knowledge, rather than efforts  to 
protect the interests of the communities affected.
Though the rationales of the documentation 
projects differ between the PBRs in India and 
the one in Sarawak, both countries should tackle 
this issue from a bigger perspective.  This can 
be done by recognising the indigenous peoples’ 
rights to property and self-determination. 
Without these recognitions, TKD projects, 
especially those initiated by the state government 
and private collaborators, shall continue to 
be seen as opportunities to further exploit 
the already marginalised indigenous peoples’ 
resources and knowledge.  The owner of any 
TKD projects should model its programmes and 
initiatives based on the lessons from the models 
put forward in practice in India in an effort to 
avoid the stigma associated with the other state 
initiated efforts elsewhere in the world.
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INTRODUCTION
A basic definition of contempt of court can be 
when a legal persona (be it a natural person 
or a company) interferes, by act or omission, 
with the administration of justice.  This may 
be committed by anyone, anywhere, and in 
any context.  It is a power given to every court, 
expressly by statute, or through the inherent 
jurisdiction of courts.  In the context of the 
Malaysian Court, contempt can occur both in the 
civil courts as well as the Syari’ah Courts.  It is 
instructive to refer to Common Law in tracing 
the history of contempt of court.  Contempt 
of Court is capable of great diversity of form 
and in fact, the many forms of contempt have 
unnecessarily complicated the understanding of 
this judicial power.
Bhag Singh (2007) wrote that defining 
‘contempt of court’ continues to be an issue of 
current concern.  There are many definitions 
of this concept, but the versatility of its forms 
makes it difficult to encompass all these forms 
into a single definition, other than a broad one. 
A definition that is quite specific may neglect 
to include the full scope of the various forms, 
and a definition that is quite broad may only 
provide a general idea of the concept, but be 
lacking in specific details.  The law on the 
contempt of court has a rich history, stemming 
from the United Kingdom from centuries ago, 
and extending to a number of the country’s 
former colonies, many of which, still have such 
laws based on the same source.  In the United 
Kingdom, this can historically be traced to 
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the auspices of the King and the courts as His 
channel of justice.  V.R. Krishna Iyer (2002) 
wrote, “this branch of vintage jurisprudence 
is of Anglo-Saxon heritage and regal mintage, 
the King being the fountain of justice and the 
Judges lions under the throne…”  Steve Shim 
CJ of the Malaysian Federal Court in Zainur 
bin Zakaria v. Public Prosecutor observed that 
contempt of court is a “… means whereby the 
courts may act to prevent or punish conduct 
which tends to obstruct, prejudice or abuse the 
administration of justice either in relation to a 
particular case or generally.”  This highlights 
the important dual perspective that a judge has 
to often be mindful of, that of ensuring a smooth 
and fair process in the case before the court at 
the time, but also giving a warning to others 
about what is expected of them in the conduct 
of a trial generally as illustrated by the courts’ 
using contempt of court to hold accountable 
various parties in a case for improper conduct, 
from lawyers and their clients failing to attend 
trial without a valid excuse, such as in Lai 
Cheng Chong v. Public Prosecutor; litigants not 
fulfilling the terms of court orders expeditiously 
as in Hardial Singh Sekhon v.PP; witnesses 
giving false testimony, as in Jaginder Singh & 
Ors. v. Attorney-General; and members of the 
audience disrupting the proceedings, as in Public 
Prosecutor v. Lee Ah Keh & Ors.  A great deal is 
expected of a judge, perhaps too much.  C.K.G. 
Pillay (1985) wrote that a judicial officer’s 
life is by no means easy because too much is 
expected of him.  Whether such expectations 
are fair or not, judges too are subject to scrutiny 
regarding their professional behaviour.  Judicial 
decisions and comments are often reported and 
highlighted by the media.  Therefore, judicial 
remarks can affect the public’s regard and 
respect for the legal system.  Since the law on 
the contempt of court is intended to uphold the 
integrity of the legal system, judges exercising 
this power should be all the more concerned 
that their decisions and comments in such cases 
do not invite public ridicule.  Another common 
description of the contempt of court is that it is 
intended to ‘protect’ the administration of justice 
such as so described by Balia Yusof Wahi J. of 
the High Court in Perbadanan Pembangunan 
Pulau Pinang v. Tropiland Sdn. Bhd. that “the 
court has an inherent jurisdiction to ensure the 
due administration of justice and to protect the 
integrity of the judicial process…”  Lowe and 
Sufrin (1996) wrote that contempt of court plays 
“…a key role in protecting the administration of 
justice”, whereas Rashid (2002) says that “the 
law of contempt of court plays a key role in 
protecting the administration of justice.”
Is lam recognises  offences  re la ted 
to contempt of court.  Since courts are the 
mechanism for dispensing justice, Islam requires 
respect towards the judiciary which implements 
justice according to the Islamic law.  Allah SWT 
says in Surah Al-A’Raaf, verse 3, “follow what 
has been revealed to you from your Lord and 
do not follow guardians besides Him how little 
do you mind.”  Thus, disobeying the Prophet 
SAW could be regarded as a contempt against 
the judicial authority.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are not many writings on the contempt 
of court in Syari’ah Court in Malaysia.   Basir 
Mohammad (2005) discussed the definition of 
contempt of court, the history of contempt in 
Islam, the contempt of the Syari’ah Court, the 
suitability of contempt of court with Islamic 
law and the various forms of contempt of court. 
The word ‘contempt’ in Arabic means ihtiqar, 
imtihan, intihak hurmah, istirdhal and qillat 
al-ihtiram.  All those words when combined 
together (intihak al-mahkamah, ihtihar al-
mahkamah and imtihan al-mahkamah) carry 
the same meaning, i.e. the contempt of court. 
Contempt of court is defined as any act which 
can be construed as ridiculing or weakening 
the process of the court or disobeying the court 
order.  According to him, the contempt of court 
(intihak al-mahkamah) can be divided into two 
categories, i.e. direct (mubashir) and indirect 
(ghayr al-musabshir).  The direct contempt is 
an act of contempt committed in the court or 
before the judge presiding in court.  A similar 
contempt also refers to refusal to be a witness. 
It may include disobeying the court’s order. 
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An indirect contempt of court (intihak al-
mahkamah al-ghayr al-mubashir) refers to an 
act of contempt outside the court premises and 
not seen by the judge.  
Basir outlines six forms of contempt of court 
as follows: (i) refusal to attend court trial, (ii) 
making false charges, (iii) refusal to be a witness, 
(iv) giving false testimony, (v) making false 
oath and (vi) defaming a judge.  Meanwhile, 
A. Mukhti (2007) examined contempt of court 
in the Syari’ah courts, although the author also 
compared this particular law as it applies to 
civil courts as well.  In more specific, the author 
examined the Malaysian authorities; about 11 
Malaysian cases and 11 Malaysian statutes 
related to the Syari’ah statutes applying to the 
federal territories and the state of Selangor.  This 
presents an instructive review of the contempt 
of law in the civil and the Syari’ah courts. 
Mukhti also analysed the concept of contempt 
of the Syari’ah Court in the context of the al-
maqasid al-Syari’ah.  Al-maqasid al-Syari’ah 
is the primary objective of the Shari’ah in the 
realization of benefit to the people, concerning to 
their affairs both in this world and the hereafter. 
It is generally held that the Shari’ah in all of its 
parts aims at securing a benefit for the people 
or protecting them against corruption and evil. 
Thus, contempt of court was viewed from the 
principle of maqasid al-Syari’ah, in which 
the ultimate purpose is to achieve respect and 
adherence to the judicial authority.  Similarly, 
N. Yaakub (2000) discussed contempt of court in 
the Syari’ah Court and its effects on journalists. 
The article focuses more on the threat of 
contempt which could befall on journalists while 
carrying out their work.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology chosen for this article 
is doctrinal research.  A.A. Razak (2009) defines 
this particular research methodology in the 
following way; “doctrinal research asks what 
the law is on a particular issue.  It is concerned 
with analysis of the legal doctrine and how it has 
been developed and applied.”  What is attempted 
is a thorough examination of the current law on 
the contempt of court in Malaysia, as evidenced 
from statutory provisions and judicial principles. 
This is typical of the doctrinal research as 
commented by Hutchinson who writes that 
doctrinal research is library research based on 
primary materials - the actual sources of the 
law (legislation and case law), and secondary 
materials - including commentaries on the law 
(from textbooks and legal journals) (Hutchinson, 
2002).  Chynoweth (2009) similarly writes 
that “the methods of doctrinal research are 
characterised by the study of legal texts and, 
for this reason, it is often described colloquially 
as ‘black-letter law’”. This detailed review of 
existing law will then be used as a platform 
to consider proposals for reform.  The Pearce 
Committee labels this part as reform-oriented 
research.”  This is described as “research which 
intensively evaluates the adequacy of existing 
rules and which recommends changes to any 
rules found wanting” (Pearce et al., 1987).  In 
short, the academic legal writing is based on 
the analysis of law on a given problem which 
this article has adopted.  The authors relied 
heavily on the various States’ enactments 
which contained provisions on the contempt of 
court and analyse them accordingly.  The cases 
of the Syari’ah Courts that pertained to the 
contempt of court are also referred to in order 
to examine the approaches adopted by the courts 
in dealing with such offences.  This review is 
intended to highlight that while many statutes 
and some cases have specific provisions for the 
contempt of court before the Syariah courts in 
the territories and states, there are still a number 
of uncertain and inconsistent issues in the law 
of contempt of court before the Syariah courts.
LEGAL ANALYSIS STATUTORY 
PROVISION OF CONTEMPT POWER
The Syari’ah courts’ power to punish for 
contempt seems to have been expressly provided 
by statutes in all the territories and states (Farid, 
2003).  All the Syari’ah courts have been given 
the power to generally punish for contempt, 
except in the state of Sabah, although even in this 
State, as will be discussed below, the power to 
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punish for specific categories of contempt have 
been provided.  This general power, however, 
has been granted in slightly different words. 
The Syari’ah courts in the Federal Territories of 
Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and Labuan (1998), 
the States of Kelantan (2002), Pahang (2002), 
Selangor (2003), Terengganu (2001), Malacca 
(2002), Penang (1999), Perak (2004), Perlis 
(2006), Negeri Sembilan (2003) and Sarawak 
(2001) have the jurisdiction to commence 
proceedings against any person for the contempt 
of court.  The Syari’ah courts in the State of 
Johor (1993) shall have the power to punish 
any contempt of itself, while each Syari’ah 
court in the State of Kedah (1993) has the 
power to impose a penalty for any act, omission 
or conduct that is deemed to be a contempt of 
court.  Strangely in the State of Sabah (1993), 
there is a corresponding statute, but it does not 
seem to be a corresponding provision on this 
particular issue.
Considering that the express statutory power 
to punish for contempt is less consistently given 
to the civil courts, it is surprising why this issue 
seems to have been so consistently recognised 
by the State authorities for the Syari’ah courts. 
Having statutes providing rules of procedure for 
cases before the Syariah courts of every territory 
and state does not fully explain why the power 
of contempt is so consistently included as rules 
of procedure have been provided for many non-
Syari’ah courts such as the Special Court, Court 
for Children and Labour Court without including 
a contempt power for these courts.  Yet, the 
contempt power seems to have been specifically 
included in these statutory rules of procedure for 
all the Syari’ah courts.
CATEGORIES OF CONTEMPT 
IN STATUTES INCONSISTENTLY 
SPECIFIED, DEFINED AND 
PUNISHABLE
There are specific categories of contempt of 
court before the Syari’ah courts specified in the 
relevant statutes, though these categories are not 
consistently specified in terms of the categories 
themselves, how the categories are defined 
and to what extent a party can be punished for 
committing these categories of contempt.  In 
particular, there are four categories specified 
in these statutes.  The first category specified is 
the contempt of a court order.  This category is 
specified for the Syari’ah courts in the territories 
and all the states, except for the states of Pahang, 
Malacca, Perak, and Perlis.  This appears to be 
a common category of contempt specified, yet 
has been defined differently, with quite different 
maximum sentences provided.  For the Syari’ah 
courts in the federal territories of Kuala Lumpur, 
Putrajaya and Labuan (S.10, 1997), the states of 
Terengganu (S.11, 2001), Penang (S.10, 1996), 
Johor (S.10, 1997) and Sarawak (S.10, 2001), 
this category is defined as any person who defies, 
disobeys, disputes, degrades or brings into 
contempt any court order and is punishable with 
a fine not exceeding RM3,000, an imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 2 years, or both. 
Yet, in the state of Sabah (S.104, 1995), this 
category refers to any person who disobeys, 
opposes, disputes, disgraces, humiliates or 
refuses to comply with any court order and is 
punishable with a fine not exceeding RM1,000, 
an imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 
months, or both.
This category for the Syari’ah courts in 
the states of Kelantan (S.31, 1985) and Kedah 
(S.31, 1998) is defined as any person who 
fails to comply with, contravenes, objects to, 
derides or refuses to obey a court order and is 
punishable with a fine not exceeding RM1,000, 
an imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 
year, or both.  Yet, in the state of Selangor 
(S.15, 1995), this category relates to any person 
who defies, disobeys, degrades or brings into 
contempt a court order and is punishable with a 
fine not exceeding RM3,000, an imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 2 years, or both.  This 
particular category is defined in the most detailed 
for the state of Negeri Sembilan (S.109, 1992). 
Here, this category involves any person who 
knowingly disobeys an order promulgated by 
a public servant lawfully empowered to do so 
directing him to abstain from a certain act or 
to take a certain order with certain property in 
his possession or under his management.  If 
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the disobedience causes or tends to cause (or 
risks causing) any obstruction, annoyance, 
injury to any person lawfully employed, this is 
punishable with a fine not exceeding RM500, an 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months, 
or both.  If the disobedience instead causes or 
tends to cause danger to human life, health or 
safety, a riot or affray, it shall be punishable with 
a fine not exceeding RM1,000, an imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 6 months, or both.  
It should be noted that these definitions are 
broader than just failing to fulfil a court’s order, 
which is the most common form of contempt 
appearing in the civil courts.  It is unclear why 
the scope of the this category of contempt is 
much broader than its counterpart before the 
civil courts, or why this category is so commonly 
specified for the Syari’ah courts, yet defined 
in such different terms and the same category 
being punishable to such a different extent, 
ranging from a fine of RM500 to RM3,000 and 
an imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 
months to 2 years.  The civil courts have different 
sentencing limits for contempt, which are 
according to the level of court, not to the specific 
category of contempt, as appears to be the case 
for contempt of court before the Syari’ah courts.
The second category of contempt specified 
for the Syari’ah courts is contempt of law.  This 
category is specified for the Syari’ah courts in 
the territories and states, except for the states 
of Pahang, Malacca, Perak and Perlis.  This 
particular category is also variously defined and 
punishable under the Syariah criminal offences 
statutes ranging from RM1,000 to RM5,000 
and an imprisonment for a maximum of 6 
months to 3 years.  For the Syari’ah courts in the 
Federal territories of Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya 
and Labuan (S.7(c)), the states of Terengganu 
(S.8(c)), Penang (S.7(c)), Johor (S.7(c)) and 
Sarawak (S.7(c)), this category refers to any 
person who orally, in writing, by visible 
representation or in any other manner degrades 
or brings into contempt any binding law related 
to the religion of Islam and is punishable with a 
fine not exceeding RM3,000, an imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 2 years, or both.  Yet, in 
the states of Kelantan (S.28) and Kedah (S.28), 
this category relates to any person who derides or 
despises any binding law and is  punishable with 
a fine not exceeding RM1,000, an imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 6 months, or both.
In the state of Selangor (S.10(c)), this 
category is where any person who, by words that 
are capable of being heard or read, by drawings, 
marks or other forms of representation that are 
visible or capable of being visible, or in any 
other manner degrades or brings into contempt 
any binding law related to the religion of Islam 
in this state.  This category is punishable with a 
fine not exceeding RM5,000, an imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 3 years, or both.  In the 
state of Negeri Sembilan, this category involves 
any person who, by spoken or written words, 
signs, visible representations, by any act, activity 
or conduct or otherwise in any other manner 
(insults or puts into contempt) any fatwa legally 
issued by the Mufti under the Administration of 
the Islamic Law (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 
1991.  Those penalized under this category is 
punishable with a fine not exceeding RM5,000, 
an imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
3 years, or both.  In the state of Sabah, this 
category is where any person who, by spoken or 
written words, visible representation or in any 
other manner insults or brings into contempt or 
ridicule any lawfully issued fatwa by the Majlis 
or the Mufti under the provisions of any law or 
this Enactment.  This category is punishable with 
a fine not exceeding RM2,000, an imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 1 year, or both.
This category is inconsistently defined and 
punishable between the Syari’ah courts in the 
territories and states, not typically recognised 
in statutes or cases involving the contempt of 
court in the civil courts, and inconsistently 
punishable with contempt of a court order 
before the Syari’ah courts.  The third category 
of contempt specified before the Syari’ah court 
appears to be acting or taking proceedings on 
behalf of another without lawful authority. 
This category relates to any person doing any 
act or taking any proceedings in the name or on 
behalf of another person, knowing himself not 
to be lawfully authorised by that person to do 
so, shall be guilty of contempt of court.  This 
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category is specified for the Syari’ah courts in 
all the territories and states, except for the states 
of Kedah and Sabah.  This category appears to 
be quite consistently defined, but no maximum 
punishment is specified.  It is unclear why this 
category is similarly common as contempt of 
a court order and contempt of law before the 
Syari’ah courts, yet unlike these categories, more 
consistently defined and without a maximum 
punishment specified for this category of 
contempt.  This category is also not typical of 
the statutes and cases for civil courts.
The fourth category of contempt specified 
before the Syari’ah courts relates to the contempt 
of a court officer.  However, the only state that 
seems to have a specific provision on this issue 
is the state of Sabah.  This particular category is 
defined as any person who denies, goes against, 
opposes or derides the lawful authority of any 
officials of any court and is punishable with a 
fine not exceeding RM1,000, an imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 6 months, or both. 
This category is not commonly specified for 
the Syari’ah courts, and limited to officials of 
any court, which is not clear if it extends to 
Official Assignees and Receiver/Manager as 
in the contempt cases before the civil courts, 
and although the State authorities recognise 
this particular category of contempt as being 
sufficiently significant to specifically provide for, 
but not deserving of a particularly harsh sentence 
limit.  The categories of contempt specified for the 
Syari’ah courts do not appear to be consistently 
provided, defined or punishable between the 
Syari’ah courts of different territories and states, 
and in comparison to the contempt cases before 
the civil courts.  It is also unclear why these 
categories have been specifically provided by 
statute when, as courts, Syari’ah courts would 
also arguably have the inherent discretion to 
punish any form of contempt.  These inconsistent 
patterns do not seem to have been explained in 
any judicial or academic forum.  Perhaps, they 
indicate different priorities and a lack of cross-
referencing between the state authorities drafting 
such legislation.
In a more general perspective, not limited 
to the Syari’ah courts in specific states or 
categories, the Syariah Judiciary Department 
issued Practice Direction No. 13 of 2004 
regarding contempt of court outside of Syariah 
Courts.  In this document, it is stated that 
contempt of court outside of the Syari’ah court 
includes a refusal to comply with any order 
issued by the Syari’ah Court or the issuance 
of a statement by any person or body or an 
association or an organization either orally or 
in writing that makes a mockery of the Syari’ah 
Court.  Contempt proceedings outside the Court 
may be initiated by either a Syari’ah Prosecutor 
or any interested person.  The court shall hear the 
application to register contempt of court under 
the provided law.  If the Court is satisfied that the 
person who commits contempt of court should 
be imprisoned, an order of committal to imprison 
on the offender shall be imposed on him until 
he apologizes unconditionally to the Court and 
others who have interests.  These provisions 
appear to give some categories ‘included’ in 
contempt of court, but still allow other categories 
to be recognised in other statutes and cases.
UNCERTAIN PRINCIPLES AND RULES 
OF PROCEDURE TO BE APPLIED IN 
CONTEMPT CASES
The categories of contempt that have appeared 
before the 6 reported Syari’ah cases are 4 cases 
on disobeying a court order (Azman Abdul Talib 
lwn. Suhaila Ibrahim1, Roslaili bt Abdul Ghani 
v. Ahmad Azman b Yaacob2, Zainip bte Ahmad 
1 In this case, the plaintiff applied to commit the respondent to prison for contempt of court for disobeying an interim 
custody order requiring the respondent to hand over their child to the plaintiff.  This court order was granted by the Syariah 
High Court.  The court found the respondent not guilty of contempt of court as the plaintiff failed to comply with a number 
of procedural rules.
2 In this case, the plaintiff contended that a husband failed to comply with a court order to hand over their children to the 
wife.  The court accepted the defendant’s defence that the court order was unclear and rejected the plaintiff’s committal 
notice.
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v. Abdul Aziz bin Hussain3 and Hasnan Yusof 
lwn. Yasmin Mohd Yacob4, 1 case on providing 
false testimony in court (Ahmad Shapiai 
lwn. Hani Itam Ali Husin & Yang Lain5 and 
1 case on abusing the legal process (Hasnah 
bte Mohd Ali v. Bukhari bin Kahar6).  These 
cases are consistent with contempt before the 
civil courts in terms of most of the contempt 
cases (the first 4 cases) being committed by 
disobeying a court order and the second most 
common category being contempt in the face 
of the court (the latter 2 cases).  To use the 
terms in the statutes for Syari’ah courts, these 
categories would be contempt of a court order 
and contempt of law.  The court only imposed 
a sentence for contempt in 1 of these cases, and 
that was imprisonment for 4 months.  The cases 
of contempt before the Syari’ah and civil courts 
appear to involve similar categories, though the 
categories provided for these parallel courts do 
not seem to share this similar approach.
Kamaluddin Maamor A.J. of the Syari’ah 
Appeal Court at Perak in Ahmad Shapiai lwn. 
Hani Itam Ali Husin & Yang Lain held that 
the charge should be read and explained to 
the contemnor until he gives his verbal plea of 
guilty or not guilty.  The court concluded that 
the appellant was not given an opportunity to 
defend himself before being convicted by the 
lower court which was an injustice.  As such, the 
court unanimously agreed to allow this appeal, 
overturn the conviction of contempt of court and 
set aside the lower courts’ decisions.  The court 
relied on 3 cases of civil courts as authority for 
the principle above that the charge should be read 
and explained before a verbal plea is given.  The 
court noted that these cases were not binding, 
but still relied on these authorities.  As such, the 
Syari’ah courts, even the Syari’ah Appeal Court, 
have been willing to refer to cases from the 
civil courts to clarify the law.  There is a similar 
problem of having uncertain rules of procedure 
for contempt cases before the Syari’ah courts.
The only rules of procedure provided for 
contempt proceedings before the Syari’ah 
courts are on the issue of the service of a notice 
to show cause in contempt proceedings before 
all the Syari’ah courts, except in the state of 
Kedah.  Nonetheless, there are no further rules 
of a procedure specific to contempt proceedings 
provided in the statutes.  It is unclear why the 
procedure provided is so woefully incomplete. 
The incomplete procedure has been noted by the 
judges in the Syari’ah courts.  Abdul Rahman 
Yunus J. of the Syari’ah High Court in Pahang 
in Azman Abdul Talib lwn. Suhaila Ibrahim 
noted that the rules of procedure for contempt 
proceedings before the Syari’ah courts were not 
provided by statute.  As such, the court elected to 
use the relevant rules of procedure in the Rules 
of the High Court 1980.  The court found the 
respondent not guilty of contempt of court for a 
number of points, including that the plaintiff did 
not attach a fair copy of the court order.  Rules 
of the procedure, thus, have been significant in 
the case, even though, as noted by the court, not 
fully provided by statute.
Hj Saarani Ismail J. of the Shariah High 
Court in Shah Alam in Roslaili bt Abdul Ghani 
v. Ahmad Azman b Yaacob found that since a 
3 In this case, the applicant contended that the respondent was in breach of court orders to make child support payments. 
The court held the respondent guilty of contempt of court and imposed imprisonment for 4 months.
4 In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the respondent committed contempt of court by failing to obey the terms of a court 
order.  The respondent succeeded in showing the cause why he was not in contempt of court as he did not breach the court 
order.
5 In this case, the appellant was found guilty of contempt of court for deceiving the court and giving false evidence in his 
divorce proceedings.  The Syariah Appeal Court in Perak allowed the appeal and overturned the conviction and sentence 
due to procedural errors done in the lower court.
6 This case involved divorce proceedings. The husband had told the court that he would submit written responses to the 
issues in the proceedings.  The court, therefore, postponed the case for for 4 months to allow him time to submit his written 
response.  He did not submit this response and did not appear on the date of the next hearing.  The court found this to 
constitute contempt of court for failing to fulfil his promises to the court. The court then granted the wife’s application for 
divorce.
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proper procedure for a notice to show cause 
was not clear from the relevant statute, the 
court could adopt the procedures in Order 34, 
rule 1 of the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980. 
The court proceeded to accept the defendant’s 
defence that the court order was unclear and 
rejected the plaintiff’s committal notice.  In this 
case again, the court noted the procedural rules 
to be incomplete, adopted the relevant rules for 
non-Syari’ah courts and found failing to adhere 
to these procedural rules to be significant.  In this 
case, this failure resulted in the court dismissing 
the committal proceedings.  Zulfikri Yasoa J. 
of the Syari’ah High Court in Kuala Lumpur 
in Hasnan Yusof lwn. Yasmin Mohd Yacob 
noted that the relevant statute did not contain 
rules of procedure for notice to show cause and 
referred to the guidelines explained by the court 
in Roslaili bt Abdul Ghani v. Ahmad Azman b 
Yaacob.  The court noted that it is not bound by 
the case from Selangor, but it is appropriate to 
refer to these guidelines.  This case illustrates 
that the Syari’ah courts seem to be willing to 
refer to cases before the civil courts and the 
Syari’ah courts in other states, even though both 
these cases are not binding to clarify uncertainty 
in the applicable statutes.
Applying the principles from the civil 
contempt cases requires the Syari’ah judges to 
be well-versed with the contempt cases before 
the civil courts or at least be able to easily 
identify such cases.  Syari’ah judges may be 
less involved with the lawyers, judges and cases 
before the civil courts and as such, may not be 
aware of the relevant cases before these courts. 
With many different key words being used in the 
law reports for contempt cases in the civil and 
Syari’ah cases, identifying relevant civil case 
law could also be difficult.  The Syari’ah judges 
have found the incomplete rules of procedure 
for contempt cases before these courts to be a 
problem.  Since these rules of procedure have 
been significant in contempt cases before the 
Syari’ah courts, rather than referring to such 
rules for civil cases, it may better protect the 
rights of the parties to have more complete rules 
of the procedure for contempt cases before the 
Syari’ah courts, especially since these courts 
have been entrusted by the statute to use their 
contempt powers, which they have so used. 
INCONSISTENT SENTENCING LIMITS 
FOR CONTEMPT CASES
Statutes applicable to the Syari’ah courts have 
provided different sentencing limits for different 
categories of contempt.  These statutes also have 
further sentencing limits for contempt of court 
cases in general (where no specific category is 
specified for these limits).  Interestingly, these 
sentencing limits differ, not just by territory 
or state, but also by which statute has been 
breached.  The Syari’ah civil procedure statutes 
for the Syari’ah courts in all the territories and 
states, except for Kedah and Sabah, specify a 
sentencing limit for contempt of court before 
the Syari’ah courts.  The limit specified is 
consistent that the Syari’ah courts can impose 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months 
or a fine not exceeding RM2,000 for contempt 
of court.
Meanwhile, the Syari’ah criminal procedure 
statutes for Syari’ah courts are more consistent 
in that a limit is specified for the Syari’ah courts 
in all the territories and states.  However, the 
limits specified are not consistent.  These limits 
are a fine not exceeding RM100 for Kedah, a 
fine not exceeding RM1,000 for the Federal 
territories of Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and 
Labuan and the states of Kelantan, Pahang, 
Terengganu, Malacca, Penang, Perak, Negeri 
Sembilan, Perlis, Sabah and Sarawak, and a fine 
not exceeding RM2,000 or imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding 1 year or both for the states of 
Selangor and Johor.  These differing sentencing 
limits can be very confusing to apply with the 
sentencing limits differing by category, definition 
of category, territory or state and statute.  The 
rationale for this convoluted pattern is not 
evident from these statutes or reported cases. 
This pattern is not consistent with the statutory 
provisions of sentencing limits for the contempt 
of court before the civil courts, where greater 
statutory limits are provided for the courts of 
superior jurisdiction.  It is unclear why the 
sentencing limits for contempt cases before the 
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Syari’ah courts are given in a different approach 
than such cases before the civil courts and why 
the sentencing limits for such cases before the 
Syari’ah courts differ so much according to so 
many criteria.  The Syari’ah courts of different 
levels in a territory or state are given the same 
sentencing limits.  Is the contempt of court 
considered to be more serious according to the 
form and category of contempt, statute being 
breached and geographical boundary of where 
the offence was committed?  This seems to be 
difficult to rationalise or justify.
CONCLUSION
The law for the Syari’ah courts is expressly 
provided by statute for all the courts, and the 
same power is given to the courts at all levels in a 
territory or a state and the categories of contempt 
are defined differently for many territories or 
states.  The principles and rules of the procedure 
applicable to contempt proceedings have been 
held to be significant in contempt cases before 
the Syari’ah courts.  The Syari’ah courts have 
resorted to relying on the Syari’ah cases from 
other states and civil cases on contempt law. 
The courts are often bound by very few other 
courts (limited to the courts of higher jurisdiction 
in that territory or state alone).  The Syari’ah 
courts have adopted points from the Syari’ah 
cases from other states and civil cases.  Relying 
on the Syari’ah cases from other states may be 
difficult since very few cases have been reported, 
and even those appear under different key 
words in the law reports.  The Syari’ah courts 
have also relied on the contempt cases before 
the civil courts.  There do not seem to be any 
non-Syari’ah court deciding a contempt case 
that has relied on a Syari’ah case on contempt 
so far.  Thus, the Syari’ah courts seem to be 
more reliant on the civil courts’ explanations of 
contempt law, rather than vice versa.  In which 
case, the uncertainties and inconsistencies in the 
contempt law before civil courts are more likely 
to extend to the Syari’ah courts, rather than the 
other way around.
The sentencing limits for contempt cases 
seem to be a hotchpot of different rules, 
depending on the how a category of contempt 
is defined, the territory or state involved, and 
the statute applicable to the case.  All levels of 
the Syari’ah courts in a territory or a state is 
entrusted with the same applicable sentencing 
limit.  It is clear that all levels of the Syari’ah 
courts, in all the territories and states, are given 
the power to punish for contempt of court and 
that some of these courts are using this power. 
As such, it is submitted that it is critical that this 
law to be made clear and consistent for cases 
of similar facts.  Suggesting that greater clarity 
and consistency is desirable is in line with the 
current reforms being suggested for the Syari’ah 
law, i.e. to make these laws more consistent 
between the territories or states, and with those 
of the civil laws.
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INTRODUCTION
It is the aim of this article to determine what 
is accepted by the law in Malaysia as being 
a valid consent to medical treatment.  Is a 
consent considered to be valid once the patient 
had signed the consent form, or is a consent 
can be said to be valid only if the patient has 
been informed of the nature and purpose of the 
medical procedure that is going to be performed 
on him?  The determination of what constitutes 
a valid consent is relevant as it will in turn 
determine the most appropriate cause of action 
that can be taken by the patient against his/her 
doctor should there be a dispute regarding the 
giving of consent by the affected patient.  In this 
article, the discussion will be made by referring 
to the meaning of a valid consent according to 
common law principles.
Regarding the issue of what is meant by a 
valid consent in Malaysia, the discussion will be 
based largely on the case of Tan Ah Kau v The 
Government of Malaysia ((1997) 2 AMR 1382). 
Tan Ah Kau is the most relevant case in respect 
of this issue on validity, as in this case, the High 
Court had decided that the consent given by the 
patient/plaintiff was not a valid consent. One 
would have thought that since no valid consent 
was given, the case should have been decided 
under the sphere of trespass law.  However, the 
plaintiff in Tan Ah Kau had brought his case 
as a medical negligence case, and henceforth, 
despite declaring that the consent was not valid, 
the court proceeded to decide the case under the 
law of negligence.  Unfortunately, no discussion 
or analysis was made by Justice Low Hop Bing 
on the legal consequences of treatment given 
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by a doctor when the consent of his patient was 
found to be invalid especially in reference to the 
law of battery. 
A REAL CONSENT IS A VALID 
CONSENT: THE COMMON 
LAW POSITION
With regard to the English case of Chatterton 
v Gerson ((1981) 1 QB 432),  Justice Bristow 
held that a real consent is a valid consent in law. 
Thus, the question must be - what is meant by a 
real consent?  According to him, a real consent is 
a consent given by the patient after the doctor has 
explained to him/her in broad terms the nature 
of the procedure that is going to be performed 
on him/her.  Therefore, in order to be valid, the 
consent must be real. Failure on the part of the 
doctor to explain in broad terms the nature of 
the procedure will vitiate any consent given 
by the patient.  This will consequently cause 
any treatment involving any form of physical 
contact perceived as battery.  However, the 
judge in the above-mentioned case then went 
on to say that failure to disclose inherent risks 
present in the medical procedure will not vitiate 
the consent.  The consent is still valid in law but 
the doctor had committed a breach in his duty 
to give advice. This breach of duty is to be dealt 
with under the law of medical negligence and 
not trespass, specifically battery.  The principle 
enunciated in Chatterton v Gerson ((1981) 1 QB 
432) was subsequently approved and applied in 
Hills v Potter ((1983) 3 All ER 716), whereby 
in this case, it was decided that since the patient 
had given his consent to the surgery performed 
on him, the consent would negate the doctor’s 
liability under battery.  Rather, failure to disclose 
information such as inherent risks present in the 
procedure falls under the sphere of a doctor’s 
duty to give advice in the law of negligence and 
it will not vitiate any consent given.  Justice Hirst 
in Hills v Potter ((1983) 3 All ER 716) held: 
As to the claim for assault and battery, 
the plaintiff ’s undoubted consent to 
the operation which was performed (to 
cure the neck deformity) negatives any 
possibility of liability under this head 
… the proper cause of action, if any, is 
negligence.
The principle in Chatterton was also 
affirmed by the Court of Appeal and the House 
of Lords in the landmark case of Sidaway v 
Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital 
((1984) 1 All ER 1018 (Court of Appeal) and 
(1985) AC 871 (House of Lords)). At the Court 
of Appeal, Lord Donaldson held that:
I am wholly satisfied that as a matter of 
English Law, a consent is not vitiated 
by a failure on the part of the doctor to 
give sufficient information before the 
consent is given.
What is accepted as a valid consent under 
the English common law was aptly summarised 
by Lord Donaldson in Freeman v Home Office 
(No.2) ((1984) 1 All ER 1036).  According to 
His Lordship:
If there was real consent to the 
treatment, it matters not that the doctor 
was in breach of his duty to give the 
patient the appropriate information 
before the consent was given.  Real 
consent provides a complete defence 
to acclaim in the tort of trespass to the 
person ... subject to the patient having 
been informed in broad terms of the 
nature of the treatment, consent in fact 
amounts to consent in law.
Therefore, what is actually meant by the 
phrase ‘nature of the procedure’?  Kennedy and 
Grubb (1998) opined that the phrase is:
… a  re l a t i v e l y  n a r ro w  n o t i o n 
encompassing by description the 
character of the act(s) to be done 
by the doctor, and qualitatively, the 
intended effect(s) of the procedure and 
its purpose.
The Meaning of a Valid Consent to Medical Treatment in Malaysia
37Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 20 (S) 2012
From the opinion given above, it can 
be concluded that the phrase ‘nature of the 
procedure’ includes the patient’s understanding 
of the purpose or effect desired from the 
proposed procedure.  Therefore, even though 
the court in Chatterton v Gerson ((1981) 1 QB 
432) had employed the word ‘nature’, at present, 
it is the norm for the courts in England to use 
the phrase ‘nature and purpose of procedure’.  
In order to succeed in his claim against his 
doctor in a case based on battery, the patient must 
prove that there was in fact no valid consent in 
the first place.  However, in circumstances where 
he had been informed in broad terms the nature 
of the procedure, he would have no redress under 
the law of battery.  Justice Bristow was of the 
view that it is against the principle of justice to 
allow a patient who was already informed of the 
nature of the medical treatment and procedure 
to take an action for battery against his doctor 
((1981) 1 QB 432).  
It is thus clear that under the English 
common law, the courts in England have 
divided the types of information that a doctor 
needs to disclose to his patient for the purpose 
of determining whether the consent given is a 
real consent or otherwise.  A consent is real and 
therefore valid only if the patient is given the 
information regarding the nature and purpose 
of the proposed medical procedure.  Failure to 
give those information will vitiate the consent 
and consequently render the doctor liable for 
battery.  On the other hand, failure to perform his 
duty under the law to disclose the information 
regarding the inherent risks present in the 
proposed procedure will only render him liable 
for negligence but the consent remains legally 
valid.  
TAN AH KAU V THE GOVERNMENT OF 
MALAYSIA ((1997) 2 AMR 1382):  
AN ANALYSIS
In this case, Tan Ah Kau as the plaintiff sought 
to claim damages for the alleged negligence of 
the defendant as the servant and/or agent of the 
defendant.  The plaintiff’s claim for damages 
was founded on the defendant’s negligence and/
or breach professional duties in carrying out a 
surgical operation on him.  The surgical operation 
performed by the defendant had resulted in the 
plaintiff being paralysed completely from the 
waist down.  In his testimony, the plaintiff 
claimed that he signed two blank forms, and 
at the same time, no explanation was given to 
him by the doctor relating to the reason for the 
operation before it was carried out ((1997) 2 
AMR 1382).  The doctor did not explain that 
the surgery would cause the blockage of blood 
flow.  In fact, the plaintiff did not know that it 
was cancer before the operation ((1997) 2 AMR 
1382).  Therefore, the question for the court 
to decide was whether at the time the plaintiff 
signed the consent forms, he understood the 
nature and consequences of the consent, and also 
whether the plaintiff knew the subject matter 
which was central to his consent in light of the 
evidence that most patients opt out when the 
complications (especially the risk of paralysis) 
are explained to the patient.   The plaintiff was 
not fully informed, therefore, he was not given 
the opportunity to decide whether to opt for or 
opt out of the operation ((1997) 2 AMR 1382).
During the trial, it was also revealed that 
during the operation, the surgeon discovered 
that the tumour was intramedullary and a biopsy 
was done.  However, the consent was taken on 
the basis that the tumour was extramedullary. 
The court was of the opinion that in relation to 
the intramedullary tumour, to constitute a valid 
consent (that is valid in light of the surgical 
discovery), a consent to cover this would be 
necessary and advisable ((1997) 2 AMR 1382). 
Therefore, a fresh consent ought to have been 
obtained based on the finding that the tumour 
was intramedullary. The doctor who performed 
the operation also admitted during trial  that he 
had not explained to the plaintiff that during 
the operation itself, there would be an incision 
or cutting through the tumour resulting in 
bleeding and swelling of the spinal cord and 
that itself would cause the plaintiff immediate 
paralysis.  He further admitted that explaining 
the information would cause the plaintiff to 
reject the operation.  To the above testimony by 
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the doctor, Justice Low Hop Bing held that no 
valid and proper consent was obtained from the 
plaintiff ((1997) 2 AMR 1382).
Consequently, the High Court held that the 
whole question of obtaining the consent of the 
plaintiff in relation to the surgical operation 
remained cloudy and had not been satisfactorily 
established by the defendant.  Therefore, no 
consent was obtained from the plaintiff at all, 
or even if the consent had been obtained, the 
content of such consent had not been fully and 
comprehensively explained to the plaintiff in 
order to enable him to understand the nature 
and consequences of the consent in relation to 
the operation and the diagnosis ((1997) 2 AMR 
1382).  Furthermore, the plaintiff was not given 
the opportunity to decide whether to opt for 
or to forego the operation.  Therefore, in this 
case, the defendant was held liable for medical 
negligence.
As stated above, Tan Ah Kau was a 
negligence case. The approach taken by the 
court and the absence of any reference to the 
law of battery clearly showed that the court 
accepted that the correct law to be applied is the 
law of negligence.  However, it is submitted that 
this approach clearly went against the principle 
that a valid consent must be a real consent as 
enunciated in Chatterton v Gerson ((1981) 1 QB 
432).  By holding that, “no consent was obtained 
from the plaintiff at all, or even if the consent had 
been obtained, the content of such consent had 
not been fully and comprehensively explained to 
the plaintiff in order to enable him to understand 
the nature and consequences of the consent in 
relation to the operation and the diagnosis” 
((1997) 2 AMR 1382), the court must be taken 
to mean that there was no consent at all or that 
the consent given by the plaintiff was vitiated by 
the doctor’s failure to explain to him the nature 
and purpose of the operation. The plaintiff’s 
consent was, therefore, not a real consent as 
envisaged by Justice Bristow in Chatterton 
((1981) 1 QB 432).  His Lordship had also in 
fact specifically stated that the consent was not a 
valid and proper consent ((1997) 2 AMR 1382). 
Again, this statement clearly went against the 
principle of a valid consent under the common 
law. Thus, the question remains whether despite 
the wordings of judgment mentioned above, the 
consent was in fact still valid for the purpose of 
sanctioning and justifying the physical touch to 
the plaintiff’s body. 
It is submitted that if the court had applied 
the common law approach in a case such as this, 
the court should identify whether there is a valid 
consent or otherwise in order to do so, the court 
must determine first of all, what is meant by ‘the 
nature of the procedure’ and whether it had been 
explained to the patient.  If the learned judge 
had applied this approach at the first instance 
and concluded that the nature of the procedure 
was not explained to the plaintiff as required by 
the common law, then he could have justified 
his finding that no valid and proper consent was 
obtained from the plaintiff.  
Nevertheless, in this respect, one might 
perhaps be tempted to argue in defence of the 
Lordship that what he really meant by the above-
mentioned finding was, the facts that were not 
disclosed to the plaintiff were the facts relating 
to the risks present in the operation (i.e the risk 
of paralysis) and not the nature of the operation 
itself.  The validity of the consent remained 
unaffected. Hence, in such circumstance, 
negligence was the correct cause of action in 
accordance with the principle in Chatterton 
((1981) 1 QB 432).  
In response to such an argument, it is 
however submitted that, where the risk is so 
serious and significant that it could affect the 
decision of the plaintiff as to opt for or opt out 
of the operation, the risk must be explained and 
failure to do so would vitiate the consent given 
by the plaintiff.  Hence, any operation done 
thereof would constitute a battery against the 
body of the plaintiff.
In support of the above submission, 
reference can be made to the points put forward 
by Jones in his book titled Medical Negligence 
(Jones, 2001).  He stated that, there are views 
that disagree with the division on the types of 
information to be disclosed to a patient (Jones, 
2001). According to him, it has been forcefully 
argued that the distinction created by the courts 
is untenable as it assumes an inherent difference 
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in terminology and substance between the nature 
of the treatment and the risks inherent in the 
treatment.  Some risks may be so significant that 
they relate to the nature of the operation itself, 
so non-disclosure of the risks would vitiate the 
consent and lead to liability in battery (Tan Keng 
Feng, 1987).  Therefore, it is his contention 
that there are risks which are so significant 
that they are closely related to the nature of the 
treatment and thus making failure to disclose 
those necessary information fatal to the consent 
given by the patient. This will, of course, expose 
the doctor to an action for battery (Jones, 2003). 
However, Jones admitted that it is not really 
clear on what is meant by the phrase ‘nature of 
a medical treatment,’ and this will eventually 
depend on how a person chooses to characterise 
the nature of a particular activity. 
In contrast to the Tan Ah Kau’s case, in Dr. 
Ismail Abdullah v Poh Hui Lin (administrator 
for the estate of Tan Ah Moi @ Ong Ah Mauy, 
deceased) ((2009) 2 MLJ 599), the doctor did 
inform the deceased and her family members 
that he would attempt to remove the stones in 
the gall bladder by the endoscopy method, failing 
which he would undertake an operation called 
cholecystectomy.  Apparently, the deceased 
consented to it.  However, the defendant was 
sued for medical negligence for inter alia, 
which was failing to advise the deceased of the 
risks of acute pancreatitis and acute respiratory 
syndrome. During the trial, the deceased’s 
understanding as to the nature and purpose of 
the procedure was never questioned. Instead, 
the focus was on the issue of what types of risks 
which are required to be disclosed to a patient. 
The High Court held that only material risks of 
injury arising from a treatment or surgery will 
need to be disclosed. The court stated that, the 
decision of the Federal Court in Foo Fio Na v 
Dr. Soo Fook Mun & Anor ((2007) 1 CLJ 229) 
represents the law in this aspect.
In Foo Fio Na ((2007) 1 CLJ 229), the 
Federal Court had cited with approval the 
principle propounded by the Australian High 
Court in Rogers v Whitaker ((1992) 109 ALR 
625).  In Rogers’ case, it was held that in relation 
to the duty to disclose risks, a doctor has the duty 
to warn a patient of a material risk inherent in the 
proposed treatment.  A risk is material if in the 
circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable 
person in the patient’s position, if warned of the 
risk, would likely to attach significance to it, or if 
the medical practitioner is or should reasonably 
be aware that the particular patient, if warned 
of the risk would likely to attach significance to 
it.  The Federal Court then decided that the test 
in Rogers v Whitaker ((1992) 109 ALR 625) 
would be a more appropriate and viable test of 
this millennium.  
However, one must bear in mind that the 
decision of the Federal Court had nothing to do 
with the issue of the validity of the plaintiff’s 
consent, as that issue was never raised by the 
counsels.  The consent was accepted to be valid 
by all quarters.  Instead, the question posed to 
the Federal Court was whether the Bolam’s test 
in the area of medical negligence should apply 
in relation to all aspects of medical negligence, 
that is, the doctor’s duty in giving diagnosis, 
treatment and advice (disclosure of information). 
Consequently, the decision of the Federal 
Court is important in so far as the issue of the 
applicability of the Bolam’s test ((Bolam v Friern 
Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 
582) in medical negligence cases.
Referring back to Dr. Ismail’s case, since 
the validity of the deceased patient’s consent 
was not questioned by the court, it is not 
relevant to discuss the issue of the validity of the 
deceased patient’s consent from the perspective 
of the common law principle as envisaged in 
Chatterton v Gerson ((1981) 2 QB 432).
The wisdom of creating a distinction 
between the types of information disclosed to a 
patient was also questioned by Somerville.  She 
suggested that some risks could be so serious 
and probable that they should be regarded as 
part of the basic nature and quality of the act 
of the act (Somerville, 1987).  For example, if 
an operation has a 90 percent risk of death (but 
despite this, the patient wants to proceed with it 
to avoid a certain death at a later time without the 
operation), the nature and degree of risk could be 
regarded as part of the basic nature and quality 
of the act of surgery (Somerville, 1987). 
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The opinion and suggestion by both Jones 
and Somerville could be based on the fact that 
a risk which is so significant that it relates 
to the nature of the proposed treatment will 
undoubtedly influence the patient in deciding 
whether to agree to the proposed treatment or 
otherwise.  Subsequently, in such circumstances, 
the consent by a patient without first being 
given the necessary information is not a real 
consent.  Thus, the doctor can therefore be sued 
for battery.  Expanding the scope relating to the 
meaning of a real consent will eventually give 
more room for the law of battery to function 
in the consent to medical treatment cases. The 
case of Kelly v Hazlett ((1976) 75 DLR (3d) 
536) is a case in point, where it was held that in 
some cases it may be difficult to distinguish and 
separate the matter of consequential or collateral 
risks from the basic nature and character of the 
operation or procedure to be performed.  The 
more probable the risk, the more it could be 
said to be an integral feature of the nature and 
character of the operation.
It is humbly submitted that it cannot be 
denied that there are cases where the risks 
involved are so serious that they should be 
treated as being part of the nature of the medical 
procedure proposed.  The case of Tan Ah Kau 
v The Government of Malaysia is a perfect 
example.  If the issue of whether a risk is so 
significant that it is related to the nature of the 
procedure, and that it must be disclosed to the 
patient is brought up in court, it is incumbent for 
the court to hear expert evidence before deciding 
whether the consent given by the patient is a 
real valid consent or otherwise according to the 
principle established in Chatterton v Gerson 
((1981) 1 QB 432).
In 1999, the trial judge in the case of Foo 
Fio Na v Dr. Soo Fook Mun ((1999) 6 MLJ 
738) had the opportunity to delve further on the 
issue of the validity of a patient’s consent.  The 
learned judge had observed that regarding the 
first operation performed on the plaintiff who 
had rendered her paralysed from the neck down, 
the procedure (operation) and the reason for it 
was not told to the plaintiff.  He went on to hold 
that the failure to do so and the misrepresentation 
by the second defendant that it was a minor 
operation clearly shows that the plaintiff 
would not consent to such an operation, and the 
consent, if any, was not obtained properly.  In 
response to that statement, the questions should 
be - Was there a valid consent in the first place? 
If there was a consent but it was not obtained 
properly, what were the legal consequences? 
Can it still be accepted as a valid consent in 
law?  Unfortunately, no further discussion was 
made by the learned judge on what he meant by 
“the consent, if any, was not obtained properly”. 
Thus, the possibility of the case being tried under 
the law of trespass remained undetected by all 
parties involved. Moreover, as is the norm in 
Malaysia in consent to treatment cases, the case 
was decided under the law of negligence as the 
focus was on the duty of the defendant doctor 
to disclose information and/risk to the plaintiff.
Although drawing distinctions between the 
defective consent which gives rise to a cause of 
action in battery and defective consent which 
gives rise to a suit in negligence may appear to be 
only or largely a theoretical exercise, it actually 
has very real significant ramifications to medical 
practice (Somerville, 1987).  This is because, 
there can exist situations where it would not 
be possible for the patient/plaintiff to establish 
negligence on the part of the doctor because 
a reasonable standard of care has not been 
breached.  On the other hand, it would be possible 
for him to establish battery, as battery does not 
depend on the breach of a reasonable standard of 
care.  The consent of a patient has the effect of 
transforming what would otherwise be unlawful 
into accepted and therefore acceptable contact, 
and battery consists of unconsented touching 
to the patient (Cockburn & Madden, 2006). 
Henceforth, there can be battery regardless of 
whether the touching is done with reasonable 
care or not.  To put it simply, if battery is not 
available, a patient/plaintiff may be without a 
cause of action in cases where the treatment is 
performed in the absence of a valid consent as 
the doctor has not committed a breach of the duty 
of care (Somerville, 1987). This view is shared 
by Grubb who agreed that a doctor can be sued 
for battery if he does not disclose information 
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relating to the nature of the procedure (Grubb, 
1985).  As Teff put it, to hold that a patient has 
given his valid consent to a medical procedure 
where he is not aware of what is really involved, 
is at best over-literal and artificial.  The consent 
given by a patient in such circumstances should 
not be regarded as an obstacle that will prevent 
him from taking an action against his doctor for 
battery (Teff, 1994).
One good example of an incident that could 
have been brought under the law of battery is 
an incident in Penang, where one doctor was 
suspended from the Malaysia Medical Register 
for a period of one year for disregarding and/
or neglecting his professional responsibilities. 
Despite being informed of his patient’s election 
for an open procedure, he went against the wish 
and performed a Laparoscopically Assisted 
Vaginal Hysterectomy instead.  He did not 
explain the risks to the patient nor did he seek her 
consent for the said procedure (Press Release, 
Disciplinary Punishment By The Malaysian 
Medical Council Against Errant Registered 
Practitioners in The Year 2008).  Even though 
the case was not brought to court, it is humbly 
submitted that should the patient have decided 
to sue her doctor, such a case would have 
fallen under the sphere of the law of battery. 
This is because, an action for battery is the 
most appropriate form of action compared to 
negligence in cases where a different treatment 
is given to that which has been consented to 
(Cockburn & Madden, 2006).  
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that the meaning of 
a valid consent in Malaysia is still uncertain.  The 
law of torts in this country is formed by applying 
legal principles developed from cases decided 
by the courts in England.  However, from the 
case of Tan Ah Kau ((1997) 2 AMR 1382), it is 
not clear whether the courts in Malaysia really 
adhere to the common law principle relating to 
the meaning of a valid consent as accepted in 
England.  This position will remain cloudy as 
long as there is no case brought to the Malaysian 
High Courts pertaining to this issue. 
Be that as it may, it is submitted that in 
consent to treatment cases, one should not 
overlook the role that can be played by the law 
of battery.  This is because, it cannot be denied 
that there are cases where there is in fact no valid 
consent given by the patient.  Failure to explain 
or disclose to a patient the risks that are so 
significant and serious that they affect the nature 
of a particular procedure should be held capable 
of vitiating the validity of the patient’s consent 
and thereby give rise to an action for battery. 
Legal clarity pertaining to this issue will enable 
parties intending to commence legal proceeding 
against their doctors to choose the best cause of 
action to take, whether negligence or battery, 
according to the facts of each particular case. 
As stated above, the development of the law of 
torts depends on cases decided by the civil courts 
in Malaysia.  Therefore, it is the duty of the 
judges to use their wisdom in interpreting legal 
principles to ensure legal clarity and certainty 
for the purpose of justice. 
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INTRODUCTION
The 19th century witnessed the system of 
laissez-faire, the non-interference policy of the 
government, and the principle of caveat emptor, 
let the buyer beware, which were the birthmarks 
of capitalism that reigned proudly in Europe. 
The common law being the handmaiden of 
“laissez-faire constitutionalism” has become 
indistinguishable from the extreme free-market 
ideologies.  Noga Morag-Levine (2007) opines 
that its putative opposite was nothing more 
than the sensible governmental involvement in 
society and the economy in pursuit of remedies 
to the inefficiencies and inequities of the market 
place.  In contrast with the civil law, it gave 
judges and juries the final say on the necessity of 
regulatory interventions to protect public health 
and safety, empowering them to oversee actions 
by both administrators and legislators.
Market ideology during the 19th century 
was indeed ignorant of consumer welfare.  The 
idea of equal bargaining power was created 
then by marketers to justify the existence of 
freedom of contract, the cardinal rule of contract 
law (Azimon & Sakina, 2009).  It cannot be 
denied that the current modernisation trend 
in human thinking has produced diversity in 
creativity and creation of latest technologies 
in the market that meet and satisfy consumer 
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demands.  Modern technologies are increasing in 
consumer trading environment and have sparked 
a new phenomenon in the future of any consumer 
protection regime when traders are taking this 
opportunity to create standard form contracts 
which can be found in every corner of consumer 
transaction.  Online sales transactions of goods 
have proven that technological sophistication has 
been absorbed into consumer daily environment 
which directly adopts such contracts as the 
practice of traders in these virtual transactions. 
Nowadays, sellers or suppliers have created 
an absolute free market for the smooth flow 
of their products, and at the same time, ways 
and means to discharge their liabilities and 
increase their rights at their own whim, often at 
the disadvantage of the consumers.  Their most 
potent tool to discharge their liability is thus 
through the utilisation of manipulative method 
of drafting contract in what is now known as 
the ‘unfair terms’.  These unfair terms, which 
are part of the laissez-faire legacy, have further 
eroded the protection of consumers in many 
commercial transactions and thus call for the 
paternalistic role of the government.
The subject of ‘Unfair Terms in Contract’ 
has attained grave importance in recent times, 
not only in relation to consumer contracts but 
also in regard to other contracts.  The subject 
has assumed great importance currently in the 
context of tremendous expansion in trade and 
business, as well as consumer rights.  In the 
last two decades, several countries had gone in 
for new laws on the subject in order to protect 
consumers and even smaller businessmen from 
bigger commercial entities.  Furthermore, 
several law commissions across the world have 
taken up the subject for study and recommended 
new legislation.  The British and Scottish Law 
Commission has prepared its latest report in 
2004 on ‘Unfair Terms in Contracts’ (Law Com 
No. 292, Scot Law Com No. 199) with a new 
draft bill annexed to the report after reviewing 
its earlier laws.  In addition, the South African 
Law Commission, in its report in 1998 on 
‘Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and 
the Rectification of Contracts’ has reviewed the 
comparative law in several countries and has 
come forward with a draft bill.  The Discussion 
Paper of 2004 from Victoria (Australia) proposed 
by the Standing Committee of Officials of 
Consumer Affairs, the Interim Report of 2005 
from Canada (British Columbia) prepared by 
the British Columbia Law Institute and the 
Reports of the New Zealand Law Commission 
and Ontario Law Commission have added new 
dimensions to the subject (Law Commission of 
India, 199th Report, 2006).  In the south-eastern 
Asian region, the development in this area of 
law in certain jurisdictions is also commendable. 
The enactment of laws in Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Thailand to curb the harshness of unfair 
terms evinces the commitment of the respective 
governments in ensuring ethical and healthy 
market environment and competition.
With the above introduction, it is the aim 
of this article to look into the above highlighted 
issues, namely, the issues of unfair contract 
terms in consumer contracts.  A study on the 
Malaysian position with regard to unfair terms 
in particular exclusion clauses shall be made 
with reference to case laws and statutes alike. 
Upon ascertaining the Malaysian judicial 
and legislative intervention, a comparative 
study with the Indonesian and Thai legislative 
approach shall then be made. 
THE RISE OF PATERNALISM IN 
CONSUMER CONTRACT
To understand the development which has taken 
place in the area of unfair terms, we must be 
mindful of the policies in play; these are, on 
one hand, the traditional concern for freedom 
of contract, the cardinal rule of contract law, 
and on the other hand, the concern to curb 
unfairness resulting from significant inequality of 
bargaining power, and in this context, known as 
the principles of consumer protection.  Classical 
contract legislation, which was fully controlled 
by the economic theories in the 19th century, has 
placed contracting parties as an economic unit 
which should possess equal negotiation strength 
together with freedom to make any decision. 
‘Market individualism’ was the ideology then. 
This ideology was partly based on the main 
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theme dominating contract law throughout 
this century, namely, the principle of freedom 
to contract, the cardinal rule of contract law 
(Atiyah, 1979).  To guarantee integrity in free 
and individual market economies, this principle 
clearly suggests that the court holds the parties 
to the terms of the contract independently 
negotiated.  The idea behind the supremacy of 
this principle is rooted by the economic and 
market factors.  An individual is given full 
freedom to decide and choose the terms of the 
contract he/she wishes to enter.  This eases the 
supplier of goods to know thus provide supplies 
in any form, either products or services, which 
are required and demanded by the buyer.  In a 
long-term market, this practice gives room to 
the consumers to obtain goods based on their 
agreed prices.  
In the late 19th century, the doctrine of 
freedom of contract and the principles of laissez-
faire had a great influence on judges.  This was 
manifested by the courts’ persistent refusal to 
intervene in contracts on the basis of fairness 
(Bradgate, 2000).  According to Lord Diplock 
in a landmark case, Shroeder Music Publishing 
Co. Ltd. v Macaulay [1974] 1 WLR 1308, this 
non-interventionist approach adopted by the 
courts was justified on the basis that it “facilitates 
the conduct of trade by promoting certainty.” 
Laissez-faire and freedom of contract can truly 
be said to symbolise the ideology of market 
individualism.  Richard A. Epstein (1996) stated:
Laissez-faire capitalism, and its 
associated doctrine of freedom of 
contract, had many stalwart defenders 
during the nineteenth century.  But it has 
received a rocky reception from many 
legal and philosophical commentators 
in the twentieth century.  Freedom of 
contract has often been pronounced 
“dead on arrival” as an organizing 
principle for complex contemporary 
societies.  That principle has been 
said to be insensitive to differences in 
wealth, status, position and power that 
make the exercise of contractual choice 
a myth for the weak and dispossessed.
Beginning mid 19th century, there was 
a belief that equality was no longer an ideal 
concept in the trading world.  As trading 
became more and more complex, it transformed 
the contract environment, thus changed the 
issue on the reality of an agreement between 
two parties with unequal bargaining strength 
(Mulcahy & Tillotson, 2004).  With the rise 
of consumerism, the 20th century had seen 
paternalistic approach in consumer protection. 
When the era of consumer welfarism takes 
place, legal intervention is seen as a requirement 
in addressing the negative effects of unfair 
terms in the standard form consumer contracts. 
Both the judiciary and the legislature have 
adopted new attitude and measures in promoting 
consumer welfarism.  Consumerism, thus, has an 
interventionist character, which is a far cry from 
the doctrine of contract freedom.
Nevertheless, according to Gregory M. Duhl 
(2009), the malignant spread of unfair terms in 
consumer contracts is partly due to the attitude 
of the lawyers in drafting contractual documents. 
Commenting on the case of United Rentals, Inc. 
v. RAM Holdings, Inc. 937 A.2d 810, 814-15 
(Del. Ch. 2007), he stated:
Part of lawyers’ professional obligation 
is to draft clear contractual language 
for their clients.  Furthermore, 
lawyers have an ethical obligation 
to reveal known inconsistencies that 
exist in the agreements that they are 
drafting, and not to contribute to such 
inconsistencies.  Where the language 
of the agreement is ambiguous, there 
is a risk-especially from application 
of the four-comers rule-of courts not 
enforcing the obligations to which 
the parties consented.  This risk poses 
a challenge to consent and other 
autonomy-based theories of contract.
THE MALAYSIAN SCENARIO
The Judicial Intervention
In Malaysia, the standard form contracts have 
come to dominate more than just routine 
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transactions.  Unlike Thailand, where there is 
specific legislation dealing with unfair terms, 
the laws in Malaysia vis-à-vis unfair terms are 
very much contained in case laws.  Malaysia 
does not regulate unfair contracts by way of 
specific legislation.  In the area of unfair terms 
by virtue of section 3 and 5 of the Civil Law 
Act 1956, the common law principles have been 
applied.  The general rule on interpretation is 
that, the court will construe the words in any 
written document “in their plain, ordinary, 
popular meaning, rather than their strictly 
precise etymological, philosophic, or scientific 
meanings” (Malaysian National Insurance Sdn. 
Bhd. v. Abdul Aziz Bin Mohamed Daud [1979] 2 
MLJ 29, 31).  Nevertheless, when interpreting 
unfair terms, the courts are hampered by the 
theory of freedom of contract and consequently 
unable to prohibit these terms, but within this 
theory, they have developed strict rules relating 
to the incorporation of such clauses as terms of 
the contract as well as interpreting them contra 
proferentem (Sakina, Azimon & Suzanna, 2010): 
the words of written documents are construed 
more forcibly against the party putting forward 
the document; in the case of exclusion clauses, 
this is the party seeking to impose the exclusion. 
This rule of construction in only applied where 
there is doubt or ambiguity in the phrases used, 
and provides that such doubt or ambiguity must 
be resolved against the party proffering the 
written document and in favour of the other party 
(Lee (John) & Son (Grantham) Ltd. v Railway 
Executive [1949] 2 All E.R. 581).  Although 
the courts have long interpreted ambiguities 
strictly, in certain jurisdiction, such as the United 
States, recent cases have shown that the strict 
interpretation has been rejected.  David Horton 
(2009) claims that the rejection of the strict-
against-the-drafter rule stems from the confusion 
about its normative foundation.  Judges and 
commentators have offered three rationales for 
the doctrine: it discourages ambiguity, corrects 
unfairness, and redistributes wealth.  These 
theories share the goal of improving the quality 
and legibility of standard-form terms.
Judicial development in Malaysia on unfair 
terms has concentrated very much on a species 
of unfair terms, that is exclusion clause.  The 
first judicial principle on exclusion clause can 
be traced back as early as 1959 in a business to 
business (B2B) transaction.  In Sze Hai Tong 
Bank Ltd. v Rambler Cycle Co. Ltd. [1959] 
MLJ 200, the Privy Council adopted a strict 
interpretation to narrow down the scope of 
exclusion clause so as not to allow fundamental 
breach of contractual obligation.  The contra 
proferentem rule was later applied in Sharikat 
Lee Heng Sdn. Bhd. v Port Swettenham Authority 
[1971] 2 MLJ 27 and later by the Privy Council 
in Port Swettenham Authority v T.W. Wu and 
Company (M) Sdn. Bhd. [1978] 2 MLJ 137.  The 
Federal Court in Sharikat Lee Heng Sdn. Bhd. 
held “that the contra proferentum rule should 
apply to the construction of Rule 91(1) just as 
much as it does to any exemption clause in a 
contract.” Ong CJ stated that:
In the absence of clear and unequivocal 
language to the contrary, I am of 
the opinion that the onus lies on the 
Authority to show that it has taken 
all reasonable care of the goods 
and that the loss thereof occurred in 
circumstances which showed no lack 
on its part.
In cases involving a consumer, it is difficult 
to ascertain the attitude of the Malaysian Courts 
towards unfair terms due to the scarcity of 
cases.  Nevertheless, granted that cases in this 
area have been very limited, the decisions in 
these cases have not been a great champion of 
consumer rights.  In Malaysian Airlines System 
Bhd. v Malini Nathan & Anor [1995] 2 MLJ 
100, Malaysian Airlines was sued for breach of 
contract for failing to fly the first respondent, a 
fourteen-year-old pupil back to Kuala Lumpur. 
In denying the liability, MAS relied on Condition 
9 under the Conditions of Contract printed on the 
airline ticket, which reads:
Carrier undertakes to use its best 
efforts to carry the passenger and 
baggage with reasonable dispatch.  
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Times shown in timetables or elsewhere 
are not guaranteed and form no part 
of this contract.  Carrier may without 
notice substitute alternate carrier or 
aircraft, and may either alter or omit 
stopping places shown on the ticket in 
case of necessity.  Schedules are subject 
to change without notice.  Carrier 
assumes no responsibility for making 
connections.
The Supreme Court held that MAS was 
entitled to rely on the clause, and thus, was 
not in breach of the contract.  However, cases 
involving damage due to a negligent act of 
one of the parties to the contract demonstrate a 
strict attitude of the Malaysian courts towards 
exclusion clauses.  In the case of Chin Hooi 
Chan v Comprehensive Auto Restoration Service 
Sdn. Bhd. & Anor [1995] 2 MLJ 100, the court 
took a very strict interpretation of this type of 
clauses in cases involving damages caused by 
negligence.  In allowing the plaintiff’s claim, 
Siti Norma Yaakob J stated that:
It is settled law that an exemption 
clause however wide and general does 
not exonerate the respondents from the 
burden of proving that the damages 
caused to the car were not due to their 
negligence and misconduct.  They 
must show that they had exercised due 
diligence and care in the handling of 
the car. 
However, the decision of Elizabeth 
Chapmen JC in Premier Hotel Sdn. Bhd. v Tang 
Ling Seng [1995] 4 MLJ 229, in the Kuching 
High Court, has caused some concern as it 
indicates the court’s readiness to give effect to 
a clearly worded exclusion clause in the event 
of negligence:
General words of exclusion clauses 
would not  ordinari ly  protect  a 
contracting party from liability for 
negligence.  To protect him from 
liability for negligence, the words used 
must be sufficiently clear, usually either 
by referring expressly to negligence 
or by using some such expression as 
‘howsoever caused’.
The case law development in this area of 
the law in Malaysia has shown grave concern for 
consumer protection.  Hence, it is submitted that 
the uncertainties and inconsistencies by way of 
judicial intervention could be resolved through 
legislative measures. 
The Legislative Approach
The legislative development in Malaysia prior 
to 2010 has also shown disregard towards the 
problems posed by unfair terms.  In Malaysia, 
there is no legislation equivalent to the United 
Kingdom’s Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.  The 
courts here have also been slow in recognising 
the doctrine of inequality of bargaining power. 
Lack of legislation in this area of the law should 
justify the courts taking a stricter view of the 
exclusion clause and protect the consumers 
against onerous terms.  The court should 
recognise that the notion of freedom to contract 
on one’s own terms in consumer transaction 
is nothing more than a fiction.  Since there is 
no specific legislation regulating unfair terms 
in consumer contracts in Malaysia, the court 
should take a more active role in protecting 
the weaker party and not merely taking a strict 
constructionist approach.  Visu Sinnadurai 
suggested that the courts should exercise this 
role by invoking their inherent powers in 
refusing to sanction certain contracts on the 
grounds of public policy or under section 24(e) 
of the Contracts Act 1950 (unlawful objects 
and consideration).  Nevertheless, this proposal 
has  never been taken up in any cases.  Lack of 
consistencies in judicial approach to unfair terms 
in consumer contracts has indeed called upon 
legislative intervention in this matter.
The Sale of Goods Act 1957, which 
governs dealings between business to business 
(B2B) as well as business to consumers (B2C) 
simultaneously accords no protection to 
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consumers as far as unfair terms are concerned. 
Instead of regulating the use of exclusion 
clauses in sale, the 1957 Act by virtue of section 
62 allows the exclusion of the implied terms 
and conditions by ‘express agreement’.  The 
Consumer Protection Act 1999 (CPA 1999) 
came into force on 15 November 1999.  The Act 
goes some way towards remedying the forces of 
inequality.  As Wu Min Aun (2000) pointed out, 
it restores some equilibrium between suppliers 
and consumers.  CPA was enacted to provide a 
comprehensive protection to consumers.  Section 
6 of the Consumer Protection Act 1999 prohibits 
contracting out of the provisions of the Act.  The 
section further provides that every supplier or 
manufacturer who purports to contract out of 
any provision of this Act commits an offence, 
and under section 145, those persons are liable 
to a fine not exceeding fifty thousand ringgit or 
to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three 
years or to both (Sakina & Rahmah, 2008). 
The introduction of Part IIIA of the Consumer 
Protection (Amendment) Act 2010 has to some 
extent resolved the problems associated with 
the use of unfair terms in consumer contracts 
in Malaysia.  Under this part, where a court or 
tribunal comes to the conclusion that a contract 
or term is procedurally or substantively unfair 
or both, the court or tribunal may declare the 
contract or the term as unenforceable or void. 
Under section 24C, “A contract or a term of a 
contract is procedurally unfair if it has resulted 
in an unjust advantage to the supplier or unjust 
disadvantage to the consumer on account of the 
conduct of the supplier or the manner in which 
or circumstances under which the contract or 
the term of the contract has been entered into 
or has been arrived at by the consumer and the 
supplier.” A contract or a term of a contract is 
substantively unfair, under section 24D, “if the 
contract or the term of the contract – (a) is in itself 
harsh; (b) is oppressive; (c) is unconscionable; 
(d) excludes or restricts liability for negligence; 
or (e) excludes or restricts liability for breach 
of express or implied terms of the contract 
without adequate justification.” In addition to the 
contract or the term being held unenforceable or 
void, Part IIIA provides for a criminal penalty for 
contravention of its provisions.  Under section 
24I, if a body corporate contravenes any of the 
provisions in Part IIIA, the corporate body shall 
be liable to a fine not exceeding RM250,000; and 
if such person is not a body corporate, to a fine 
not exceeding RM100,000 or to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding three years or both.
The 2010 Amendment approach by dividing 
unfairness into procedural and substantive 
unfairness is similar to the approach proposed 
in the Law Commission of India 199th Report 
on Unfair (Procedural & Substantive) Terms in 
Contract.  Nevertheless, the necessity of dividing 
the contract or the term into procedural and 
substantive unfairness is questioned as the civil 
and criminal sanctions imposed are the same 
may it be procedurally unfair or substantively 
unfair.  One of the many weaknesses of the new 
Part IIIA lies in the uncertainty of its application 
to unfair notices.  Failure of Part IIIA to mention 
notices and draw attention to standard form 
contract as defined in section 24A may lead to 
limited application of its scope.  The ambiguity 
of this Part also lies in section 24B.  The new 
amendment provides that the new Part shall 
apply to all contracts but fails to appreciate the 
limited application of the Consumer Protection 
Act 1999.  The 1999 Act is very limited in its 
application.  By virtue of section 2(4):
The application of this Act shall be 
supplemental in nature and without 
prejudice to any other law regulating 
contractual relations.
As such, the problem posed by section 62 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1957 shall continue 
to exist since the 1999 Act does not have a 
prevailing effect over the Sale of Goods Act 
1957.  The phrase ‘all contracts’ also leads to 
ambiguity as to whether Part IIIA applies to 
contracts which apply foreign laws.  Although 
the new amendment expressly lists down clauses 
which exclude or restrict liability for breach of 
express or implied terms of the contract without 
adequate justification as procedurally unfair, 
Part IIIA fails to provide a test for determining 
what amounts to ‘adequate justification’. 
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Unlike its Indonesian and Thai counterparts, 
the new amendment to the 1999 Act also fails 
to provide a list of examples of unfair terms. 
The 1999 Act also narrowly defines the term 
‘consumer’ as “…a person who acquires or uses 
goods or services of a kind ordinarily acquired 
for personal, domestic or household purpose, 
use or consumption.” Part IIIA contains many 
weaknesses which could have been addressed 
by enacting a single comprehensive piece of 
legislation on unfair terms for Malaysia. 
In short, the legislative development on 
unfair consumer terms in Malaysia has not been 
a great champion of consumer rights.  As such, 
enacting specific laws is seen as the best solution 
to the malignant spread of abuses in the use of 
unfair terms in consumer contracts.
THE INDONESIAN FRAMEWORK
The Indonesian legal system is complex because 
it is a confluence of three distinct systems.  Prior 
to the first appearance of Dutch traders and 
colonists in the late 16th century and early 17th 
century, indigenous kingdoms prevailed and 
applied a system of adat (customary) law.  The 
Dutch presence and subsequent colonisation 
during the next 350 years until the end of World 
War II left a legacy of the Dutch colonial law. 
A number of such colonial legislations continue 
to apply today.  Subsequently, after Indonesian 
declared its independence on 17 August 1945, 
the Indonesian authorities began creating a 
national legal system based on the Indonesian 
precepts of law and justice.  These three strands 
of adat law, the Dutch colonial law and the 
national law co-exist in modern Indonesia.
In Indonesia, the interest for the enactment 
of a comprehensive legislation governing 
consumer protection has existed since the 
1980s (Sakina & Rahmah, 2006).  Lack of a 
comprehensive legislation and awareness on 
the part of the consumers are the two major 
contributors to consumer problems in Indonesia. 
In dealing with these problems, Undang-Undang 
No. 8 tentang Perlindungan Konsumen or 
Law No. 8 on Consumer Protection 1999 of 
Indonesia was enacted and came into force on 
21 April 1999.  Until the enactment of the Law 
No. 8 on Consumer Protection in 1999, there 
was no comprehensive legislation providing a 
framework for consumer protection in Indonesia. 
Although the enactment of the Law No. 8 on 
Consumer Protection 1999 was rather recent, 
prior to 1999 consumer protection in Indonesia 
nevertheless existed in several piecemeal laws, 
which protected the interest of consumers in 
the field of hygiene, electricity, health, food, 
banking, copyright, patent, trademark and 
environment.  The main ideas behind the 
enactment of the Law No. 8 on Consumer 
Protection 1999 are as follows:
(a) The aim of the national development is 
to realize a just and materially as well 
as spiritually prosperous society in the 
era of democratic economy based on the 
1945 Constitution and the Pancasila (State 
Philosophy);
(b) The national economic development in the 
globalization era must support the growth 
of businesses enabling the production 
of various goods and/or services with 
technology which can promote the welfare 
of society at large and at the same time 
ensure that goods and/or services obtained 
through trade are not harmful to consumers;
(c) With the market which is increasingly 
opening up as a result of the economic 
globalization process, the improvement of 
social welfare and certainty in respect of the 
quality, volume and security of goods and/
or services obtained in the market must be 
guaranteed;
(d) In order to improve the dignity of consumers, 
there is a need to improve the consumers’ 
awareness knowledge, attention, capability 
and independence in order to protect 
themselves and to develop a responsible 
business behaviour;
(e) Law provisions protecting consumers’ 
interests in Indonesia have not been 
adequate yet; and
(f) For all the reasons above, a set of laws and 
regulations is needed in order to achieve 
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continuity in the protection of the interests 
of consumers and business entities for 
creating a fair economy.
Law No. 8 on Consumer Protection 1999 
contains 15 chapters and 65 articles.  It provides 
for the establishment of the National Consumer 
Protection Board and Consumer Dispute 
Settlement Boards.  The law specifically 
regulates unfair competitions, standard clauses, 
warranties and guarantees, advertisements and 
product liability.  Law No. 8 on Consumer 
Protection 1999 highlights the need to balance 
between the consumer and the commercial 
interests.  The 1999 Law confers rights and 
imposes obligations on both the consumers and 
business entities.  The Law also provides for the 
sharing of responsibility for consumer protection 
between the government and non-governmental 
agencies.
The relevant clause of Law No. 8 on 
Consumer Protection 1999 on unfair terms can be 
seen in Chapter V which governs the ‘Provisions 
on the Inclusion of Basic Clause’.  Article 1 of 
Chapter 1 of the Law defines ‘basic clause’ in 
clause 10 as “any regulation or provisions and 
requirements previously and unilaterally drafted 
and stipulated by a business enactor as drawn 
up in a document and/or binding agreement 
and must be fulfilled by consumers.” The 1999 
Law regulates both the form and content of 
these unfair terms.  Article 18 of Chapter V 
provides for basic clauses, which are prohibited 
from being included in any document and/or 
agreement in the following events:
(a) State the transfer of responsibility of the 
business enactor concerned;
(b) State that the business enactor concerned 
is entitled to refuse the resubmit goods 
purchased by a consumer;
(c) State that the business enactor concerned 
is entitled to refuse the refunding of money 
paid for the goods and/or services purchased 
by a consumer;
(d) State the granting of power of attorney by a 
consumer to the business enactor concerned, 
either directly or indirectly, to undertake all 
actions unilaterally in relation to the goods 
purchased by a consumer in instalments;
(e) Set forth requirements for providing 
evidence in respect of the lost benefit of 
the goods or the services acquired by a 
consumer;
(f) Authorise the business enactor to reduce 
the benefit of service or to reduce the 
consumer’s assets being the object of sale 
and purchase of the service concerned;
(g) State the applicability of regulations in 
the form of new, supplementary, follow 
up and/or further amendments stipulated 
unilaterally by the business enactor to 
consumers during the time such consumers 
are using services acquired by them;
(h) State that the consumer authorises the 
business enactor to secure, pledge or impose 
other security rights on goods purchased by 
a consumer on instalments.
Law No. 8 on Consumer Protection 1999 
also prohibits traders from including basic 
clauses the position or form of which cannot 
be easily seen or cannot be clearly read, or the 
expression of which is difficult to understand. 
Any basic clauses included in a document or 
agreement in contravention with provisions 
contained in Article 18 shall be declared null and 
void.  The 1999 Law goes even further with its 
sanctions on traders violating Article 18.  Besides 
civil sanctions (sanksi perdata), Article 62 of 
the 1999 Law provides for criminal sanctions; 
“Business entities violating the provisions as 
intended in … Article 18 shall be sentenced with 
imprisonment for not more than five years or fine 
for a maximum amount of Rp.2,000,000,000.00 
(two billion rupiah).” In addition to the penalty 
imposed by Article 62, Article 63 provides the 
following additional punishments:
(a) Confiscation of certain goods;
(b) Announcement of the judge stipulation;
(c) Payment of compensation;
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(d) Order for the halt of certain activities 
causing detriment for consumers;
(e) Obligation to withdraw goods from 
circulation; or
(f) Revocation of business licence.
THE THAI EXPERIENCE
The growth and sophistication of Thai business 
communities are relatively recent phenomena. 
The Thai courts of justice have increasingly had 
to deal with complex commercial, corporate, 
intellectual property, maritime, privatisation, 
banking, financial, securities, environmental, 
tax, and trade issues.  The Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand in essence protects the 
right and freedom of the people.  It considers 
the opinion of the people as important, while 
it protects the right of the people as consumers 
for the first time in the section on the rights 
and freedoms of Thai people.  It includes 
promoting formation of independent consumer 
organizations to give opinions in enacting laws, 
rules and regulations, and to give opinion on 
prescribing measures to protect consumers as 
appearing in section 57 of the Constitution.  The 
Constitution also prescribes the state to promote 
the free market system based on the marketing 
mechanism to supervise fair competition, protect 
the consumers and prevent monopoly, and cut 
short directly and indirectly (Prapit Yodsuwan, 
2005).  The Thai legal system is a civil law 
system.  Many of its fundamental legal principles 
have their origins in the codified systems of 
continental Europe, particularly France and 
Germany, as well as common law countries and 
traditional Thai law.  Thailand also does not 
recognize the common law principles of binding 
judicial precedent.  However, certain persuasive 
decisions of the Supreme Court are published in 
the Supreme Court Law Reports.
Consumer protection legislation in Thailand 
is sparse.  The chief modern consumer protection 
legislation is the Consumer Protection Act of 
1979 comprising 64 sections.  It is one of the 
earliest consumer laws to be enacted in the Asia 
Pacific region.  It came into effect on 4 May 
1979 and amended in 1998.  The Consumer 
Protection Act of 1979 is the general law that 
supports the basic rights of consumers in general. 
In cases where no specific law exists, it shall be 
applicable.  The Consumer Protection Act of 
1979 adopts a completely different approach 
(Sakina & Rahmah, 2006).  Section 4 of the 
1979 Act prescribes the right of consumers in 
five aspects:
(a) The right to receive information, including 
description that is correct and sufficient in 
relation to goods or services.
(b) The right to have independence to choose 
goods and services.
(c) The right to safety from using the goods 
or services.
(d) The right to receive fairness in signing a 
contract.
(e) The right to be considered and compensated 
for damage.
In relation to standard form contract 
(Azimon & Sakina, 2008), Thailand has no 
specific provisions in any regulations pertaining 
to its practice.  However, the analysis of its 
legislation shows that it gives emphasis on the 
issue of unfair contract terms, which is also the 
main characteristic of the formation of standard 
form contract.  In other words, Thailand has 
treated the standard form contract as a dual issue 
which falls under consumer law and contract law. 
As a remedial measure, Thailand has adopted 
respectively the laws on the unfair contract 
terms in Unfair Contract Terms Act 1997, B.E. 
2540 and the Consumer Protection Act 1979, 
B.E. 2541. 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1997 
(TUCTA) has been enacted to uphold legal 
principles in relation to juristic acts and those 
contracts which are based on the principle 
of sacredness of declaration of intention.  It 
consists of 15 sections with its main justification 
to combat unfairness in their society.  Since 
the law of contract in Thailand is based on the 
principle of ‘autonomy of will’ and ‘freedom of 
contract’, the objective of this Act is to protect 
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the contracting parties from any deviation from 
these two principles.  The standard form contract 
has been defined under section 3 of this Act as:
A written contract in which essential 
terms have been prescribed in advance, 
regardless whether being executed 
in any form, and is used by either 
contracting party in his business 
operation. 
Section 4 further provides:
The terms in a contract between the 
consumer and the business, trading or 
professional operator or in a standard 
form contract or in a contract of sale 
with right of redemption which render 
the business, trading or professional 
operator or the party prescribing the 
standard form contract or the buyer 
an unreasonable advantage over the 
other party shall be regarded as unfair 
contract terms, and shall only be 
enforceable to the extent that they are 
fair and reasonable according to the 
circumstances. 
In determining what unfair terms are, 
section 4 of the Act provides a list of nine unfair 
terms which cause unreasonable advantages over 
the other party:
(a) Terms excluding or restriction liability 
arising from breach of contract;
(b) Terms rendering the other party to be liable 
or to bear more burden than that prescribed 
by law;
(c) Terms rendering the contract to be 
terminated without justifiable ground or 
granting the right to terminate the contract 
despite the other party is not in breach of 
the contract in the essential part;
(d) Terms granting the right not to comply with 
any clause of the contract or to comply with 
the contract within a delayed period without 
reasonable ground;
(e) Terms granting the right to a party to 
contract to claim or compel the other party 
to bear more burden than that existed at the 
time of making the contract;
(f) Terms in a contract of sale with right of 
redemption whereby the buyer fixes the 
redeemed price higher than the selling price 
plus the rate of interest exceeding fifteen 
percent per year;
(g) Terms in a hire-purchase contract which 
prescribe excessive hire-purchasing prices 
or impose unreasonable burdens on the part 
of the hire-purchaser;
(h) Terms in a credit card contract which compel 
the consumer to pay interest, penalty, 
expenses or any other benefits excessively, 
in the case of default of payment or in the 
case related thereto; and
(i) Terms prescribing a method of calculation 
of compound interest that causes the 
consumer to bear excessive burdens. 
It is undeniable that all the above terms are 
common terms which are often being used in the 
standard form contracts in consumer transaction. 
Hence, it clearly strengthens the perception that 
standard form contract is to be known as the 
type of contract which consists of unfair terms.
On the other hand, the Consumer Protection 
Act 1979 was adopted with the view of 
guaranteeing fairness for the parties in the 
conclusion of a contract, where it has been 
provided that specific types of contract shall be 
examined by a governmental agency called ‘The 
Committee on Contracts’ whose members are 
nominated by the Consumer Protection Board. 
In determining the types of businesses which 
are subject to their supervision, the widespread 
of standard form contract has been identified 
under section 35 of the Act as a business that 
brings problems to consumers, thus its practice 
has been treated as a business that requires 
special attention of the Committee (Thirawat, 
2000).  Section 35 Part 2 bis provides that, in any 
business in connection with the sale of any goods 
or the provision of any services, if such contract 
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of sale or contract of service is required by law 
or tradition to be made in writing, the Committee 
on Contract shall have the power to declare such 
business a contract-controlled business.
A contract between a businessman and the 
consumers in the contract-controlled business 
shall be of the following descriptions:
(a) it shall contain the necessary contract terms 
without which the consumers would be 
unreasonably disadvantageous; 
(b) it shall not contain the contract terms which 
are unfair to the consumers. 
Provided that, it shall be in accordance with 
the rules, conditions and particulars prescribed 
by the Committee on Contract, and for the benefit 
of the consumers as a whole, the Committee on 
Contract may require a businessman to prepare a 
contract in accordance with the form prescribed 
by the Committee on Contract.  In addition, 
section 35 quarter provides that failure to 
comply with such requirement as provided by 
the Committee shall have the following effect 
on the contract:
When the Committee on Contract 
prescribes that any contract of a 
contract-controlled business shall 
not contain any contract term under 
section 35 bis, if such contract contains 
such contract term, it shall be deemed 
that such contract term does not exist.
A businessman who fails to comply with 
the requirement set by the Committee shall, 
according to section 57, be liable to the following 
criminal penalty:
Any businessman who fails to deliver 
the contract containing the contract 
terms or containing contract terms in 
the correct form in accordance with 
section 35 bis … shall be liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
one year or to a fine not exceeding one 
hundred thousand Baht or to both.
Thus, the enactment of the above two 
legislations gives a clear picture that although 
the objectives of these two Acts are identical, 
nonetheless, the mechanisms for the protection in 
these two Acts are different.  The Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1997 aims at the determination of the 
characteristics and legal consequences of unfair 
contract terms, which would be beneficial to 
the consumer in the case where the conflict is 
brought before the court of law, whereas the 
Consumer Protection Act 1979 creates one 
governmental organ which is administrative in 
nature, with its function to detect and identify the 
existence of the unfair contract terms.
CONCLUSION: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS
The rise of standard form contracts and the use 
of unfair terms to deprive consumers from their 
rights have indeed inspired the law in Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Thailand to react against the 
increasing decline of individual’s capacity to 
make free and rational choice (Shaik Mohd 
Noor Alam, 1994).  The legal development in 
this area illustrates the role of contract law and 
can thus be best summed up as follows (Zweigert 
& Kotz, 1987): “…the modern task of contract 
law is to develop criteria and procedures through 
which contractual fairness can be assured.” 
The control of substantive unfairness through 
the regime of contract law and consumer law 
of these selected south-eastern Asian countries 
reflect substantially their varied, though not 
dissimilar colonial experiences and the way in 
which the law reform in each country is taking 
form.  The response to the challenge of unfair 
terms is not the concern of the common law 
alone.  Both in the common law and the civil 
law systems, the legislatures have evolved 
various techniques of control to ensure the 
epidemic brought by the use of unfair terms is 
contained and controlled.  The statutory control 
of unfair terms in the selected southeast Asian 
countries above has taken many forms, from 
specific legislation on unfair terms, such as in 
the Thailand Unfair Contract Terms Act 1997, 
to provisions in other specific legislations, such 
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as the Malaysian Consumer Protection Act 1999 
and the Indonesian legislation, Law No. 8 on 
Consumer Protection 1999 and the Consumer 
Protection Act 1979 of Thailand.  The table 
below is an overview of the relevant legislations 
on unfair terms in the three selected southeast 
Asian countries.
In recent years, consumers have grown more 
conscious of their rights and tend to resort more 
often to legal remedies provided by the consumer 
protection laws.  Consumerism thus has again 
arisen in view of the new market condition in the 
world economy that warrants a fresh examination 
of the economic power of sellers in relation to 
buyers.  In the past, in many Asian nations, 
consumers’ interests were suppressed under the 
goal of long-term economic development.  With 
the advancement of technology and changes 
in the trading world, market should not be 
allowed to neglect consumers’ interests.  The 
concern for better consumer protection has been 
expressed not only in Malaysia but in many 
other countries, such as Indonesia and Thailand. 
The legal regimes of Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Thailand as demonstrated above have come to 
recognise unfair terms as a threat to consumers 
and to ethical trading environment, and thus, the 
necessary protection by way of legislation has 
been accordingly provided.
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INTRODUCTION
The consumer right to safety in relation to 
products means that the products they purchase 
must be safe for their intended use, must include 
thorough and explicit directions for proper use, 
and must be tested by the manufacturer to ensure 
product quality and reliability.  The consumers 
must be protected from products that could 
endanger them in any manner.  Product safety 
must be one of the priority areas that should 
be attended by every country (Rahmah, 2000). 
President John F Kennedy considered unsafe 
products as a threat not only to the consumers’ 
safety and health, but also a threat to the nation’s 
harmony.  This concern was manifested in his 
special message speech to the US Congress on 
protecting the consumers’ interest on 15 March 
1962:
If a consumer is offered inferior 
products, if prices are exorbitant, 
if drugs are unsafe or worthless, if 
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a consumer is unable to choose on 
an informed basis, then his dollar is 
wasted, his health and safety may be 
threatened and national interest suffers. 
Product safety issues have been addressed 
by various organisations at international and 
national levels.  Since 1930’s, the consumer 
movements at international level have been 
addressing these issues through their product 
testing to identify the dangers associated with the 
products.  According to F. Josie (unpublished), 
at this stage, product testing has been done on 
breakfast cereals, soap, tooth brush and milk. 
Product safety issues have also become the 
attention of the Organisation for Economics, 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) since 
its inception in 1960.  Their efforts in product 
safety were manifested in the establishment 
of Consumer Policy Committee to facilitate 
information exchange in product safety, and 
in 1972, OECD formed the Working Party on 
Product Safety.  The United Nations also plays 
a vital role in promoting product safety.  In 
1982, it passed a resolution on the Protection 
against Products Harmful to Health and the 
Environment, followed by its Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection in 1985.  Furthermore, 
various networks have also been established 
internationally to tackle the product safety issues, 
such as, Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
Pesticides Action Network (PAN) and Health 
Action International (HAI).  The significant 
contribution of the United Nations can be seen 
in its issue of the Consolidated List of Products 
Whose Consumption and/or Sale Have Been 
Banned, Withdrawn, Severely Restricted or 
Not Approved by Governments.  This list was 
part of the United Nations’ effort to disseminate 
information at the international level relating 
TABLE 1 
List of parent legislations on product safety
No. Legislation Objective
1. Poison Act 1952 To control the importation, possession, manufacturing, 
storage, transportation and use of poison.
2. Sale of Drugs Act 1952 To control and make regulations on the importation, 
exportation, production, sale and use of opium and other 
dangerous drugs. 
3. Medicine (Advertisement and 
Sales) Act 1956 
To prohibit certain advertisement relating to medical matters 
and to regulate the sale of substances recommended as a 
medicine. 
4. Trade Descriptions Act 2011 To promote good trade practices by prohibiting false trade 
descriptions and false or misleading statements, conduct 
and practices in relation to the supply of goods and services 
and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental 
thereto.
5. Pesticides Act 1974 To control the importation, production, sale and storage of 
pesticides through registration of import and export permits.
6. Food Act 1985 To protect the public against health hazards and fraud in the 
preparation, sale and use of food, and for matters incidental 
thereto or connected therewith.
7. Standards of Malaysia Act 1996 To formulate policies, programs, scheme, projects and 
activities on standardization.
8. Consumer Protection Act 1999 To provide for consumer protection, the establishment of the 
National Consumer Advisory Council and the Tribunal for 
Consumer Claims and for matters connected therewith.
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to unsafe products to health and environment 
(Sothi, 1994).
At the national level, since 1970’s, various 
consumer associations, such as the Consumer 
Association of Penang (CAP) and the Federation 
of Malaysian Consumer Associations (FOMCA), 
have initiated product testing on food, drinks, 
cosmetics, vehicles and other products.  The 
results of the testing are disseminated to the 
public through the consumer bulletins (Mohd 
Hamdan, 1990).  Besides the effort taken by 
the Malaysian consumer associations, the 
government has also taken legal measures to 
protect the consumers.  Before 1999, there were 
seven parent legislations which regulated product 
safety in various goods, and these legislations are 
still in force.  In 1999, Malaysia had enacted the 
Consumer Protection Act 1999, which brought 
significant changes to product safety.  Table 1 
shows the list of these legislations.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Laws have been used to protect consumers 
for centuries (Peter, 2004).  These laws have 
drawn on a variety of legal norms, including 
criminal laws, torts and contracts to achieve 
their objectives.  In relation to product safety, 
safety legal measures are seen as an important 
instrument to safeguard consumer safety from 
unsafe products.  According to Miller and 
Brian (1985), a considerable number of statutes 
and regulations are concerned with consumer 
safety.  Many are concerned with specific 
types of products, for example, food, drugs, 
medicines and poisons.  Meanwhile, others are of 
general applications.  Brian and Deborah (2000) 
analysed various goods safety legislations in the 
United Kingdom in relation to specific types of 
products, such as, the Pharmacy and Poisons 
Act 1933, Poisons Act 1972, Medicine Act 
1968 and others.  All these acts impose criminal 
law sanctions to safe guard consumer safety 
from unsafe products.  Likewise, Christoper, 
Mark and Howard (1996) analysed product 
safety provisions in the United Kingdom 
Consumer Protection Act 1987 and the General 
Product Safety Regulations 1994.  Notably, the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987 and the General 
Product Safety Regulations 1994 apply the 
similar sanction, which has been adopted by 
the Pharmacy and Poisons Act 1933, Poisons 
Act 1972, Medicine Act 1968 and other acts. 
In addition, Geraint and Thomas (1997) in their 
book also paid a particular attention to General 
Product Safety Regulations 1994.
Conversely, David and John (1997) divided 
their discussion on product safety into two parts, 
namely, product safety under the civil law and 
product safety under the criminal law.  Product 
safety under the civil law gives the right to the 
consumer to bring a personal action against the 
wrongdoer when the consumer suffers physical 
harm to his person or his property.  This personal 
action is called product liability action.  Product 
liability is generally the liability of persons for 
damages caused by defective products (Curzon, 
1998).  The physical harm is compensated 
through the operation of the law of tort, an action 
under the consumer protection legislation or an 
action for breach of contract (David & John, 
1997).  On the other hand, product safety under 
the criminal law, which is the focus of this paper, 
involves the intervention of the government or 
state to enforce the product safety legislations. 
Meanwhile, Wu Min Aun (2000) analysed 
the product safety provisions in the Malaysian 
Consumer Protection Act 1999.  Part III of 
the Consumer Protection Act 1999 deals with 
products or goods safety.1  Part III is of general 
applications, in which it applies to all products 
except for health care goods and food.  The study 
on product safety legislations in Malaysia is 
needed in order to see the legal measures taken 
by the government through the criminal law 
instrument under various legislations.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research method used in this study is the 
content analysis.  According to Valerine (1995), 
content analysis is a research method which is 
1 Part III of the Consumer Protection Act 1999 also deals with services safety.
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adopted to analyse legal provisions, ministries’ 
decisions, academic books, contracts and 
decided cases.  This method is chosen because 
the objective of this research is to examine the 
provisions of the product safety legislations to 
see the application of strict criminal liability in 
product safety legislations in Malaysia.  This 
research is pure legal research.  Mahdi Zaharaa 
(1998) also agreed that legal research is done 
to review and improve the concepts, theories, 
principles and applications of the law.  Notably, 
legal research refers to any systematic study 
of legal rules, principles, concepts, theories, 
doctrines, decided cases, legal institutions, legal 
problems, issues or questions or a combination 
of some or all of them (Anwarul Yaqin, 2007). 
Having mentioned that, the legal research of this 
article is a study of legal rules, decided cases and 
the underlying concepts pertaining to product 
safety legislations.  According to Anwarul Yaqin, 
a term of legal rules refers to rules recognised 
and enforceable under any legal system, or rules 
declared under any constitutional document, 
or statutory provisions framed by law-making 
bodies or authorities, or subsidiary legislation 
framed by administrative bodies or authorities. 
Further, Anwarul Yaqin explained that the term 
concepts, theories or doctrines are ordinarily 
used to refer to ideas, notions, perceptions or 
abstract principles that represent a particular 
view or explain the nature, purpose or function 
of law.
THE APPLICATION OF STRICT 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
As mentioned above, the Malaysian government 
has taken a legal measure to protect the 
consumers from unsafe products through 
various parent legislations as shown in Table 
1.  In all of these legislations, the legal measure 
taken is the application of criminal liability on 
those who contravene the provisions of the laws. 
This approach has a significant advantage for 
the consumers, which states that the expensive 
and time-consuming process of regulating the 
rogue is entrusted to public officials, who in 
recent legislation usually have a duty to enforce 
its provisions (Robert & Geoffrey, 2004). 
Criminal law is widely used as a means of 
deterring traders and producers from engaging 
in certain types of trading abuse, which operates 
to the detriment of consumers (David & John, 
1997).  In other words, the criminal law is 
used as a means of protecting the consumers’ 
interest.  The principal means of control is 
strict criminal liability, which is employed as a 
means of encouraging the business community 
to achieve high standards of trading conduct 
(David & John, 1997).  Strict criminal liability 
offence requires no blameworthiness on the part 
of the accused (Rusell, 2001).  The prosecution 
is relieved from the responsibility of proving 
that the alleged offence has the necessary mens 
rea (which means the state of mind) as to one of 
the elements in criminal law offence.  What the 
prosecution needs to prove is actus reus, which 
means the guilty act or forbidden conduct.  The 
normal criminal offences require the proof of 
actus reus (the forbidden conduct) and mens rea 
(the state of mind). 
The idea of strict liability took hold in the 
nineteenth century with the development of 
social legislation regulating certain activities 
affecting the public’s health, safety or welfare, 
such as food and drugs, liquor and health, as well 
as safety in factories and other places of work. 
It is largely confined to statutory offences and is 
possible where statutory definition of an offence 
fails to include and express mens rea or negligent 
requirement (Russell, 2001).
Strict criminal liability is used as an 
instrument by governments to protect consumers 
against the strength of producers (Sornarajah, 
1985).  Besides that, it is also used to enforce 
statutory standards (Michael, 1996) and able 
to prevent the offender and other people from 
committing the same offence.  Yong Pung How 
J. in the case of MC Strata Title No 641 v Public 
Prosecutor2 had made the following statement 
2 [1993] 2 SLR 650.
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in relation to the creation and objective of strict 
criminal liability:
The creation of strict liability offences 
would be vital in promoting the objects 
of the statute and encouraging greater 
vigilance to prevent the commission of 
the offences.
The justification for imposing strict criminal 
liability can also be seen in the judgment of Lord 
Diplock in the case of Tesco Supermarket Ltd v 
Nattrass3, whereby Lord Diplock had said that:
Consumer protection is achieved only 
if the occurrence of the prohibited 
acts or omissions is prevented. It is 
the deterrent effect of penal provisions 
which protects the consumer from the 
loss he would sustain if the offence 
were committed…The loss to the 
consumer is the same whether the 
acts or omissions, which result in his 
being given inaccurate or inadequate 
information, are intended to mislead 
him, or are due to carelessness or 
inadvertence. So is the corresponding 
gain to the other party to the business 
transaction with the consumer…Where, 
in the way that the business is now 
conducted, they are likely to be acts 
or omissions of employees of that 
party and subject to his orders, the 
most effective method of deterrence 
is to prove upon the employer the 
responsibility of doing everything 
which lies within his power to prevent 
his employees from doing anything 
which will result in the commission 
of an offence. This I apprehend is 
the rationale and moral justification 
for creating in the field of consumer 
protection…offences of ‘strict liability’. 
Based on the opinions of the above writers, 
strict criminal liability is imposed on activities 
affecting the public’s health, safety or welfare. 
Since public’s health, safety or welfare is very 
important for the stability of a country, it is 
submitted that the use of strict criminal liability 
is justified and must be supported.  The use of 
strict criminal liability to protect the public’s 
health and safety can be seen in the case of 
Hobbs v Winchester Corp.4  In Hobbs, the Court 
had to consider section 117 of the Public Health 
Act 1875, which provides that where any meat 
unfit for the food of man was exposed for sale, 
the person to whom the meat belonged or in 
whose possession, it shall be liable to a penalty. 
The question that arose for consideration was 
whether the offence under section 117 was 
complete by the mere fact of exposing for sale 
and selling meat unfit for human consumption 
or whether it was necessary to prove in addition 
that the butcher knew it was unfit.  Cozens-Hardy 
MR in his judgment said that:
In my opinion the offence was complete 
when the unsound meat was exposed 
for sale and sold, and I think it is 
not relevant for the butcher to say 
‘I did not know and my men did not 
know and neither I nor they with such 
knowledge as we had having regard 
to our positions in life could have 
ascertained that the meat was unsound, 
although experts have subsequently 
given evidence which has satisfied the 
arbitrator that such was the case.
Cozens-Hardy MR held that a person in 
possession of meat intended for human food is 
liable to conviction whether he knew or did not 
know that the meat was unfit for human food. 
In rejecting the argument of the accused that as 
the disease could not reasonably be discovered 
except by an expert, strict liability should not be 
imposed, Kennedy L J further said:
3 [1972] AC 153.
4 [1910] 2 KB 471.
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…To say that the difficulty of discovering 
the disease is sufficient ground for 
enabling the seller to excuse himself on 
the plea that he cannot be reasonably 
expected to have the requisite technical 
knowledge or to keep an analyst on 
his premises, is simply to say that the 
public are to be left unprotected and 
must submit to take risk of purchasing 
an article of food which may turn out to 
be dangerous to life and health.
In Public Prosecutor v Teo Kwang Kiang,5 
the High Court of Singapore agreed that the 
imposition of strict liability was necessary for 
the protection of the public.  The respondent 
in this case was charged with an offence under 
section 40(1) of the Singapore Environmental 
Public Health Act 1987 for having in possession 
snow peas (a type of vegetable) which were 
unfit for human consumption.  The prosecuting 
officer argued that section 40(1) of the Act is 
an absolute liability provision and the words 
importing mens rea are not present in section 
40(1).  The vegetables were in his possession, 
and therefore, he was guilty of an offence under 
the Act.  Section 40(1) of the Environmental 
Public Health Act 1987 reads:
No person shall, without lawful excuse, 
have in his possession any article of 
food intended for human consumption 
which is unsound or unfit for human 
consumption.
Furthermore, S. Rajendran J., who delivered 
the judgment of the Court, agreed with the 
contention of the prosecutor.  According to the 
learned judge, since the respondent had the 
snow peas in his possession, he had imported 
them for the purpose of human consumption 
and the snow peas had a very high quantity of 
carbon disulphide in them that they were unfit 
for human consumption, the respondent was 
guilty of the offence charged.  The decision in 
Public Prosecutor v Teo Kwang Kiang shows 
the willingness of the Court to impose strict 
criminal liability when the public’s health or 
safety is at stake.
There is an argument which says that 
whenever a statute is silent as to mens rea, there 
is a presumption that, in order to give effect to 
the will of Parliament, we must read in words 
appropriate to require mens rea, and this was 
decided in the case of Sweet v Parsley.6  House 
of Lords in Sweet v Parsley further said:
The fact that other sections of the 
Act expressly required mens rea, for 
example, because they contain the word 
“knowingly”, is not in itself sufficiently 
to justify a decision that a section which 
is silent as to mens rea creates a strict 
liability offence.
Later in 1985, the case of Gammon (Hong 
Kong) Ltd v Attorney-General7 states that 
the presumption that mens rea is required for 
criminal offence can be rebutted if the words of 
a statute suggest that strict liability is intended. 
In Gammon, it was stated that the presumption 
that mens rea is required was less strong for 
regulatory offences than truly criminal offences. 
Gammon is an example of a regulatory offence. 
The defendants in Gammon were involved 
in building works in Hong Kong.  Part of the 
building they were constructing fell down, and 
it was found that the collapse had occurred 
because the builders had failed to follow 
the original plans exactly.  The Hong Kong 
building regulations prohibited deviation of 
any substantial way from such plan, and thus, 
the defendants were charged with breaching 
the regulations and were convicted in the lower 
court.  On appeal, they argued that they were 
not liable because they did not know that the 
5 [1992] 1 CLJ 318.
6 [1969] 1 All ER 347.
7 [1985] AC 1.
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changes they made were substantial ones. 
Nevertheless, the Privy Council held that the 
relevant regulations created offences of strict 
liability and the conviction was upheld.
The reason why the House of Lords was 
reluctant to treat the offence in Sweet v Parsley 
as strict liability offence was because, the 
offence in Sweet v Parsley was regarded as 
being a ‘true crime’, and not merely a breach 
of regulatory provisions.  In Sweet v Parsley 
case, Ms Sweet, who was a teacher, took a 
sublease of a farmhouse outside Oxford.  She 
rented the house to the tenants and rarely spent 
any time there.  Unknown to her, the tenants 
were smoking cannabis on the premise.  When 
they were caught, she was found guilty of being 
concerned in the management of the premise, 
which was being used for the purpose of 
smoking cannabis, contrary to the Dangerous 
Drugs Act 1965.  Ms Sweet appealed on the 
ground that she knew nothing about what the 
tenants were doing, and could not reasonably 
have been expected to have known.  Lord Reid 
in this case acknowledged that strict liability 
is appropriate for regulatory offences or quasi-
crimes, which are not criminal in any real sense. 
However, their Lordships regarded the offence, 
which Ms Sweet was being charged, as a true 
crime - the stigma had, for example, caused Ms 
Sweet to lose her job.  Their Lordships held that 
it was not a strict liability offence, and since Ms 
Sweet did not have the necessary mens rea, her 
conviction was overturned. 
The reluctance of the courts to treat an 
offence as strict liability offence when a statute 
is silent as to mens rea can further be seen in 
the case of B (a minor) v DPP.8  In this case, 
a 15-year-old boy had sex with a 13-year-old 
girl.  The boy was charged with inciting a child 
under the age of 14 to commit an act of gross 
indecency.  Both the trial judge and the Court 
of Appeal ruled that this was a strict liability 
offence and that there was therefore no defence 
available that the boy believed the girl to be 
over 14.  The House of Lords confirmed that 
there was a presumption that mens rea was 
required, and ruled that the relevant offence was 
not actually one of strict liability.  The House 
stated that in order to rebut the presumption that 
the offence required mens rea, there needed to 
be a ‘compellingly clear implication’ that the 
Parliament intended the offence to be one of 
strict liability.  Since the offence carried a serious 
social stigma and a heavy sentence, the House of 
Lords decided that the Parliament did not have 
this intention.
In Malaysia, the product safety legislations 
deal with regulatory offences.  A regulatory 
offence is one in which no moral issue is 
involved, and usually (though not always) 
one for which the maximum penalty is small 
(Catherine & Frances: 2008).  According to 
Cobuild Dictionary (1997), the term ‘moral’ 
refers to principles and beliefs concerning right 
and wrong behaviours.  In addition, the product 
safety legislations in Malaysia are enacted to 
protect the public’s health and safety.  All the 
product safety legislations discuss below aim 
at protecting consumers from unsafe products. 
It is submitted that since the offences in the 
legislations are regulatory offences aiming at 
protecting the public’s interest, the strict criminal 
liability must be imposed when the words of the 
provisions are silent as to mens rea.
Sale of Drugs Act 1952
The Sale of Drugs Act 1952 is under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health.  This Act 
protects consumers from adulterated drugs, false 
or misleading statements on drugs and others. 
Section 2 of the Sale of Drugs Act 1952 defines 
drug as:
any substance, product or article 
intended to be used or capable, or 
purported or claimed to be capable, of 
being used on humans or any animals, 
whether internally or externally, for a 
medicinal purpose.
8 [2000] AC 428.
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According to this section, drugs intended 
to be regulated under this Act are drugs used for 
medicinal purposes on humans and animals.  The 
Sale of Drugs Act 1952 allows the public to have 
any drug analysed.  This can be done through 
any medical officer or inspector appointed 
under section 3 of the Act.  Section 6 of the Act 
provides that:
Any person, other than the seller, 
may, on payment of the prescribed fee 
together with the cost of the sample, 
require any officer of inspector to 
purchase a sample of any drug and 
submit the same for analysis. 
The application of strict criminal liability 
is found in section 10 of the Act.  Section 10 
stipulates that:
(i) any person commits an offence who sells -
 • any adulterated drug without fully 
informing the purchaser at the time of 
the sale of the nature of the adulteration;
 • any drug in any package which bears 
or has attached thereto any false or 
misleading statement, word, brand, label 
or mark purporting to indicate the nature, 
quality, strength, purity, composition, 
weight, origin, age or proportion of the 
article contained in the package or of any 
ingredient thereof;
 • any drug containing any substance 
addition of which is prohibited;
 • any drug containing a greater proportion 
of any substance than is permitted;
 • any drug for internal use which contains 
methyl alcohol, isopropyl alcohol or 
denatured alcohol; or
 • any drug which is not of the nature or not 
of the substance or not of the quality of 
the drug demanded by the purchaser to 
the prejudice of the purchaser.
The provision in section 10(1)(a) is quite 
misleading.  The provision will have the 
implication that adulterated drug can be sold if 
the seller informs the purchaser at the time of the 
sale of the nature of the adulteration.  Anything 
which is adulterated is dangerous and must be 
prevented from selling.  It is submitted that this 
provision needs to be reviewed.  
The section creates a regulatory offence, in 
which no moral issue is involved.  The section 
makes it an offence if anybody sells adulterated 
drug, or drug which contains prohibited 
substance, or  drug which is prejudiced to the 
purchaser.  The offence is committed by the act 
of selling the prohibited drug.  It is submitted 
that, to presume that the offence requires mens 
rea as decided in the case of Sweet v Parsley is 
not appropriate because it does not involve a 
moral issue
Medicines (Advertisement and Sale) Act 1956
The Medicines (Advertisement and Sale) Act 
1956 regulates advertisements and sales relating 
to medicines, which is under the purview of 
the Ministry of Health.  The Act regulates 
medicinal advertisements by prohibiting certain 
advertisements and imposing the requirement 
that all advertisements relating to medicines 
must obtain the approval from the Medicine 
Advertisements Board as stipulated in section 4B 
of the Act.  The imposition of this requirement 
is to ensure that there is no false or misleading 
information in the advertisements and also to 
safeguard the safety of the consumers.
Sec t ion  3(1) (a )  o f  the  Medic ines 
(Advertisement and Sale) Act 1956 prohibits 
advertisements relating to certain diseases 
specified in the Schedule to the Act.  The 
Act has listed twenty diseases whereby the 
advertisements relating to these diseases are 
prohibited.  Some of these diseases are defects 
of the kidney, defects of the heart, diabetes, 
asthma, and tuberculosis.  Despite the fact that 
the advertisements relating to these diseases are 
prohibited, nevertheless, we can still see many 
medicines which claim that they can cure these 
diseases.  To substantiate these claims, they 
produce testimonials from people who have 
used the medicines.  This normally occurs in 
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traditional medicines.  There is a difficulty to 
charge them under this Act because the Act does 
not cover advertisements in relation to traditional 
medicines.  Nevertheless, the Ministry of Health 
is now in the process of coming up with an act 
to regulate these traditional medicines.
The Act also prohibits advertisements 
relating to medicines for the purpose of practising 
contraception among human beings, improving 
the condition or function of the human kidney or 
heart, or improving the sexual function or sexual 
performance of human beings, as stipulated in 
section 3(1)(b) & (c).  Besides that, according 
to section 4 of the Act, advertisements relating 
to any medicines that can procure miscarriages 
among women are also prohibited.  Thus, any 
person who contravenes all these prohibitions 
is committing an offence under section 5 of the 
Medicines (Advertisement and Sale) Act 1956. 
Again, section 5 is silent as to the element 
of mens rea.  Is it justified to presume that mens 
rea is needed?  If one looks at the objective of the 
Act, which is to prohibit certain advertisements 
relating to medical matters and to regulate the 
sale of substances recommended as a medicine, 
the Act is merely creating regulatory offences. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the offences 
created under section 5 are strict liability 
offences. 
Trade Descriptions Act 2011
The Trade Descriptions Act 2011 is a new 
Act which replaces the Trade Description 
Act 1972.  It is under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and 
Consumerism and is more comprehensive than 
the 1972 Act. 
Trade descriptions are defined in section 
6(1) of the Act.  This Act is used, amongst others, 
to monitor false trade descriptions to products 
by making it an offence in section 5(1) of the 
Act to apply false trade descriptions to any 
goods or products.  Through this mechanism, the 
consumers are protected from imitation products, 
which may cause dangers to them.  In relation 
to product monitoring, a power is given to the 
Assistant Controller of Trade Descriptions in 
section 30 of the Act.  This monitoring power is 
related to the control of false trade descriptions 
to goods or products.  Goods in the context of 
this Act include all kinds of moveable property 
regardless whether they are food, health care, 
pharmaceuticals and others.   
The Trade Descriptions Act 2011 is also the 
manifestation of the application of strict criminal 
liability.  In section 5(1), it provides that any 
person who does any of the following commits 
an offence:
 • applies a false trade description to any 
goods; or
 • supplies or offers to supply any goods to 
which a false trade description is applied, or 
 • exposes for supply or has in his possession, 
custody or control for supply any goods to 
which a false trade description is applied.
In the case of Ang Seng Ho v Public 
Prosecutor,9 it was held that the offence in 
section 3 (under the Trade Descriptions Act 
1972, which has no significant difference from 
section 5(1) of the 2011 Act, except that section 
5(1) of the 2011 includes one more offence, 
that is the offence of exposing for supply or 
has in his possession, custody or control for 
the supply of any goods to which a false trade 
description is applied) was a strict liability 
offence.  In this case, the appellant was charged 
under section 3(1)(b) of the Trade Descriptions 
Act 1972 for supplying groundnuts, which 
falsely bore the brand name of Thumb Brand 
Ngan Yin Groundnut Factory.  The appellant 
contented that he had no knowledge that the 
groundnuts were an imitation and relied on the 
defence in section 24(1) of the same Act, which 
allowed the defence of mistake or the reliance of 
information supplied to the accused person or the 
act or default of another person or an accident or 
some other cause beyond the accused’s control. 
9 [1991] 2 CLJ Rep 265.
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Section 24(3) provides that the accused must 
prove that he did not know and could not with 
reasonable diligence have ascertained that the 
good did not conform to the description or that 
the description had been applied to the good. 
James Foong CJ held that under section 24 of 
the Trade Descriptions Act 1972, the word used 
therein ‘is for the person charged to prove’ the 
relevant stated defences.  This implies that the 
offences under the Act are strict liability.  It is for 
the accused person to prove his mental state at 
the time of the offence in order to avail himself 
of one of the defences.
In the case of PP v Intrakota Consolidated 
Bhd,10 the High Court ruled that the existence of 
due diligence defence dispelled the suggestion 
that the offence was a strict liability.  The 
respondent in this case was charged with an 
offence under section 22(1) of the Environmental 
Quality Act 1974 for the emission of excess 
smoke.  The section was silent as to the 
requirement of mens rea.  However, the defence 
in section 43(2) of the Act provided for due 
diligence.  Contrary to what had been decided by 
James Foong C J, Abdul Wahab Patai J. decided 
that the offence was not a strict liability offence 
due to the existence of this defence.
It is in the opinion of the writer that the 
decision arrived by James Foong C J should be 
the correct decision.  The existence of statutory 
defences, particularly the due diligence defence, 
do not alter the nature of strict liability offence. 
These statutory defences are to help the innocent 
offender to escape liability if he can show that 
one of the statutory defences provided for 
applies to him (David & John: 1997).  What the 
prosecution needs to prove is the commission of 
the offence, and then it is the duty of the person 
charged to prove the defences if he wants to rely 
on any of the defences.  If he fails to prove any 
of the defences, then the offence is committed.
Pesticides Act 1974
The Pesticides Act 1974 is under the purview 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-based 
Industry.  Section 2 of the Pesticides Act 1974 
defines pesticides as follows:
 • any substance that contains an active 
ingredient; or
 • any preparation, mixture or material that 
contains any one or more of the active 
ingredients as one of its constituents.
However, this does not include contaminated 
food or any article listed in the Second Schedule.
Section 7 of the Act makes it mandatory to 
any person who desires to import or manufacture 
a pesticide to apply to the Pesticide Board to have 
the pesticide registered.  One of the conditions to 
enable the pesticide to be registered is specified 
in section 8(1)(c) of the Act.  It stipulates that 
the applicant must satisfy the Pesticides Board 
that the pesticide, if used or handled according to 
the instructions contained in its proposed label, 
would be efficacious and safe to human beings 
and animals, or constitutes a risk to human 
beings and animals of such a minimal extent or 
degree as to be outweighed by the necessity or 
advantages of using the pesticide.
Pesticides are normally used in food, 
particularly, vegetables and fruits.  Therefore, 
in order to protect consumers from food 
contaminated with pesticides, section 21(1) 
of the Act empowers the Ministry concerned, 
after consulting the Pesticides Board and the 
Ministry responsible for health services, to make 
regulations to prohibit:-
the addition to or the use or presence 
in food or any specified kind thereof, or 
the treatment of food or any specified 
kind thereof, or with any specified 
pesticide or more than the specified 
quantity, proportion, strength, or 
concentration thereof.
Contaminated food is defined in section 2 
of the Pesticides Act 1974 to mean:-
10 [1999] 4 CLJ 714.
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food in which there is present a pesticide, 
or a quantity, proportion, strength, 
or concentration of a pesticide, in 
contravention of regulations made 
under section 21; and a reference to 
the use or presence of a pesticide in 
food includes a reference to its use or 
presence on food. 
Section 24 of the Pesticides Act 1974 gives 
the right to food analysis to the public.  This 
can be done in two methods.  The first method 
is provided in section 24(1), which provides:
A person who has bought any food 
shall, on payment of the prescribed 
fees, be entitled to have a sample of 
the food analysed by an analyst in 
order to determine whether the food is 
contaminated, and to receive from him 
a certificate of analysis.
Under this provision, the buyer of food may 
give the sample of the food to the food analyst 
together with the prescribed fees to have the 
food analysed to determine whether the food is 
contaminated.  The other method is specified in 
section 24(2) of the Act, which states:
A person, other than the seller of 
the food, may, on payment of the 
prescribed fees and the cost of the 
sample, require an authorized officer 
to purchase a sample of any food and 
submit it for analysis by an analyst in 
order to determine whether the food is 
contaminated.
In the second method, the applicant needs to 
pay the prescribed fees and the cost for the food 
sample to the authorised officer.  The authorised 
officer will arrange for the food analysis by 
giving the sample to an analyst.
Besides the right given to the public to have 
the food analysed, the power of entry, inspection 
and seizure is given to the authorised officer. 
Such power is codified in section 22 of the 
Pesticides Act 1974.  Section 22 codifies that an 
authorised officer may:-
 • at all reasonable times enter into and inspect 
any place where he has reason to believe that 
there is any food intended for sale;
 • inspect any food, wherever found, that he 
has reason to believe to be  intended for sale;
 • seize, detain, or remove any such food that is 
or appears or is believed to be contaminated 
food, and any mark, seal, or otherwise secure 
the food in order to affect seizure, detention, 
or removal thereof.
The application of strict criminal liability 
can be found in section 25 of the Pesticides Act 
1974, whereby it provides that a person who 
sells any contaminated food commits an offence. 
It is sufficient for the offence to be committed 
by the act of selling contaminated food only. 
Whether the accused has the knowledge or not, 
is irrelevant.
Food Act 1983 and Food Regulations 1985
Food Act 1983 is the primary Act which 
regulates food.  This Act is supported by the 
Food Regulations 1985.  Food Regulations 1985 
prescribes compositional standards, standards 
for additives and nutrient supplement, standards 
for food packages and standards for labelling 
of particular food.  All these standards are 
mandatory standards which must be complied 
with by the food manufacturers.  Both of these 
legislations are under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Health.  In addition, food is defined 
under section 2 of the Food Act 1983 to include:
Every article manufactured, sold or 
represented for use as food or drink for 
human consumption or which enters 
into or is used in the composition, 
p repara t ion  and  preserva t ion 
of any food or drink and includes 
confectionary, chewing substances 
and any ingredient of such food, drink, 
confectionery or chewing substances.
Rahmah Ismail et al.
68 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 20 (S) 2012
Hence, from the definition of food 
above, it gathers that food includes anything 
manufactured, sold or presented for use as 
food or drink for human consumption and 
any ingredients used in any food or drink 
including confectionery and chewing substances. 
However, live animals, which also can be used 
as human consumption, are not considered as 
food under section 2 of the Food Act 1983. 
This was held in Chuang Hock Meng @ Chung 
Hock Meng v Pegawai Kesihatan Daerah Hulu 
Langat Kajang, Selangor Darul Ehsan & Anor.11 
It was decided that live pigs which had been 
seisured could not be accepted as an article that 
could be used in the composition, preparation or 
preservation of any food as defined under section 
2 of the Act.
In order to ensure that only safe food is 
supplied to the consumers, the Food Act 1983 
has created various criminal offences.  The 
offences are as follows:
 • selling food containing substances injurious 
to health, as stipulated in section 13;
 • selling food unfit for human consumption, as 
stipulated in section 13A;
 • selling adulterated food, as stipulated in 
section 13B;
 • selling food not of the nature, substance or 
quality demanded, as stipulated in section14;
 • selling food whose label does not comply 
with the prescribed standard, as stipulated 
in section 15; and
 • selling food which has a false label, as 
stipulated in section 16.
The wordings in sections 13, 13A, 13B, 14, 
15 and 16 are silent as to mens rea.  The question 
here is - do all these sections create strict liability 
offences?  According to Barry (2000), modern 
food legislation has been of strict liability since 
its inception generally.  To relieve the harshness 
of strict liability offences, the Parliament has 
customarily added provisions which enable 
the liability to be passed on the person truly 
responsible for the contravention and afford 
honest traders statutory defences (Barry: 2000).
In the Food Act 1983, the defence of ‘all 
reasonable steps’ is provided in section 23 of 
the Act.  In the case of Public Prosecutor v 
Pengurus, Rich Food Products Sdn. Bhd,12 the 
respondent was charged under section 11(1)(b) 
of the Sale of Food and Drug Ordinance 1952, 
which is equivalent to section 15 of the Food Act 
1983.  The respondent was relying on a defence 
in section 21 of the Sale of Food and Drug Act 
1952, which is equivalent to section 23 of the 
Food Act 1983.  The defence in section 21 of 
the Sale of Food and Drug Act 1952 stated that:
…it shall be no defence that the 
defendant did not act wilfully unless he 
also proves that he took all reasonable 
steps in ascertaining that the sale of the 
article would not constitute an offence 
against this Ordinance.
Mohd Yusoff Muhamed J. held that with this 
defence, the offence in section 11(1)(b) of the 
Sale of Food and Drug Act 1952 was not a strict 
liability offence.  The writer would like to differ 
from the decision of the Learned Judge.  The 
defence in section 21 did not alter the burden of 
the prosecution in proving the offence in section 
11(1)(b) of the Sale of Food and Drug Act 1952. 
The provisions in section 11(1)(b) is silent as to 
mens rea.  Therefore, the prosecution only had to 
prove the actus reus.  If the defendant or accused 
would like to rely on section 21 of the Sale of 
Food and Drug Act 1952, the defendant had to 
prove that he did not act wilfully by proving to 
the court that he had taken all reasonable steps 
in ascertaining that the sale of the article would 
not constitute an offence against this Ordinance. 
It is for the defendant to prove the state of his 
mind, not the prosecution.
11 [2002] 4 MLJ 27.
12 [1981] CLJ Rep 257.
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Standards of Malaysia Act 1996
This Act is under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation 
(MOSTI).  It regulates the Department of 
Standards Malaysia in exercising its function as 
the standard development agency. ‘Standard’ is 
defined in section 2 of the Act as:
a document approved by a recognized 
body, that provides for common and 
repeated use, rules, guidelines or 
characteristics for products or related 
processes and production methods, with 
which compliance is not mandatory; 
and which may also include or deal 
exclusively with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling 
requirements as they apply to a product, 
process or production method.
Although the Department of Standards is 
entrusted with standard development, in carrying 
out this function, it has appointed the Standard 
of Industrial Research Institute of Malaysia 
(SIRIM) for standard development activities. 
All standard development activities are done 
by SIRIM.
Section 15 of the Standards of Malaysia 
Act 1996 empowers the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation to declare any 
specification, which has been adopted with 
or without modification to be a standard 
specification or a provisional standard 
specification.  However, this provision does 
not make this standard as a mandatory to be 
complied with by manufacturers.  The standards 
will only become a mandatory when they 
are prescribed as mandatory by the relevant 
Ministry in regulations.  In 2009, the Ministry of 
Domestic Trade, Cooperatives and Consumerism 
had enacted two regulations to impose safety 
standards on toys.  The regulations are the 
Consumer Protection (Certificate of Approval 
and Conformity Mark of Safety Standards) 
Regulations 2009 and the Consumer Protection 
(Safety Standards for Toys) Regulations 2009. 
In 2010, the Consumer Protection (Certificate 
of Approval and Conformity Mark of Safety 
Standards) Regulations 2009 was replaced by the 
Consumer Protection (Certificate of Approval 
and Conformity Mark of Safety Standards) 
Regulations 2010.  The Consumer Protection 
(Safety Standards for Toys) Regulations 2009 
was also amended in 2010 to include the standard 
for safety of electric toys.  In addition, there are 
other regulations, orders and rules, which have 
imposed standards on various goods before the 
enforcement of the Consumer Protection Act 
1999, such as the Electrical Supply Regulations 
1990 and the Electrical Regulations 1994 which 
impose standards on electrical goods, the Motor 
Vehicles (Safety Belt) Rules 1978 which imposes 
standards on safety belts, the Motorcycles 
Order (Safety Helmet)  Rules 1973 which 
imposes standards on safety helmets, and the 
Trade Descriptions (Marking of Non-Pressure 
Kerosene Stove) Order 1991 which imposes 
standards on kerosene stoves.
The strict criminal liability offences created 
under section 18 of the Standards of Malaysia 
Act 1996 are geared towards ensuring no false 
representation in relation to accreditation, 
standard specification and standard conformity. 
These false representations may be done on 
commodities, processes, practices or services. 
Notably, the word ‘commodity’ is defined in 
section 2 of the Act to mean any article, product 
or thing that is a subject of trade or commerce. 
Consumer Protection Act 1999
The Consumer Protection Act 1999 came into 
force on 15 November 1999 and under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Domestic Trade, 
Co-operatives and Consumerism.  In relation 
to products/goods safety, it is codified in Part 
III of the Act.  Section 19(6) of the Act limits 
the application of Part III, which does not apply 
to healthcare goods and food.  Nevertheless, it 
applies to imported goods as provided in section 
24 of the Consumer Protection Act 1999.
The Act has brought certain important 
changes in product safety, such as power vested 
to the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives 
and Consumerism to monitor product safety 
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and imposition of safety standards for products 
or goods.  In relation to the monitoring power 
vested to the Ministry, the monitoring is done 
at two stages, namely, at pre-marketing stage 
and at marketing stage.  Monitoring at pre-
marketing stage can be seen in section 19(1), 
which empowers the Ministry to prescribe safety 
standards for goods or class of goods.  According 
to Wu Min Aun, the purpose of prescribing safety 
standards is to prevent risks of injury (Wu Min 
Aun: 2000).  On the other hand, monitoring at 
marketing stage is seen in section 23(1), which 
empowers the Ministry to declare unsafe goods 
as prohibited goodsThe power of the Ministry 
to prescribe safety standards for products or 
goods will be able to overcome many unsafe 
consumer goods in the market.  It is the hope 
of the consumers that the Ministry will utilize 
this power as many consumer products in the 
market do not have safety standards.  However, 
only in 2009, the Ministry of Domestic Trade, 
Co-operatives and Consumerism utilised the 
power given in section 19(1) by prescribing 
safety standards for toys.  Two regulations were 
enacted to enforce the standards, namely, the 
Consumer Protection (Safety Standards for Toys) 
Regulations 2009 which contains the list of safety 
standards for toys, and the Consumer Protection 
(Certificate of Approval and Conformity Mark 
of Safety Standards) Regulations 2009 which 
was later replaced by the Consumer Protection 
(Certificate of Approval and Conformity Mark 
of Safety Standards) Regulations 2010.
In order to help the businesses that 
supply toys in Malaysia to comply with the 
legislations and requirements imposed by the 
Ministry of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and 
Consumerism, the Ministry concerned has issued 
the Guideline on Mandatory Standards for Toys 
2010.  This Guideline will assist the industry to 
understand the main features of the legislations 
and the requirements in order to confirm to the 
prescribed safety standards.
Based on these two regulations, any person 
or business that supplies, or offers to or advertises 
for supply toys must ensure that:
 • the toys comply with the prescribed safety 
standards;
 • the Certificate of Conformance (COC) is 
issued by the product owner;
 • a copy of the COC is to be kept for record 
and enforcement purposes;
 • the toys are marked or affixed with the 
conformity mark (MC) together with the 
registration number determined by the 
Ministry of Trade, Co-operatives and 
Consumerism;
 • the toys are marked and affixed with the 
name and address of the manufacturer, 
importer or distributor; and
 • the toys must be accompanied by warnings 
and information on precautions where 
necessary.  These must be either in the Malay 
language or/and the English language.  As an 
addition, other languages may also be used.
When there is a safety standard determined 
by the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives 
and Consumerism, section 20 provides that no 
person shall supply, or offer to or advertise for 
supply any goods which do not comply with 
the safety standards determined under section 
19(1).  In the situation where no safety standard 
has been determined, section 19(4) provides that 
the person supplies or offers to supply the goods 
shall adopt and observe a reasonable standard of 
safety to be expected by a reasonable consumer, 
due regard being had to the nature of the goods 
concerned.  According to Wu Min Aun, this 
provision can act as a safety net to catch goods 
which are not safe (Wu Min Aun: 2000).13 On 
the other hand, section 21 imposes general 
safety requirement for goods.  It provides that, 
in addition and without prejudice to section 20, 
13 Wu Min Aun, Consumer Protection Act 1999: Supply of Goods and Services, Pearson Education Malaysia Sdn Bhd, 
2000, p 32.
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no person shall supply, or offer to or advertise 
for supply any goods which are not reasonably 
safe having regard to all the circumstances, 
including:-
 • the manner in which, and the purpose 
for which, the goods are being or will be 
marketed;
 • the get-up of the goods;
 • the use of any mark in relation to the goods; 
and
 • the instructions or warnings in respect of the 
keeping, use or consumption of the goods.
This general safety requirement will impose 
on the supplier a duty to trade safely.  It does 
not impose a duty to supply goods which are 
absolutely safe as the cost of achieving this will 
be very costly and this will make consumer 
goods to be so expensive that they fall out of the 
reach of poorer consumers.
The penalty for contravening the provisions 
in Part III is provided in Part IV of the Consumer 
Protection Act 1999, particularly section 25. 
Section 25 provides that any person who 
contravenes Part II and III commits an offence. 
The section is silent as to mens rea   The writer 
would like to suggest that there is no necessity 
to presume mens rea in section 25 because 
this section is creating a regulatory offence. 
Although section 22 allows the person charged 
to put up a defence of no knowledge and had no 
reasonable ground to believe that the goods or 
services failed to comply with the requirement 
of section 20 or 21, the duty to prove the state 
of knowledge in section 22 is burdened on the 
person charged, not on the prosecution.  The duty 
of the prosecution is to prove the commission of 
the crime by way of contravening any provisions 
in Part III without the necessity to prove the state 
of mind of the person charged.  It is submitted 
that the existence of the defence of no knowledge 
does not alter the nature of strict liability offence 
in section 25.  
CONCLUSION
Criminal law performs a number of important 
functions in society, but chief among these is 
that of protecting the consumer from harm.  The 
above discussion reveals that all the studied 
legislations employ criminal liability offences. 
However, the question that arises is that - do all 
the studied legislations impose a strict liability 
offence? This question needs to be addressed 
because the relevant provisions are silent as 
to mens rea.  Although it is difficult to decide 
whether the statutory provisions impose strict 
criminal liability, the decided cases show that 
the courts are willing to impose a strict criminal 
liability when the provisions create regulatory 
offences.  The defendants in regulatory offences 
usually, although not necessarily, be those 
acting in the course of a trade or business. 
Such defendants may be particularly suitable 
candidates for the imposition of strict criminal 
liability.  They are suitable candidates because 
they are very often well placed to pay the penalty, 
which usually be a fine; they participate in a 
potentially hazardous activity by choice; and 
they take the benefit of that activity, and ought 
therefore to bear the loss when mistakes are 
made.  In Malaysia, product safety legislations 
regulate offences that affect the public’s health 
and safety.  The use of criminal law is believed 
to be one of the methods that can control the 
offences of product safety.  The offences created 
by the relevant provisions are not ‘true crime’ 
and they do not involve moral issues, though 
this statement on moral issues is not always 
right when we define crime as morally wrong. 
The words moral issues must be given strict 
interpretation, which involves bad behaviour. 
Therefore, the writer would like to suggest that 
strict criminal liability is imposed in product 
safety legislations when the relevant provisions 
are silent as to mens rea.  It is further submitted 
that the creation of strict criminal liability 
offences will be able to protect consumers from 
unsafe products. 
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BACKGROUND
Build Operate Transfer (BOT) is a kind of legal 
mechanism of privatisation (UNIDO, 1996).  It 
is a structure that utilizes the private investment 
in undertaking the public sectors infrastructure 
projects, apart from being a complicated process 
with multiple parties and contracts.  In more 
specific, BOT is a business venture between the 
government and the concessionaire, with the 
ownership of the project asset transferred to the 
government at the end of the concession period.
The privatisation of road projects in 
Malaysia via Build Operate Transfer (BOT) 
mechanism began in 1984, whereby the Federal 
Roads (Private Investment Management) 
Act was enacted to allow the privatisation of 
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ABSTRACT
Build Operate Transfer (BOT) is a kind of legal mechanism of privatisation.  It is a business venture between 
the government and the concessionaire, with the ownership of the project asset transferred to the government 
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the emergence of capital market which consisted of conventional and Islamic capital market.  Both Islamic 
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contemporary Islamic law, and it is resulted from the modern infrastructure development needs.  Although 
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and other countries.  The study adopted an analytical approach by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of 
the financing contracts via the sale, partnership, and lease contract.  Finally, the findings showed that sale-based 
financing is more popular to the Project Company of BOT in Malaysia due to the fixed return and deferred 
payment mechanism.  On the other hand, the mudarabah and musharakah contract provides an alternative to 
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road constructions and management.  For this 
purpose, the BOT mechanism was adopted 
because it is a “win-win situation” in which the 
private entity may compensate the financing via 
toll collection and the completed project will be 
transferred back to the Government at the end 
of the concession period.
Table 1 shows the total number of projects 
according to sectors, privatisation mechanism 
adopted, and investment.  BOT is considered as 
one of the categories of Greenfield project.  A 
Greenfield project refers to a private entity or 
a public-private joint venture which builds and 
operates a new facility for the period specified in 
the project contract.  The facility may be returned 
to the public sector at the end of the concession 
period.  Other categories of the Greenfield 
project include build, lease, and transfer (BLT), 
build, operate, and transfer (BOT) and build, 
own, and operate (BOO).  On the other hand, 
concession is a technique whereby a private 
entity takes over the management of a state-
owned enterprise for a given period, during 
which it also assumes significant investment 
risk.  It consists of modes such as rehabilitate, 
operate, and transfer (ROT), rehabilitate, lease 
or rent, and transfer (RLT), build, rehabilitate, 
operate, and transfer (BROT).  Table 1 illustrates 
that 57 out of 96 projects opted for Greenfield 
mechanism in all the sectors.  Two sectors with 
high utilization of the Greenfield technique are 
energy and transportation.
Table 2 highlights the total investment of 
the projects according to sectors.  Energy and 
transportation sectors were high investment 
projects compared to others during the period. 
Due to the high investment nature, both projects 
were suitable for BOT mechanism, whereby 
the Government awarded the concession to the 
private entity to build and operate the facilities. 
TABLE 1 
Total number of project and privatisation mechanism in Malaysia from 1990 to 2008
Sector Concession Divestiture Greenfield project Management and lease contract Total
Energy 0 4 22 0 26
Telecom 0 1 6 0 7
Transport 18 1 27 1 47
Water and sewerage 11 1 2 2 16
Total 29 7 57 3 96
Source: Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects Database of the World Bank, <http://ppi.worldbank.org >, retrieved 
on 20/11/2009.
TABLE 2 
Total investment in projects according to type and primary sector (US $ million) in 
Malaysia from 1990 to 2008
Sector Concession Divestiture Greenfield project Management and lease contract Total
Energy 0 3,805 10,508 0 14,313
Telecom 0 2,469 7,127 0 9,596
Transport 3,626 130 12,796 0 16,552
Water and sewerage 9,422 16 706 0 10,144
Total 13,048 6,420 31,136 0 50,605
Source: Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects Database of the World Bank, <http://ppi.worldbank.org>, retrieved 
on 20/11/2009.
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In the course of operation, the private entity may 
recoup the expenditure incurred by collecting 
tolls or fees from the end users.  After the 
expiration of the concession period, the project 
will be returned back to the Government.
A decade after the beginning of privatisation 
was marked by the emergence of the capital 
market which consisted of conventional and 
Islamic capital market (Ruzian & Norilawati, 
2009).  Both the capital markets facilitate 
privatisation and infrastructure projects by the 
issuance of bonds, equity financing securities 
and Islamic securities.  The Islamic capital 
market products provide long-term fund raising 
and investment.
DEFINITION OF THE ISLAMIC BOT 
FINANCING CONTRACT
Islamic BOT financing is a new type of contract 
in contemporary Islamic law (Counsel of 
International Islamic Fiqh Academy, 2009).  It 
resulted from the needs for modern infrastructure 
development.  The contractual structures of BOT 
financing include concession, construction, 
operation, and management.  Although the 
financing of BOT is new to Islamic law, the 
specific contracts used in the structure are 
common to the Islamic principles of muamalat 
(Islamic transactions).
In determining the Shariah compliance of 
Islamic  BOT financing  contract, the contractual 
framework must satisfy the elements of  a valid 
contract, including the offeror and offeree, the 
pillars of ijab (offer) and qabul (acceptance), the 
subject matter of the contract and consideration 
(Mohd Daud Bakar & Engku Rabiah Adawiah, 
2008).  Once ijab and qabul are performed, the 
contracting parties are bound by the contract.  
A legitimate contract in Shariah needs 
three essential conditions.  Firstly, the object 
of the contract is mÉl mutaqawwam (property 
that is permissible in Islam), which must also 
be within the means to possess (hiyazah) during 
the contract, except in certain exceptional 
circumstances.  Therefore, it is not allowed to 
sell the property that is not yet acquired (Article 
127, The Mejelle, 2001).  An example for this 
would be selling fish in the sea.  In addition, the 
object must be precisely determined in terms of 
its essence, quality, and value.  The object must 
be free from any encumbrances, like the property 
is not in pledge and free from any oppression, 
fraud, and misrepresentation (Muhammad Ayub, 
2007).
Secondly, the contract must not contain 
any components of riba (interest), gharar 
(uncertainty) and maysir (gambling).  In the 
context of financial transaction, riba technically 
refers to the “premium” that the borrower is 
obliged to pay to the lender, together with the 
principal amount, as a requirement for the loan 
or for an extension in the duration of the loan 
(Zamir Iqbal & Abbas Mirakhor, 2007).  The 
researchers outlined four characteristics of the 
prohibited interest rate, which include a positive 
and fixed ex-ante, the premium is tied to the 
time period and amount of the loan, its payment 
is guaranteed in spite of the outcome, or the 
objectives for which the principal was borrowed, 
and the state apparatus sanctions and enforces 
its collection.
Thirdly, the object should exist at the time 
of contract for possession (milkiyyah).  The 
subject matter of the contract is deliverable at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract.  This 
is evidenced by the hadith which states that the 
Holy Prophet (SAW) was reported to have said 
that, “He who buys foodstuff should not sell it 
until he has taken possession of it” (Zamir Iqbal 
& Abbas Mirakhor, 2007).  It is reported that 
the companion Hakim ibn Hizam had bought 
some commodities during the reign of Umar ibn 
al-Khattab and intended to sell them to others. 
Umar ordered him not to sell the commodities 
before taking their possession.  Zayd ibn Thabit, 
Abdullah ibn Umar and Abdullah ibnu Abbas 
held the same view as that of Umar. However, 
the contract is allowed despite the fact that the 
subject matter of the contract does not exist 
at the time of contract, in exception to the 
contract of salam (deferred contract) and istisna’ 
(manufacturing contract).
In addition, the contracts shall satisfy 
the maqasid al shariah (i.e. objectives of the 
shariah) by fulfilling the needs of the community 
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in providing utilities and welfare for individuals 
and the community.  This is not the requirement 
for the validity of a contract but rather a 
compliment to the execution of a valid contract. 
To illustrate the point, among the benefits of 
BOT to the community are the constructions 
of bridges, highways, hospitals, and schools. 
A BOT structure reduces the financial burden 
on the state, and the state can theoretically 
concentrate on poverty eradication programmes. 
BOT projects increase the capital development 
in legitimate ways by providing civil projects 
to the private and public sectors.  In a way, it 
provides the necessary expertise and qualifies 
the local communities in construction works 
and maintenance services to allow them to be 
independent in their future works.
TYPES OF ISLAMIC BOT 
FINANCING CONTRACT
In the early development of Islamic capital 
market, Islamic securities with sale based 
features were widely issued in the Malaysian 
capital market.  Both BOT projects and sale 
based features of the Islamic securities shared 
the same character of long term financing, fixed 
return and staggered payment.  The Islamic 
Securities Guideline in 2004 has changed the 
landscape of the Sukuk market in Malaysia, 
with many kinds of sukuk based on sale, equity, 
partnership and lease emerged.  Some examples 
of the Sukuk issued to finance BOT projects 
are Sukuk Istisna’, Murabahah, Ijarah and 
Musharakah.
THE SALE BASED FINANCING  
IN BOT PROJECT
The financing of BOT is normally achieved in a 
form of syndicated financing, joined by a number 
of banks and financial institutions.  These 
syndicated financing is also made securitizable 
for the consumption of a wider base of investors, 
institutional or otherwise.  Studies on the 
Islamic project financing in Malaysia have 
shown the tendency of the banks and financial 
institutions involved to prefer the sale-based 
mode of financing over other mode of financing 
(Engku Rabiah Adawiah, 2003).  This is due 
to the general rule that the sale-based mode of 
financing can contractually guarantee a fixed 
flow of income to the financiers and investors. 
Other modes of financing, particularly the 
equity-based financing, are perceived as having 
or imposing a higher risk portfolio due to its 
inability to contractually guarantee neither profit 
nor capital.
The Islamic sale-based Sukuk is applied in 
financing the BOT project in the form of al bay’ 
bithaman ajil (the sale of deferred payment), 
murabahah (the sale by mark up) and istisna’ 
(the manufacturing contracts).  This is due to the 
nature of the BOT projects that require sizeable 
funding and long concession periods.  Hence, 
divisible and tradable financial instruments 
are needed.  Since the financing is shariah 
compliant, it must observe the prohibitions and 
hindrance of valid Islamic contracts.
Bay’ Bithaman Ajil Islamic Debt Securities 
(BaIDS)
The Islamic Securities Guidelines 2004 are 
defined bay’ bithaman ajil (BBA) (sale of 
deferred payment) as:
A contract that refers to the sale and 
purchase transactions for the financing 
of an asset on a deferred and an 
instalment basis with a pre-agreed 
payment period.  The sale price will 
include a profit margin.
The above definition shows three important 
elements of BBA; namely, the sale and purchase 
transaction, deferred payment in the form of 
instalments with a pre-agreed payment period, 
and the sale price inclusive of profit margin.
In practice, the mechanisms for BaIDS 
issuance are two layered.  First, the creation of 
indebtedness in the form of contemporaneous 
buying and selling with deferred payment 
between the issuer and the financiers.  Second, 
the issuer’s debt arising out of the previous 
transactions will be securitized via the issuance 
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of primary and secondary notes for BaIDS. 
The primary note (PN) represents the capital, 
while the secondary notes (SN) are the profit 
component.  In qualifying the PN and SN to 
be tradable, the debt must be supported by an 
underlying asset (Saiful Azhar Rosly, 2008).  In 
relation to BOT projects, the underlying asset 
is the concession right and revenue stream of 
the project.
Financing of BOT projects through issuance 
of BaIDS involves the following processes.  The 
issuer will first identify the asset to be used in the 
financing.  The asset must be Shariah compliant 
and free from any encumbrances for a valid sale. 
In the context of the BOT project, the asset is in 
the form of concession right.  The Resolution of 
the Shariah Advisory Council of the Securities 
Commission has decided that “all contracts 
awarded by the government, i.e. concession, 
construction, supply and services contracts, 
are accepted as approved underlying assets 
for structuring Islamic securities.  The same 
principle can also be applied to contracts awarded 
by state governments, government agencies and 
government related companies.”  The decision 
of the SAC was said to be based on the analogy 
with the concept of iqta’ (government award), 
which was an approved practice in Islamic law.
The issuer then sells the asset to the primary 
subscribers at a price which is comparable to 
the issuer’s financing needs.  The BaIDS is 
normally sold by way of private placement with 
a known or identified buyer (subscriber).  The 
asset is then sold to the primary subscriber for 
cash proceeds (purchase price).  Immediately 
thereafter, the primary subscribers sell the asset 
back to the issuer, on deferred payment basis 
(BBA) with a mark up.  The deferred price (or 
sale price) is a debt owed by the issuer to the 
primary subscribers to evidence the debt owed 
in the deferred sale price (BBA).  The issuer 
issues BaIDS to the financiers to evidence 
the debt obligation created in the second sale 
and purchase contract.  These BaIDS are also 
known as shahadah al dayn (debt certificate), 
and are tradable at the secondary market.  The 
primary subscriber may then trade the BaIDS on 
the secondary market based on the permission 
of bay’ al dayn (debt trading) (Securities 
Commission, 2006).  The financiers will then 
pay the proceeds of the sale of bonds to the 
issuer, as the payment of the financiers’ purchase 
price in the first asset purchase agreement.  The 
issuer pays the debt obligation arising in the 
second asset sale agreement (comprising of the 
purchase price and the financiers’ mark-up) on an 
instalment basis over an agreed period, which is 
normally long-term in nature (beyond one year).
Table 3 shows that the issuance of BaIDS 
involved in the development of airport and 
highways via BOT financing.  Many of the 
highway projects opted for the issuance of 
BaIDS due to its long-term financing and 
guaranteed fixed of income to the financier and 
the investors.
Murabahah Notes Issuance Facility (MUNIF)/
Islamic Medium Term Notes MTN)
The Islamic Securities Guideline 2004 explained 
murabahah (sale with mark up) as a contract that 
refers to the sale and purchase transaction for the 
financing of an asset, whereby the cost and profit 
margin (mark-up) are made known and agreed 
TABLE 3 
Lists of BOT Projects and Issuance of BaIDS
Project Amount
Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) RM2.2 Billion BaIDS
Cheras–Kajang Highway  RM210.0 Million BaIDS
Shah Alam Expressway RM800.0 Million BaIDS
KL-Putrajaya Highway RM380.0 Million BBA Medium Term Notes (BBA MTN)
New Pantai Expressway RM740.0 Million BaIDS
Western KL Traffic Dispersal Scheme RM510.0 Million BaIDS
Ruzian Markom, Engku Rabiah Adawiah Engku Ali and Aznan Hasan
78 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 20 (S) 2012
by all parties involved.  The settlement for the 
purchase can be either on a deferred lump sum 
basis or on an instalment basis, which is specified 
in the agreement.
The above definit ion explains that 
murabahah is a kind of sale and purchase of an 
asset with profit and deferred in payment either 
lump sum or by instalments.  The differences 
between murabahah and BBA are the cost 
and mark up price must be made known to the 
involved parties.  This is because murabahah is 
a category of bay’ al amanah (trust sale).
In terms of modus operandi, both BBA and 
murabahah securities share similar features. 
The only difference is in the term of tenor and 
mode of payment of financing.  The industry 
applies BBA financing for long-term financing 
with instalments payments, while murabahah 
financing is used for medium- and short-term 
financing needs with short- or medium-term 
maturity with bullet or lump sum payment.  The 
classification is purely based on industry driven 
and not due to any Shariah requirement.  Both 
the products are popular due to their ability to 
contractually guarantee a fixed flow of return 
to the financier, by virtue of the debt obligation 
created by the deferred payment mode, plus 
the mark-up.  The risks to the financiers are 
also practically low because of the immediate 
sequence of the purchase and sale contracts 
entered into by the parties.  Since the financiers 
own the property very shortly during the 
transaction, the risks attributed to ownership of 
the property are practically almost non-existent. 
The issuance process of MUNIF resembles 
BBA structure with a few modifications.  The 
transaction begins with the issuer identifying an 
asset to be sold to the primary subscriber.  The 
identified asset is then tendered by the issuer to 
a group of tender panel members (TPM).  The 
aim of the tendering process is to allow for a 
best purchase price for the tendered asset.  The 
tender sale is based on the Shariah principle of 
bay’ muzayadah.  According to the Resolutions 
of the Securities Commission Shariah Advisory 
Council, bay’ muzayadah is the offering of 
goods in a market by a seller with a number 
of interested buyers who compete to offer the 
highest price.  The sale is permissible based on 
athar of the Companions of the Prophet and the 
opinions of the past jurists.
The tendering process is either with 
or without underwriting.  If the tender is 
underwritten, the underwriter will buy the asset 
at the underwriting price, if there is no other 
higher bidder.  The role of the underwriter is to 
secure a minimum price for the asset, particularly 
when the issuer is not confident of getting the 
targeted price during the tendering process.
The successful tender panel member will 
buy the asset from the issuer for the agreed 
purchase price.  Immediately thereafter, the 
buyer will sell the asset back to the issuer 
for a sale price that is an informed mark up 
(murabahah) and on a deferred payment basis 
(Bai Bithaman Ajil, BBA) at an agreed maturity 
date.  The issuer will then issue the murabahah 
notes (MUNIF) as an evidence of the marked 
up and deferred sale price.  This creates a debt 
obligation (indebtedness) between the issuer 
and the successful tender panel cum primary 
subscriber.  These notes are tradable at the 
secondary market based on debt trading.
Another type of murabahah security is the 
Islamic commercial paper (CP) and or Islamic 
medium term notes (MTN).  The MCP includes 
short-term issuance with maturity ranging from 
14 days to 12 months.  It is structured with 
multiple draw-downs within the agreed ‘ceiling’ 
of financing amount that can be ‘revolving’.  For 
instance, the maximum financing amount for the 
MCP is RM200 million.  The issuer may issue 
smaller amounts in a number of draw-downs as 
long as the total does not exceed the ceiling of 
RM200 million.  The available financing amount 
will be adjusted accordingly upon the maturity 
and payment of the debts owed to offer the 
revolving feature to the MCP structure.
The tendering process is conducted at 
every draw-down in the MCP programme.  The 
successful tender panel member (investor) will 
then buy the asset at the agreed purchase price. 
Cash payment shall be made to the issuer for the 
asset purchase price.  Immediately thereafter, the 
underlying asset is resold to the issuer by the 
tender panel member cum investor at a mark-up 
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price.  The MCPs are then issued to the investor 
to prove the obligation to pay the sale price 
based on the agreed tenure between 14 days to 
12 months.  The issuer will arrange payments for 
the asset sale price within the deferred period as 
stated in the MCPs.
The tender process and the issuance 
of the MCPs are completed through Fully 
Automated System for Tendering (FAST), 
which is electronically operated by Bank Negara 
Malaysia.  The transactions are facilitated by 
Facility Agent with appointed trustee acting 
for the benefit of the MCP holders based on the 
terms of the Trust Deed of the MCPs.
Table 4 illustrates that there are two 
highways via BOT financing which have issued 
MUNIF.  Both the projects have issued BaIDS 
for their long-term financing and MUNIF for 
short-term financing.
Sukuk Istisna’ in BOT Project
Istisna’ is defined in the Islamic Securities 
Guidelines 2004 as a purchase contract of an 
asset whereby a buyer will place an order to 
purchase the asset which will be delivered in the 
future.  In other words, the buyer will require 
a seller or a contractor to deliver or construct 
the asset that will be completed in the future 
according to the specifications given in the 
sale and purchase contract.  Both parties of the 
contract will decide on the sale and purchase 
prices as they wish and the settlement can be 
delayed or arranged based on the schedule of 
the work completed.
The definition describes that istisna’ is a 
classification of purchase order contract.  In 
this contract, the buyer ordered the seller to 
manufacture or to construct an asset according to 
the specification agreed in the sale and purchase 
agreement.  The price of the ordered asset will 
be decided by the parties to the contract.  The 
payment can be made during the contract or 
delayed or arranged according to the schedule 
of the work progress.
Bay’ al istisna’ is a sale based on an order to 
construct or to manufacture an asset according 
to the specifications agreed on and the materials 
provided by the contractor/manufacturer (Nazih 
Hammad).  Bay’ al istisna’ is an exception to 
the general Shariah principles that the subject 
matter of the contract must exist at the time of 
the formation of the contract.  The majority of the 
jurists, such as the Hanafis, Shafiis and Malikis, 
allowed the sale of non-existent assets due to the 
hajat (need) of the people for such forward and 
manufacture contracts. 
In practice, sukuk istisna’ represents two 
situations; namely, sukuk that represents the 
istisna’ sale price and sukuk that represents 
the istisna’ asset.  The sukuk istisna’ issued in 
Malaysia represents the deferred sale prices. 
In other words, they are debt-based sukuk.  In 
term of the transaction structure, there is no 
basic transaction structure for the sukuk istisna’. 
This is due to the fact that sukuk istisna’ in 
Malaysia has evolved from one model to the 
another based on the market familiarisation and 
experimentation with the concept and features 
of istisna’ arrangement.
LEBUHRAYA KAJANG-SEREMBAN 
(LEKAS) RM1,453.0 MILLION 
SUKUK ISTISNA’
The LEKAS project has secured a tranche 
of RM1,453.0 million sukuk istisna’.  In this 
transaction, the issuer is LEKAS Sdn. Bhd., 
while the primary subscribers are Am investment 
Bank for Senior istisna’ and Bank Pembangunan 
TABLE 4 
Lists of the BOT projects and Issuance of MUNIF
Project Amount
Shah Alam Expressway RM100.0 Million MUNIF/IMTNs
KL-Putrajaya Highway RM80.0 Million Murabahah Commercial Paper (MCP)
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Malaysia Berhad (BPMB) for Junior istisna’ 
that entered into parallel istisna’ arrangement. 
Firstly, the issuer enters into a Sale Agreement 
with the primary subscribers, whereby the latter 
agreed to construct and deliver the identified 
assets to the former, in consideration of the 
istisna’ sale price.  The istisna’ sale price was 
inclusive of profits to the primary subscribers, 
cum seller, and would be paid on deferred 
payment terms according to an agreed payment 
schedule.  The sukuk istisna’ was issued to the 
primary subscribers so as to prove the issuer’s 
obligation for the deferred istisna’ sale price. 
The suku istisna’ structure consisted of senior 
and junior sukuk.
Then, the issuer entered into istisna’ 
Purchase Agreement with the primary 
subscribers, where the former agreed to construct 
and to deliver the identified assets to the latter 
in consideration of the istisna’ purchase price. 
The istisna’ purchase price would form the sukuk 
issuance proceeds.  The identified assets in both 
of the istisna’ agreements were the Kajang-
Seremban Highway to be construed pursuant to 
the relevant concession agreements.
THE PARTNERSHIP-BASED 
FINANCING OF BOT PROJECTS
The partnership-based financing of the BOT 
projects utilized two main contracts, namely, 
the murabahah (profit sharing contract) and the 
musharakah (partnership contract).
Sukuk Mudarabah
The Islamic Securities Guidelines 2004 
considered mudarabah  as a contract which is 
made between two parties to finance a business 
venture.  The parties are a rabb al mal or an 
investor who solely provides the capital and a 
mudarib or an entrepreneur who solely manages 
the project.  If the venture is profitable, the profit 
will be distributed based on pre-agreed ratio. 
In the event of a business loss, the loss shall be 
borne solely by the provider of the capital.
The Islamic Securities Guideline provides a 
detailed explanation on the issuance process of 
sukuk mudarabah.  The contract of mudarabah 
is a joint venture which involves rabb al mal 
(investor) and mudarib (an entrepreneur) who 
will manage the project.  The profit of the 
business venture will be distributed according 
to the pre-agreed ratio.  The loss shall be borne 
solely by the capital provider.  Nevertheless, if 
the loss is due to the mudarib’s negligence, the 
mudarib shall be liable for the amount of the 
mudrabah capital.
In the transaction structure, the issuer will 
first call for the investors to participate in the 
mudarabah contract.  The issuer will act as the 
manager or mudarib, and the investors will be 
the capital provider or the rabb al mal.  The 
mudrabah sukuk is issued by the issuer to prove 
the proportionate capital contribution by the 
investors (rabb al mal) to the mudrabah and their 
subsequent rights in the mudarabah project or 
the investment activities.
The issuer, as a mudarib, will then invest 
the mudarabah capital into an agreed project. 
Normally, the mudarabah project has already 
identified project cash flow, and this allows the 
issuer to indicate an expected rate of profile to 
the investors upon initial issuance of the sukuk 
mudarabah.  The expected rate of profit should 
be calculated based on a pre-agreed profit 
sharing ratio that is tentatively applied to the 
projected return of the project.
Once the project starts to generate profit, 
the issuer will apply the profit sharing ratio and 
pay the profit share of the investors as a periodic 
coupon distribution, which is normally at the 
expected profit rate.  However, if the project 
suffers a loss, it will be borne by the investors, 
except when the loss is caused by the negligence 
of the mismanagement of the mudarib.
Sukuk mudarabah are conceptually equity-
based and not debt instruments.  The mudarabah 
sukuk represents the sukuk holder’s proportionate 
rights over the mudarabah project and the 
revenue.  Accordingly, the secondary trading of 
the mudarabah sukuk on the secondary market 
is not generally a sale of debt (unless it can be 
shown that the mudarabah project has been 
liquidated and its entire assets are in the form 
of cash or receivables).
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It is important to note that guarantee is 
not permissible to the capital or the profit in a 
sukuk mudarabah transaction.  This is due to 
the fact that the mudarib is considered as the 
manager and amin (trustee) of the mudarabah 
fund and its project.  Therefore, the mudarib 
is not to be made responsible for losses, unless 
it is due to negligence, mismanagement and 
dishonesty that have led to losses.  However, an 
independent third party is permissible to give 
guarantee to preserve the mudarabah capital. 
The Lebuhraya Kemuning–Shah Alam (LKSA) 
has secured a tranche of RM 415.0 Million sukuk 
Mudarabah.  LKSA links the existing Shah Alam 
Expressway’s (KESAS) Kemuning interchange 
to Shah Alam in the State of Selangor.  This is 
a pursuant to a 40 year Concession Agreement 
(CA) between PLSA and the Government of 
Malaysia, dated 27 November 2006.  Projek 
Lintasan Shah Alam Sdn. Bhd. (PLSA) is a 
company that was incorporated to undertake the 
design, construction management, operation, and 
maintenance of the PLSA.
Sukuk Musharakah
The Islamic Securities Guidelines 2004 defined 
musharakah as a partnership arrangement 
between two or more parties to finance a business 
venture, whereby all parties contribute capital 
that can be either in the form of cash or in kind 
for the purpose of financing the business venture. 
Any profit that is derived from the venture will 
be distributed based on a pre-agreed profit-
sharing ratio but a loss will be shared on the basis 
of equity participation.
The def in i t ion  c lear ly  shows that 
musharakah is a kind of partnership between 
two or more parties.  It is a business venture 
which requires all the parties to contribute their 
capital, which is either in cash or in kind.  The 
profit that derived from the business partnership 
is divided based on a pre-agreed profit sharing 
ratio.  However, the loss will be divided based 
on equity contribution of the parties.
Maju Expressway Sdn. Bhd. (MESB) has 
issued Islamic medium term notes (IMTNs) 
issuance programme under the principle of 
Musharakah.  The Sukuk Musharakah financing 
is RM550 million.  Under the Musharakah 
structure, the investors shall form a Musharakah 
among themselves to invest in a venture, which 
is the Musharakah Asset, under the Concession 
Agreement granted by the Government of 
Malaysia to MESB pursuant to the Concession 
Agreement (collectively, the Trust Asset).  The 
rights of the Musharakah Assets under the 
venture are subject to the assignment of the 
Concession as security for the existing financing 
facilities of MESB.  MESB shall make 
a declaration of trust over the Musharakah 
Assets for the benefit of the Investors.  MESB 
will then issue trust certificates (the IMTNs) 
to the investors.  The IMTNs shall entitle the 
investors to the undivided proportionate share of 
beneficial ownership in the venture.  In addition, 
the investors will also be entitled to the income 
that will be generated from the Trust Asset 
throughout the tenure of the Musharakah   and/
or proceeds from the sale of the Trust Assets in 
proportion to the nominal value in the venture 
and the rights of the investors against the issuer 
under the Purchase Undertaking.
The strengths of the project are satisfactory 
traffic growth since operation commencement 
supported by improved public awareness on 
highway, back-loaded debt service structure, 
and available cash that provides cushion for 
revenue shortfalls in the early years, moderate 
reliance on traffic growth to maintain future 
compliance with minimum FSCR, as well as 
moderate government support for the concession 
evidenced by grants and termination payments 
payable by the government in the event of 
termination of concession.  The challenges 
faced by the project are optimistic bias in toll 
road traffic forecast, and event risk arising 
from renegotiation of the concession agreement 
(MARCB, 2010).
Accordingly, Konsortium Lebuhraya Utara–
Timur (KL) (KESTURI) has issued RM820 
Million IMTNs in nominal value under the 
Shariah principle of Musharakah.  The investors 
of each tranche of IMTN (Musharakah Partners) 
shall form a Musharakah amongst themselves, 
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and shall enter into a venture (Venture) as a part 
of the financing arrangement.
The strengths of the project are the high 
proportion of commuter traffic on expressway 
which is less sensitive to economic conditions, 
strategically linked to a network of major 
roadways, and back-ended amortisation schedule 
of the notes that accommodates slower traffic 
ramp-up.  Meanwhile, the challenges of the 
project are lower than the forecast traffic flow 
and public resistance to toll hikes (MARCB, 
2010).
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) 
SD35m Sukuk Musharakah is  another 
interesting instance of sukuk musharakah.  In 
this transaction, MUIS acted as the issuer. 
MUIS wanted to raise money to invest in a 
prime property (office and shopping complex) 
as parts of its waqf development project.  Most 
of the capital was contributed by the investors. 
MUIS’s capital contribution came from the waqf 
fund that it was administering.  MUIS issued the 
musharakah sukuk to the investors to evidence 
their proportionate capital contributions to 
the musharakah and any subsequent asset/s 
acquired by it.  The musharakah capital was 
used to acquire a prime property in Singapore. 
The property was then leased out for 5 years. 
To enhance the structure, the lease rental was 
guaranteed by a third party.  The lease rental 
payments would be shared between MUIS 
and the investors at the ratio of 26.5:73.5 that 
was translated into 3.5% rate of return to the 
investors.  MUIS, on behalf of the waqf, would 
gradually buy out the investor’s share in the 
musharakah by redeeming the sukuk according 
to the agreed schedule.  The source of the 
payment for the redemption came from the waqf 
income which was from the share of the rental 
as well as other sources.  At the end of the sukuk 
tenure, the waqf would own the property in the 
name of MUIS as the waqf administrator.  In 
the MUIS transaction, the musharakah venture 
was backed by acquisition of real estate that 
generated lease rental income for the investors. 
The real estate was later fully acquired by the 
issuer through the sukuk redemption.
THE LEASE-BASED FINANCING OF 
BOT PROJECT
Ijarah is defined in the Islamic Securities 
Guidelines 2004 as a manfa’ah (usufruct) type 
of contract, whereby a lessor (owner) leases out 
an asset or an equipment to its client at an agreed 
rental fee and a pre-determined lease period upon 
the aqad (contract).  The ownership of the leased 
equipment remains in the hands of the lessor.
Leased-based financing features contract 
of usufruct between the lessor (the owners) and 
the lessee (the client).  The owner leased out an 
asset or an equipment to its client based on an 
agreed rental fee.  The period of lease was pre-
determined upon the contract signed.  However, 
the ownership of the leased asset remains with 
the owner.
Lebuhraya Kemuning-Shah Alam RM 330 
million Sukuk Ijarah is a good example of the 
BOT project which utilises the Islamic financing 
principles from the formation of the partnership 
until the operation of the completed project.  In 
operating the toll-road business, Projek Lintasan 
Shah Alam Sdn. Bhd. (PLSA) as the mudarib 
has invited other investors, namely the Sukuk 
Ijarah holders (the lessors) to participate in the 
construction and development of the LKSA (the 
Project).
Due to its significance as point of reference, 
the BOT and privatization case of Zam Zam 
Tower in Mecca is cited here in addition to the 
preceding Malaysian cases.  Sukuk Intifa’ is a 
certificate or a deed that entitles its holder the 
right to utilize a specific real estate property 
for a specific duration of time per year over a 
determined number of years.  This right is wholly 
owned by the Sukuk holder who is entitled to sell, 
grant, inherit or invest the sukuk.
Zam Zam Tower Sukuk Intifa’ involved 
the development of one of the apartment 
towers near the Grand Mosque in Makkah.  In 
this transaction, a construction and real estate 
company by the name of Munshaat had been 
awarded with a 24 year lease to construct one 
of the six towers (Zam Zam Tower) on the waqf 
land adjacent to the Grand Mosque in Makkah. 
The sukuk issuance was for the purpose of 
financing the construction cost of the said tower.
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In this transaction, the developer, Munshaat, 
was granted with a 24 year lease over the waqf 
land.  The sukuk issuance was to finance the 
construction which was achieved via the ‘ijarah 
mawsufah fi dhimmah (forward lease’ contract). 
Under the forward lease, Munshaat leased the 
asset under the construction to the sukuk holders 
for 22 years, who paid the lease rental in advance 
in one lump sum.  The sukuk holders would 
enjoy the intifa’ (usufruct) of the asset after its 
construction based on time-sharing slots due to 
the restriction on the ownership of non-Saudis 
of real property rights in Makkah.  The time 
sharing rights under the forward lease were 
evidenced by the issuance of sukuk intifa’.  The 
advance lease rental (sukuk proceed) was used 
by Munshaat to pay for the 24 year lease rental 
on the waqf, as well as the construction costs of 
the Zam Zam Tower.
The interesting part of sukuk intifa’ is the 
recognition of a new asset class upon which 
the sukuk are based.  This new asset class is 
in the category of manfa’ah (usufruct).  The 
sukuk holder holds the right to benefit or haq al 
intifa’ (enjoyment) in the form of time-sharing 
in the use of a common property.  These sukuk 
are fully negotiable, which means they can be 
sold, leased, lent, given, bequeathed, exchanged, 
and delayed subject to certain conditions.  The 
investors participate by purchasing the sukuk 
and paying their value in advance, plus the 
payment of annual charges for maintenance and 
managerial services.
THE STRENGTHS AND 
WEAKNESSES OF THE ISLAMIC 
BOT FINANCING CONTRACTS
The Sale-based Financing Has a Fixed Return 
with a Deferred Payment Mechanism
The sale-based financing in the BOT project 
has utilised the Islamic principles of bay’ 
bithaman ajil, murabahah and istisna’.  The 
BaIDs, MUNIF/CP and Sukuk istisna’ share 
the financing structure of bay’ al inah (sales of 
buy back) with the features of sale price with a 
mark up and a deferred payment.  Sale-based 
sukuk is more popular to the Project Company 
of BOT due to its fixed return and deferred 
payment mechanism.  BaIDs are issued to 
meet the long-term nature of the BOT projects 
which last from 20 to 60 years of concession. 
In contrast, MUNIF/CP is issued to meet the 
short-term financing which is between 12 months 
to 15 years.
The preceding instances showed that all 
the sale-based sukuk are issued to finance 
public facilities like airport and highways. 
At the same time, BOT projects depend on 
the revenue stream for the repayment of its 
expenditure during the construction and other 
commitments.  The fixed return feature of the 
sale-based sukuk influences the toll collection 
mechanism which will indirectly burden the end 
users.  It is submitted that partnership mechanism 
is encouraged to overcome the said constraints.
Although sale-based financing has benefited 
the BOT projects and the Malaysian Islamic 
capital market, it faces many constraints like the 
use of controversial principles.  The adoption of 
Bay’ Inah structures in the sale-based sukuk and 
the application of bay’ al dayn in trading the 
sukuk in the secondary market are unacceptable 
to the global market.  As a result, the sukuk is 
not competitive in the global world.
The Partnership-based Financing Are  
Equity Financing and Business Venture 
Between Parties
Sukuk Mudarabah and Musharakah are equity 
based.  Both sukuk involve business venture 
between the parties.  The Mudarabah Venture 
involves a business venture between the rabb 
al mal (investors) and mudarib (entrepreneur). 
Accordingly, Mudarakah Venture is a business 
venture among the investors and may include 
more than two parties.  The LKSA has utilised the 
Mudarabah Venture to finance the construction of 
its highway.  It is submitted that the Mudarabah 
structure is suitable for BOT projects.  PLSA as 
the Project Company cum Mudarib contribute 
their expertise in completing the project.  The 
investors cum rabb al mal cum sukuk holders 
provide the capital for the construction of the 
project.  The profits are distributed according to 
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the agreed profit ratio between the parties.  The 
investors in the Mudarabah Venture will bear the 
loss in the event of a business loss.  Nevertheless, 
the mudarib shall be liable if the loss is due to 
the mudarib negligence.
As indicated the Musharakah Venture 
involves the partnership among the investors. 
The advantage of the Musharakah Venture is 
that the loss of the Venture shall be borne among 
the investors in proportion of their respective 
interests in the sukuk and limited to each 
holder’s respective capital contribution under 
the Musharakah capital.
It is submitted that both the structures are 
suitable to finance the BOT projects due to their 
nature of business venture.  Accordingly, their 
profit sharing and distribution of loss mechanism 
ensure the smooth running of a particular project.
The Lease-based Sukuk Utilized the Beneficial 
Interest of an Asset
The lease-based sukuk is essentially unique 
due to the nature of the lease that exploits the 
beneficial interest of an asset.  Hence, even if the 
project is still under construction, the beneficial 
right is utilised using the forward lease principle. 
In the LKSA project, for instance, PLSA as the 
Mudarib in LKSA project has invited investors, 
namely the Sukuk Ijarah holders (the Lessors), to 
participate in the construction and development 
of the LKSA project.  The periodic rental is paid 
to the Lessors beginning from the construction 
stage based on the principle of Ijarah Mawsufah 
fi Zimmah (Forward Lease) and is considered as 
a partial payment/forward lease on the aggregate 
rental under the Ijarah Agreement.  Accordingly, 
future rental payments under the agreed rental 
schedule will be reduced.  It is observed that the 
principle of forward lease should be adopted in 
the BOT project.  The mechanism can avoid 
the increase of toll fees to the end users and 
accordingly reduce the fees until it reaches a 
nominal value. The second interesting sukuk 
ijarah is sukuk intifa’, which is based on time 
sharing.  The issuance of the sukuk has benefited 
from the principle of forward lease.  The sukuk 
has also identified a new class of asset, namely 
time-sharing, in the use of a common property.
CONCLUSION
It has been demonstrated that financing BOT 
projects using Islamic principle is quite widely in 
practiced albeit in its various forms.  The purpose 
of using the Islamic principles is that the Islamic 
financing structure is certain and transparent. 
The analysis on the Islamic BOT financing 
contracts revealed that sale-based financing is 
more popular to the Project Company of BOT 
in Malaysia due to its fixed return and deferred 
payment mechanism.  Nevertheless, the sale-
based financing still faces various constraints 
like using controversial principles of Bay’ 
Inah structures in the sale-based sukuk and the 
application of bay’ al dayn in trading the sukuk 
in the secondary market.  Both the principles 
are not acceptable in the global market.  As a 
result, the sukuk are not competitive in the global 
world.  On the other hand, the mudarabah and 
musharakah contracts provide alternatives to the 
project Company since both the structures are in 
the form of business venture.  Accordingly, their 
profit sharing and distribution of loss mechanism 
ensure the smooth running of a particular project. 
Finally, the lease-based financing exploits the 
beneficial interest of an asset.  Hence, even if the 
project is still under construction, the beneficial 
right is utilised using the forward lease principle.
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INTRODUCTION
In the present world, corporations have 
emerged, both nationally and internationally, 
as humongous economic powers.  There are 
many multinational corporations (MNCs) whose 
annual income surpasses the combined gross 
domestic products (GDP) of a significant number 
of less developed countries (LDCs) (Bantekas, 
2004).  Corporate affairs, therefore, matter for 
the society.  They (corporations) may not pay the 
employees and workers well, or provide them 
with a good working environment.  They may 
manufacture products which are unwholesome 
and thus, are not good for the consumers. 
Moreover, they may pollute the environment 
in the process of manufacturing their products, 
which, in turn, may injure the people and other 
beings.  In this vein, corporations, in one way or 
other, affect the interests of various stakeholders. 
As such, they are not merely economic entities 
that are devoted to the shareholders’ interest of 
maximisation of profits.  Rather, they are social 
organisations which owe responsibilities to all 
stakeholders and the society as a whole (CSR) 
(Sheikh, 1996).
How does Islam perceive the concept 
of CSR?  Does the Islamic conception agree 
well with the traditional view?  This article is 
an attempt to answer these questions, with a 
particular reference to employees, one of the 
important stakeholders.  The reason behind 
this undertaking is to dispel the common 
misunderstanding that the Islamic law is 
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ABSTRACT
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a Western concept.  It basically advocates that the corporation, 
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antagonistic to the traditional laws.  Both 
the Islamic law and the common law are 
two old legal systems with rich heritages.  A 
comparison between them should be interesting 
to comparative lawyers and also to common 
readers.
The article starts with an overview of the 
theoretical perspectives of the West and Islam. 
In this respect, Dusuki’s (2008) comparative 
research, i.e. “What does Islam Say about 
Corporate Social Responsibility?” has been of 
much assistance.  In the same line of Dusuki, the 
present work briefly discusses different Western 
theories of CSR.  With regards to the Islamic 
perspective, however, it differs from Dusuki’s 
in approach.  In particular, it considers the issue 
from maslahah (public interest) perspective. 
Maslahah is a subsidiary source of the Islamic 
jurisprudence which was developed by Imam 
Malik, the founder of the Maliki School of 
Law.  Before embarking on discussing CSR, the 
article considers if corporate personality itself is 
Islamic or not.  This query is important because 
Muslims, in general, and many scholars, in 
particular, are not interested in CSR.  To them, 
the very concept of corporation is not Islamic 
(Zinkin & Williams, 2005).  In fact, the concept 
of corporate personality is debatable.  There 
are two schools of thought; one accepts it as 
Islamic and the other does not.  The present 
authors argue that the corporation, from the 
maslahah viewpoint, is an Islamic concept and, 
hence, is CSR.  This is followed by a theoretical 
discourse on maslahah and CSR.  After that, the 
article compares the common law provisions 
of corporate obligations to employees with the 
Islamic law principles.  Finally, the concluding 
section sums up the findings of the research.
THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
The Western scholars consider the concept of 
CSR from a number of theoretical perspectives. 
The firm theorists (classical theory) believe 
that people engage in business for their self-
interest of profits.  Adam Smith calls this an 
“invisible hand” (1776).  Many of Smith’s 
followers maintain that profit maximization is 
the only corporate social responsibility.  Milton 
Friedman is probably the most prominent of 
them.  According to him, in a free-enterprise and 
private-property system, ‘there is one and only 
one social responsibility of business–to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits’ (Friedman, 1970).  Beyond 
this, there is no other social responsibility for 
corporations because they are soulless artificial 
persons.  Of course, individual members of the 
society, such as corporate executives, can have 
social responsibilities in the sense of spending 
their own money for the cause or benefits of 
his family, friends, club or society.  They can 
do these in their personal or private capacity. 
Nevertheless, the corporate executives cannot 
spend the money of the stockholders for social 
services because being their agents, the former’s 
responsibility is to make profits and profits only, 
and of course, staying within the bounds of law, 
social ethics and rules of game, i.e. the rules of 
open and free competition and without deception 
or fraud.  However, with a partial change of his 
position later, Friedman acknowledges CSR as 
a corporate duty provided the CSR activities 
have bearing on the promotion of the company’s 
financial interest, and ‘(w)ithout reciprocal 
interest, corporate responsibilities is not a 
sustainable idea’ (cited in Sheikh, 1996).
In an almost similar tone to the firm 
theory, the advocates of the strategic CSR 
(a.k.a. instrumental theory) argue that there 
is no philanthropic responsibility for public 
corporations unless they receive financial 
benefits in return of their services to the society. 
Otherwise, that will affect the interests of the 
shareholders for whom the corporation should 
care in intimate relationships.  However, 
philanthropic activities are appropriate for 
private firms and individuals (Lantos, 2001, 
2002).
On contrary to the firm theory and the 
strategic theory, the managerialists (stakeholder 
theory) hold the view that a company owes 
responsibility to the society, albeit its main 
objective is to maximise profits.  They also 
visualise that corporations are an economic 
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power competing with the modern State; in 
future, they are likely to even supersede it even 
(Berle & Means, 1932, as cited in Mizruchi, 
2004).  To them, the corporation is not merely a 
private business entity, but a social organisation 
that is responsible to a set of claimants including 
the shareholders, workers, consumers and the 
State.  Its managers are in charge of rendering 
obligations to these claimants (Berle & Means, 
1932 as cited in Sheikh, 1996).  E. Merrick Dodd, 
the founder of this school, bases his argument on 
the managers’ trusteeship relationship with the 
company.  He also believes that the managers are 
not the trustees of the shareholders only; rather, 
they are the trustees of other stakeholders and 
the society as a whole (Dodd, 1932).  For the 
first time, the American case of AP Smith Mfg v. 
Barlow (1953) seems to have endorsed Dodd’s 
theory by upholding a company’s proposed 
donations to the Princeton University as a part 
of its wider obligations to the society.  Jacobs 
J. says that “modern conditions require that 
corporations acknowledge and discharge social 
as well as private responsibilities as members 
of the communities within which they operate.”
Like the managerialists, the proponents 
of social contract theory perceive that the 
corporation is tied to a relationship with the 
society, but in a different way through an implied 
contract as it exists between the citizens and 
the State.  They further posit that the social 
contract binds the corporation and the society in 
a reciprocal bond of rights and responsibilities. 
The corporation needs resources from the society 
to subsist and prosper.  At the same time, the 
society needs assistance from the corporation 
to solve its problems.  The corporation should 
respond to the social needs as a duty of gratitude 
(Lantos, 2001).  In return, corporations should 
participate in social service activities alongside 
other social institutions like family, educational 
and religious institutions (Lantos, 2001).  Thus, 
corporations should not act only in commercial 
interest, but rather to fulfil the expectations of 
the society (Moir, 2001).  If, however, it fails to 
meet the expectations, it will lose its image in 
the society.  In that case, it will be difficult for it 
to survive.  The concern for its survival creates 
pressures on the corporation to carry out services 
to the society.  This is known as the legitimacy 
theory (Dusuki, 2008).
The theories discussed above explain 
together the justifications of the West for 
corporations to be engaged in CSR activities.  In 
short, they advocate that “firms engage in CSR 
to secure their ‘license to operate’ (legitimacy), 
whereby the firms are required to meet the 
interest and demand of the multiple stakeholder 
groups and honour both the explicit and implicit 
contracts with various constituents”, which will 
bring them reputation and in turn viability and 
profitability in the market (Dusuki, 2008).
In order to attain the theoretical goals, CSR 
has been given legal recognition both nationally 
and internationally.  For example, the English 
Companies Act 2006 has provided for the 
protection of stakeholders.  Section 172 of the 
Act requires the directors, while working for 
the benefits of the shareholders, to have regard, 
amongst other matters, to the interest of the 
company’s employees, the business relationships 
with suppliers, customers and others, and the 
company’s operational impact on the community 
and environment.  At the international plain, 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) is the most notable 
organisation that has adopted CSR Guidelines 
for multi-national enterprises (MNEs).  Part 
II of the OECD Guidelines outlines that 
“Enterprises (MNEs) should take fully into 
account established policies in the countries 
in which they operate, and consider the views 
of other stakeholders.”  Following this, they 
specify a number of matters for the (MNEs) to 
take care of while operating in host countries.  In 
particular, it asks the MNEs, among others, to:
1. Contribute to the economic, social and 
environmental progress with a view to 
achieve sustainable development.
2. Respect the human rights of those affected 
by their activities, in line with the host 
government’s international obligations and 
commitments.
3. Encourage human capital formation, 
in particular, by creating employment 
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opportunities and facilitating training 
opportunities for employees.
4. Refrain from seeking or accepting 
exemptions not contemplated in the 
statutory or regulatory framework related 
to environmental, health, safety, labour, 
taxation, financial incentives, or other 
issues.
5. Develop and apply effective self-regulatory 
practices and management systems that 
foster a relationship of confidence and 
mutual trust between enterprises and the 
societies in which they operate.
6. Refrain from discriminatory or disciplinary 
action against employees who make 
bona fide reports to management or, as 
appropriate, to the competent public 
authorities on practices that contravene 
the law, the Guidelines or the enterprise’s 
policies.
Thus, CSR is an established concept 
worldwide.  Today, corporations are not 
only responsible to their shareholders; their 
responsibilities extend to others -“Stakeholders” 
- who include employees, customers, investors, 
suppliers, environment and the society as a 
whole (Bantekas, 2004).
CSR FROM THE ISLAMIC 
PERSPECTIVE
Is “corporation” an Islamic concept?  The 
answer to this question is a precursor to CSR. 
There are two contending views on this issue. 
One school of Ulama (Islamic scholars) that 
includes, among others, Mufti Muhammad 
Taqi Usmani of Pakistan, holds the view that 
corporation is a juridical person.  In the absence 
of any clear provision in the Qur’an or Sunnah, 
Mufti Usmani compares (analogical deduction 
called qiyas) company with a waqf (public 
endowment).  The basic characteristic of a 
waqf is that people dedicate some properties for 
religious or charitable purpose divesting their 
ownership in them.  Allah becomes the owner of 
the property.  The beneficiaries of the waqf enjoy 
the benefits which it has been created for.  The 
waqf emerges as an entity that is separate from 
the donors.  This institution, which is similar 
to a corporation, can make contracts, buy and 
sell properties and, sue and be sued (Usmani, 
1999).  The other school, namely the Mujlisul 
Ulama of South Africa, refutes the opinion and 
the arguments of Mufti Usmani in their book 
entitled, “The Concept of Limited Liability- 
Untenable in the Shari’ah.”  Mujlisul Ulama 
maintains that Islam does not know any fictitious 
person; it recognises only natural persons.  This 
is a classical view of the Islamic jurists.  To this 
school, no one can be a person in law who does 
not have the capacity (dhimmah) to acquire rights 
and execute duties.  It is the ‘balance-sheet of a 
person showing his assets and liabilities, in terms 
of his rights and obligations’ (Nyazee, 2002).  It 
is true that in the strict sense, non-natural beings 
are not recognised as persons.  In considering the 
necessity of the present day society, however, the 
State may introduce the concept of a juridical 
person (Nyazee, 2002).  Corporations are a 
commonplace phenomenon in the present world. 
In the day-to-day life, they are conducting so 
many types of things, which need no mentioning. 
Similar to human persons, they hold properties, 
manufacture things, provide services, employ 
people, pay taxes to the government, sue others 
and are also sued by others.  In other words, they 
hold various rights and obligations, which are 
the jurisprudential criteria for attributing legal 
personality to a being.  Considering this fact, 
there can be no denial of juridical personality of 
corporations in Islam (Zahid, 2011).
As discussed above, a corporation can 
hold rights and obligations because it is a legal 
person.  In other words, rights and obligations 
are the corollaries of corporate personality.  In 
this sense, the phenomenon of CSR is one of 
those corollaries.  Thus, one author attempted 
to establish CSR under international law “in 
the context of an emerging international legal 
personality for MNEs” (Bantekas, 2004).  Now, 
the Islamic perception of CSR is being proffered 
in the following.
The Qur’an or Sunnah (doings, sayings 
and approvals of Prophet Muhammad) does not 
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specifically set out any provisions concerning 
CSR.  It does not, however, mean that Islam does 
not have anything to do about it.  The Qur’an is 
a “detailed account of everything” (Qur’an, 12: 
111).  It means the Qur’an has covered all matters 
of legislation, either by laying down specific 
provisions or by setting out general principles 
of law.  Specific provisions are not many in 
the Qur’an.  It (the Qur’an) has left a vast area 
open for human legislation by providing general 
guiding principles.  For example, the Qur’an 
has legislated in detail on inheritance which is a 
phenomenon present in every time and society 
of human civilization.  These provisions shall 
never change over time.  There are, however, 
matters which may change over time and may 
call for new legislation, given the time, people 
and place.  Regarding such matters, the Qur’an 
and Sunnah have laid down general principles 
of jurisprudence, which enable the Islamic 
lawmakers to adopt suitable laws to cater for 
the needs of the society.  One of these general 
principles is maslahah (public interest), which 
was developed by Imam Malik, the founder 
of the Maliki School of Islamic jurisprudence. 
This principle advocates for legislation in the 
interest of the society where clear provisions of 
the Qur’an and Sunnah are absent.  The authority 
for this principle lies the following Qur’anic 
verses, “Allah wants ease and comfort and not 
hardship” (2: 185); “God never intends to impose 
hardship upon you” (5: 6); “We have sent you 
(O Prophet Muhammad) but as a mercy for all 
creatures” (21: 107).  Further support comes 
from the Prophet’s saying, “No harm shall be 
inflicted or reciprocated in Islam” (Bin Hanbal). 
The whole message given in these words of 
Allah and His Messenger is that if something 
is good for the society, it may be adopted and 
legislated upon by the State, unless that is 
clearly forbidden by the Qur’an, or Sunnah or 
Ijma’ (consensus of jurists).  For example, for 
the survival and healthy development of human 
life, environmental and ecological protection 
is essential.  In the absence of any direct 
legal provisions in the Qur’an or Sunnah, the 
government may pass laws in this regard.  The 
sole purpose behind this approach of lawmaking 
is to bring about benefit to and to prevent harm 
from people’s lives. 
Maslaha is of three categories, namely, 
daririyat (essentials), haziyat (needs), and 
tahsiniyat (embellishments).  “Essentials” 
include five major interests, namely, religion, 
life, human intellect, family lineage and material 
wealth (Kamali, 2008).  These are the most 
important types of maslaha.  An Islamic State 
is obliged to preserve and protect these interests. 
“Preservation” is a positive step and “protection” 
is a negative step by the State.  For example, 
for the well-being of the society, the State must 
provide a secure environment in which economic 
activities may take place.  This will create 
material wealth and development for the people 
living in that State.  Thus, the establishment of 
business organisations like corporations may be 
considered as “essential” for the public’s interest. 
This is the “preservation” aspect of essentials. 
If the law related to the establishment and 
operation of company is violated, the State must 
punish the culprits so that the public interest of 
wealth creation is not hampered.  This is the 
“protection” aspect of essentials.  
The second category of maslaha (needs) 
include concessions granted to essentials so that 
the essentials remain in existence.  For example, 
in order for wealth to circulate from the people’s 
savings to company’s business, the State may 
require large companies to have their securities 
to be listed on a stock exchange and traded in the 
secondary market.  However, small companies 
cannot meet the requirements of listing.  For 
this reason, they should not be prevented from 
trading because that will hinder the wealth 
creation process, which is one of the main public 
interests under the Shari’ah.  According to the 
second category of maslaha, namely “needs,” 
such small companies will be granted concession 
from listing and will be allowed to trade their 
securities in the “over the counter” market. 
The  th i rd  ca tegory  o f  Maslahah , 
“embellishments,” is subsidiary, but at the 
same time complementary, to “essentials.” 
The accomplishment of the former helps the 
latter.  For example, the State may encourage 
big companies to make (optional) charity to the 
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poor (which is an embellishment) so that they 
(the poor) may engage in business activities, 
maybe at a minimum level.  This will solve 
unemployment problem, at least to some extent, 
and will help the economic development of 
the State.  Thus, the three tiers of maslaha 
go hand in hand and together they may solve 
many problems to which the primary sources 
of Shari’ah do not have any direct answers, 
provided that they fulfil the following conditions:
1. There must be a need to secure a benefit or 
to prevent a harm of the people in general;
2. There must be no clear hukm (provision) in 
the Qur’an, Sunnah or ijma’(consensus of 
Islamic jurists in general), with regard to 
the act of securing the benefit or preventing 
the harm;
3. It must be essential to serve a maslahah 
(public interest), such as protection of 
religion, life, intellect, family lineage, and 
property;
4. The maslahah sought shall not conflict with 
any Shari’ah principle, such as any law 
legalizing interest (riba);
5. The maslahah shall be rational and 
acceptable to the people of sound mind;
6. This method shall not apply to the matters 
of worship (ibadat) (Kamali, 2003; Qadri, 
1963).
As said earlier, the primary sources of 
Shari’ah are silent about CSR.  In considering 
their role in various spheres of the modern society, 
such as investment, production, employment, 
wealth creation and national and international 
finance, corporations should be acknowledged to 
have CSR under the Islamic Shari’ah from the 
maslahah viewpoint.  The sources of the Islamic 
law, even the primary sources alone, provide 
for social responsibility and social justice for 
human persons, both individual and collective. 
Those responsibilities may be extended to 
corporations by analogy.  Corporations should 
be treated as social institutions, and as such are 
responsible, in addition to making profits, to take 
care of the interests of the creditors, suppliers, 
employees, consumers and the society as a 
whole.  In addition, they should also repay their 
loans scrupulously as Allah requires fulfilment 
of obligations (Qur’an, 5: 1).  Prophet also 
underlines the matter when he says, in effect, that 
martyrdom washes off sins except the liability of 
loan (Muslim).  Islam does not, however, tolerate 
interest-based transactions because through such 
transactions, the loaner makes economic gains 
without any risk, regardless of whether the 
loanee makes profits or losses (Qur’an, 2: 275). 
This is an economic injustice that Islam wants 
to stop (Usmani, 2001).  This is why the Prophet 
made the following statement, “May Allah send 
down His curse on the one who devours riba and 
the one who pays it and on the two witnesses and 
on the person writing it” (Bin Hanbal).  Second, 
corporations are responsible to the consumers 
by producing and supplying permissible and 
good things (halalan toyyibah) because such 
things only Islam allows for consumption; “O 
mankind! Eat of what is lawful and good on the 
earth…” (Qur’an, 2: 168).  Thus, the production, 
marketing or selling of pork, wine/intoxicants, 
pornography, etc. are prohibited.  To quote the 
Prophet, “Allah and His Messenger made illegal 
the trade of alcoholic liquors, dead animals, 
pigs, and idols” (Al-Bukhari).  Corporations 
must also be fair in giving full measure and 
right weight; “And give full measure when you 
measure, and weigh with a just balance; this 
is better and fairer for your end” (Qur’an, 17: 
35).  Their failure in this respect renders them 
liable for fraud; “Woe to those who deal in 
fraud.  Those who, when they have to receive 
by measure from men, exact full measure.  But 
when they have to give measure or weight to 
men, give less than due.  Do they not think that 
they will be called to account?” (Qur’an, 83: 
1-4).  Though these verses are concerned about 
weight and measure, they cover all aspects of 
duty to be just and fair to others (Shafi, 1998). 
Honest and fair trading is highly rewarded in 
Islam; “the honest, trustworthy merchant will 
be with the Prophets, siddeeqs (true believers) 
and martyrs (in Paradise) (Ibn Majah).  Third, 
they must be just to their employees in terms 
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of payment and other facilities.  The Prophet 
Muhammad says, “Allah has placed them 
(employees) under you.  They are your brothers. 
So, anyone of you has someone under him, he 
should feed him out of what he himself eats, 
clothes him like he himself puts on, and if that 
be the case, let him not put much burden that 
he is not able to bear, then lend your help to 
him” (Al-Bukhari).  In the present context, 
this hadith implies that the corporations are 
responsible to pay the employees in such a way 
that they can have enough food, shelter, clothing 
and medication to support their lives (Zahid, 
2010).  They should not force them (workers) 
to work beyond their capability.  They must not 
discriminate between them on any ground like 
language, colour, race, etc., because these have 
been created by Allah for identification purpose 
and not for discrimination (Qur’an, 49: 13; 30: 
22).  In addition, corporations should take care 
of the environment while conducting business 
activities as it (environment) is essential for 
human survival.  The purpose of the creation 
of humankind is the worship of Allah (Qur’an, 
51: 56).  So, a healthy environment must 
be maintained so that men can live a sound 
life and worship their Lord.  For this reason, 
Islam encourages for the preservation of the 
environment and ecology.  The Prophet says, 
“If the Judgment Day comes when one of you 
is holding a seedling in his hand, if you are 
able to plant it before the Day arrives, do so” 
(Al-Bukari, 1997).  In other words, the Prophet 
encourages people to foster a green world.  “The 
earth is our first mother.  Therefore, it has certain 
rights over us.  One of these rights is making it 
come alive with green vegetation and other plant 
life” (Alhilaly, cited in Smith).  Animal world is 
also to be cared for because the members of that 
world are creations of Allah like humans.  The 
Qur’an says, “there is not an animal in the earth, 
nor a creature flying on two wings, but they are 
nations like you” (Qur’an, 6:38).  Thus, the 
Prophet advised, “show mercy and you will be 
shown mercy” (Al-Bukhari, 1997).  At another 
place he says, “there is a reward in (doing good 
to) every moist organ (i.e. in every living thing)” 
(Al-Bukari, 1997).  The rationale behind is that 
caring for the living world contributes to the 
celebration of the praise of Allah (Ahmad, 1999); 
“the Seven Heavens and Earth and all beings 
therein celebrate His praise, and there is not a 
thing but hymns His praise” (Qur’an, 17: 44).
In addition to the specific obligations, the 
corporations’ overall responsibilities to the 
society in the form of making charity and all 
other social welfare works may be gathered 
from the Qur’an and Sunnah.  The Qur’an 
enjoins the believing Muslims that “ye strive 
(your utmost) in the Cause of Allah, with your 
property and your persons; that will be best for 
you, if ye but knew” (Qur’an, 61: 10-11).  Here, 
the call for striving definitely includes the service 
to the mankind.  In this connection, Prophet 
Muhammad says, “the best of people are those 
that bring most benefit to the rest of mankind” 
(Al-Daraqutni, as cited in Niamatullah).  He 
encourages helping the poor and destitute; “the 
one who looks after and works for a widow and 
for a poor person, is like a warrior fighting for 
Allah’s cause or like a person who fasts during 
the day and performs prayers all night” (Al-
Bukhari).  He further says, “Allah loves to see 
the results of His beneficence to His servants” 
(Qutb, 2000).  This means that people (including 
corporations) should not hoard up their wealth 
(beneficence of Allah) and create economic 
hardship in the society.  “Hardship and poverty 
constitute the greatest possible denial of the 
beneficence of Allah, and He disapproves such 
a denial” (Qutb, 2000).  As such, corporations 
should contribute to social welfare by way of 
financial contributions and charity to the poor 
and various social institutions like schools, 
orphanages, and hospitals.  They must not be 
niggardly or wasteful as both are forbidden by 
Shari’ah (Qur’an, 17: 31).  In the same way, 
Allah and His Messenger prohibit infliction 
of any harm.  Thus, the Qur’an says, “O you 
believe! Eat not up your property amongst 
yourselves in vanities; let there be amongst you 
traffic and trade by mutual goodwill nor kill (or 
destroy) yourselves; for Allah has been Most 
Merciful to you” (Qur’an, 4: 29).  The Prophet 
said, “the Muslim is he/she from whose hand and 
tongue the people are safe” (Al-Tirmizi).
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To sum up, the corporation may be 
recognised as a legal person under the Islamic 
jurisprudence from the maslahah perspective. 
CSR is a corollary of that personality and should 
be accepted as an Islamic concept.  In this 
respect, the Islamic CSR is similar to its western 
counterpart.  There is, however, one most 
important difference between them.  The former 
requires corporations to carry out CSR activities 
for the pleasure of Allah, while the latter 
advocates for pursuing it for worldly gains, such 
as promoting company’s market.  Nonetheless, 
this does not mean that Islam denies company’s 
economic pursuits.  When a corporation is 
engaged in CSR activities, it may receive a 
good name in the society and its products may, 
as a natural consequence, get a broad market. 
This is fine as long as the CSR programme is 
rendered selflessly; the economic gains, if any, 
cannot be expected in return overtly or covertly. 
In other words, even if there is any financial loss 
following CSR activities, the corporation is not 
exempted from CSR obligations.  The following 
Qur’anic verse is apt to quote in this connection:
It is not righteousness that you turn 
your faces towards East or West; but it 
is Righteousness - to believe in Allaah 
and the Last Day and the Angels, and 
the Book, and the Messengers; to 
spend of your substance, out of love 
for Him, for your kin, for orphans, 
for the needy, for the wayfarers, for 
those who ask; and for the freeing of 
captives; to be steadfast in prayer, and 
practice regular charity; to fulfil the 
contracts which you make; and to be 
firm and patient in pain and adversity 
and throughout all period of panic.  
Such are the people of truth, God-
consciousness (Qur’an, 2:177).
Thus CSR, like any other good deeds in 
Islam, must be for the pleasure of Allah.  If 
it is for show or for reciprocal interest, it is 
not acceptable.  This is so because Islamic 
CSR is based on the monotheistic faith, which 
encompasses every aspect of life of a Muslim. 
This is a system of God-consciousness (Taqwa). 
It requires human actions to be motivated 
with the satisfaction of Allah, not merely for 
materialistic calculation of gain or loss (Zahid, 
2010; Dusuki, 2008).
CSR TO EMPLOYEES UNDER 
COMMON LAW AND ISLAM:  
A COMPARISON
In this Section, the principles of common law 
related to obligations owed to employees, one 
of the important CSR beneficiaries, would be 
compared with their Islamic counterparts.  Before 
embarking upon the discussion, a pertinent 
question should be answered - is CSR a legal 
concept or ethical?  CSR is primarily thought to 
be an ethical phenomenon.  It is not automatically 
binding on corporations.  It is a voluntary matter 
for them.  Over the time, however, this concept 
has gained popularity in different countries.  For 
example, a survey conducted in Ireland showed 
that in the assessment of corporate activities, 
people consider three things the most; namely, 
their service (81%), their honesty and openness 
(69%), and product quality (66%) (http://www.
bitc.ie).   As a result, business organisations 
are taking it seriously and are adopting CSR 
policies.  TOYOTA, for instance, has set out its 
“CSR Policy: Contribution towards Sustainable 
Development,” which includes its commitments 
to various beneficiaries, such as customers, 
shareholders, employees and environment. 
The objective of the Policy is “to contribute 
to harmonious and sustainable development 
of society and the earth through all business 
activities that we carry out in each country 
and region, based on our Guiding Principles” 
(http://www.toyota-global.com). Alongside the 
corporate policies, State governments (such 
as, the UK, as noticed above) are passing 
laws to enforce CSR obligations.  At the 
same time, international organisations like the 
OECD, as mentioned earlier, are also adopting 
CSR standards (soft laws) for multinational 
companies.  Thus, companies are increasingly 
becoming bound by laws related to CSR. 
For example, TOYOTA’s CSR Policy states 
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that “we comply with local, national and 
international laws and regulations, as well as 
the spirit thereof and we conduct our business 
with honesty and integrity.”  It proves the fact 
that CSR is not merely an ethical concept. 
Instead, it goes beyond and assumes the status 
of a legal concept.  This is so because corporate 
voluntary actions are not always enough to 
protect the interests of the CSR beneficiaries. 
They should go hand-in-hand: “(B)oth voluntary 
and mandatory rules are necessary and may 
co-exist to regulate specific matters depending 
on the different areas or objectives” (Mullerat, 
2005).  As such, there must be legal means to 
protect CSR beneficiaries.  These legal means 
may be of different forms, namely, statutes, 
NGO Guidelines (soft law), contracts, judicial 
decisions and interpretations, etc.
English law courts have developed rules and 
principles through the interpretation of statutes 
and contracts of employment.  In the following, 
those rules and principles are compared with 
the principles of the Islamic law to judge their 
comparative merits.
Obligation to Provide Work
After an employment contract is accomplished, 
is the employer bound to provide the employee 
work to do while he/she is paying the agreed 
salary/wages? This question arose in a number 
of common law cases. The judges came up with 
almost similar judgments that in general, so 
long the employer pays the employee, he/she 
is not bound to assign him/her work. He/she 
is, however, bound to give the employee work, 
if it is of some special type.  For example, in 
the case of an actor, it is important for him to 
demonstrate his ability in public.  So, he should 
be given contracted work (Turner v. Sawdon & 
Company [1901] 2 KB 653).  Similarly, workers 
who receive wages from commission for their 
work will lose reputation and publicity if they 
are not given work (Marbe v. George Edwardes 
(Daly’s Theatre) Ltd (1928).   The position of a 
skilled worker is alike as he/she does not want 
money only, and he/she wants to contribute to 
the public, improve his/her skill and have job 
satisfaction from the work done (Langston v. 
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers 
(No.2) [1974] ICR 510).
Allah commands Muslims to fulfil their 
contracts (Qur’an, 5: 1).  The fulfillment of 
employment contract should primarily mean to 
give work to the employees.  Earning livelihood 
by work is a matter of dignity, which is a special 
honour Allah has bestowed on every human 
person.  The Qur’an says, “Now, indeed, 
We have conferred dignity on the children 
of Adam…” (Qur’an, 17: 70).  Paying the 
employee without letting him/her work is like 
giving social assistance to unemployed people 
or giving alms to the poor.  It is a humiliation of 
human dignity.  Besides, if the employees are not 
engaged in work, they may involve themselves 
in anti-social activities like gambling.  Their 
skills are wasted.  The society is deprived of their 
contributions.  Thus, from the Islamic point of 
view, employees must be given work as agreed 
in the contract regardless of the category (skilled 
or unskilled) of work.
Obligation to Put Employees in a Right Job  
or Situation
It is the responsibility of employers not to put 
employees in a job or a situation which is against 
the law.  It is thus illegal to employ someone to 
drive a truck that is not insured (Gregory v. Ford 
& Ors. [1951] 1 All ER 121).  If, however, both 
the employer and employee know that the work 
itself is unlawful, both are liable (Tomlinson v. 
Dick Evans [1978] ICR 639; Davidson v. Pillai 
[1979] IRLR 275).
In the same vein, under the Islamic law, an 
employer is liable if he/she engages an employee 
in a work that is not permitted by Shari’ah, such 
as manufacturing wine, because the object of the 
contract is illegal (Mansuri, 2006; http://www.
biicl.org).
Obligation Not to Put the Employee in a 
Dangerous Work
It is an implied term of an employment contract 
that the employer shall not require employees 
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to carry out dangerous work or ask employees 
to work in a dangerous place, especially in 
modern industry that uses a variety of machines, 
chemical substances and exposes workers to 
various hazards.  This is a non-delegable duty of 
the employer.  Thus, in Wilson’s & Clyde Coal 
Co. v. English [1937] 3 All ER 628, the employer 
was found liable for the unsafe system of work 
in the mine, even though he has delegated that 
duty to his agent.  Of course, in Bouzourou v The 
Ottoman Bank [1930] AC 30, the Judge held that 
the threat of harm must be immediate.
Human life is precious in the sight of the 
Creator as He has created men and jinn only 
for His worship (Qur’an, 51: 56).  Taking life, 
except for justice, has therefore been prohibited 
in Islam (Qur’an, 6: 151; 5: 32).  Based on 
this principle, it may be argued that putting 
employees or workers in a dangerous or life-
threatening situation is not allowed in Islam. 
Rather, according to a Hadith of the Prophet, 
workers are like brothers of the employer.  The 
latter should not even burden the former with 
work that the former cannot do.  The latter is 
ordered to help the former in the work (Al-
Bukhari).  By tying employer and employee in 
a brotherly relation the Hadith indicates that the 
employer should provide a work environment, 
which is safe, healthy and enjoyable, to the 
employees (Zahid, 2010).
Obligation to Pay
The duty to pay wages is an implied term of 
a service contract, although nowadays it has 
been enacted in the statutes within a stipulated 
time/period of time, such as in Malaysia the 
Employment Act 1955 requires wages to be paid 
not later than the seventh day of the ensuing 
month.
On the other hand, the Prophet of Islam 
orders Muslims to “feed him (employee) out of 
what he himself eats, clothes him (employee) 
like he himself puts on” (Al-Bukhari).  If the 
instruction in this Hadith is taken literally, it 
would be difficult to implement particularly in 
the corporate world.  No employer, specifically 
when it is a big corporation, may share the same 
foods and clothes with the employees.  Rather, 
it would be correct to take a pragmatic meaning 
of the Hadith that the employer should pay the 
employees in such a way that the needs of the 
latter are fulfilled according to their social status 
in the same way as their own.  In other words, 
the salary scale should be determined in such 
a way that employees can meet their needs. 
In this respect, the Prophet also instructs his 
followers to fix the wages of a worker before 
employing him/her (Chaudhry, from http://www.
muslimtents.com).  He orders Muslim employers 
to make immediate payment of the wages by 
saying, “pay the labourer his wages before his 
sweat dries” (Ibn Majah).  Thus, the common 
law or statutory law requirement may be said to 
be at par with this provision.
Mutual Confidence and Trust
It is required of an employer that he/she must 
not “without reasonable and proper cause, 
conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely 
to destroy or seriously damage the relationship 
of confidence and trust between employer and 
employee” (Clyde & Co, 2007).  This duty 
is equally applicable to an employee as well. 
Scally v Southern Health and Social Services 
Board [1992] 1 AC 294 is the first case that 
recognizes this duty.  In this case, the plaintiff 
Scally had sued his employer for breach of 
contract in failing to adequately inform him 
about the availability of a contingent right, 
introduced by a statute, which enabled him to 
purchase added years of pensionable service 
at advantages rates.  The Court held that it was 
not “merely reasonable, but necessary, in the 
circumstances postulated, to imply an obligation 
on the employer to take reasonable steps to 
bring the term of the contract in question to 
the employee’s attention, so that he may be 
in a position to enjoy its benefits.”  In another 
landmark case, Malik v BCCI [1998] AC 20, 
Malik and Mahmud worked for the BCCI. 
BCCI went insolvent due to massive fraud, 
connection with terrorists, money-laundering, 
extortion and a raft of other criminal activities 
on a global scale.  Malik and Mahmud had both 
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lost their jobs, and they tried to seek employment 
elsewhere but failed.  They sued the company 
for their loss of job prospects, alleging that 
their failure to secure new jobs was due to the 
reputational damage they had suffered from 
working with BCCI.  Nobody, they claimed, 
wanted to hire people from a company that had 
been involved in massive fraud operations.  This 
raised the question of what duty the company 
had owed to its employees that had been broken. 
Although there was no express term in their 
contracts, Malik and Mahmud argued there was 
an implied term in their employment contract. 
The House of Lords unanimously held that the 
term of mutual trust and confidence would be 
implied into the contract as a necessary incident 
of the employment relation.
In this context, Prophet Muhammad says, 
among others, “Beware, everyone of you is 
a shepherd and everyone is answerable with 
regard to his flock” (Muslim).  According to 
this Hadith, the employer may be taken as a 
“shepherd” (master) and the employee as the 
“flock” (subordinate).  By the employment 
contract, they enter into a relationship owing a 
trust to each other.  Hence, the employer should 
not do anything that may hamper the rights or 
privileges of the employee.  At the same time, the 
employee should carry out his/her responsibility 
properly so that the employer does not suffer any 
loss or injury.  Everyone is under the constant 
surveillance of Allah, with the responsibility 
of fulfilling the trust which each of them has 
taken upon himself/herself.  Thus, a mutual 
confidence and trust-based relation between the 
employer and employee under common law is in 
consonance with the Islamic counterpart.
CONCLUSION
Basical ly,  CSR is  al l  about  corporate 
responsibility to the stakeholders, such as 
creditors, employees, consumers, etc, beyond 
mere maximization of profits.  It is a secular 
concept, but it still blends with the Islamic 
Shari’ah in general.  In particular, the common 
law obligations of the employer are very similar 
to the Islamic law principles.  The one main 
difference between them, however, is that 
common law does not require the employer to 
provide work to the employees in all cases.  Only 
in special type of employment, such as skilled 
worker cases, it enjoins providing work, lest the 
society will be deprived of their contributions. 
Islam does not accept this partial view.  Instead, 
Islam provides that for the welfare of the society, 
every employee or worker should be provided 
with a job to do.  Mere payment of salary/wages 
without assigning any work may create social 
problems like gambling.  Plus, the society will 
be devoid of their services.  Besides, an overall 
divergence between the common law and the 
Islamic law is traced in the fact that common law 
looks at the issues from temporal view, whereas 
Islam takes it as a holistic view - temporal 
and perpetual (afterlife).  Thus, common law 
maintains that the employer and employee are 
bound to a relationship of mutual confidence and 
trust for the mundane benefit of the employee 
and vice versa.  On the other hand, Islam believes 
in the same principles, but its vision goes 
beyond worldly convenience.  By providing for 
accountability to Allah, it ties the matter to the 
life hereafter as well as the temporal life (Zahid, 
2009, 2010).
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INTRODUCTION
Parental child abduction is phenomenal (Buck, 
2000), but it is not unusual for international 
parental child abduction to happen nowadays 
with the ease of transportation from one place 
to another worldwide (Smith, 2010).  The risk 
of abduction may increase in connection with 
custody disputes (Stark, 2005), and non-finality 
of custody orders obtained from a foreign 
country which creates uncertainty will contribute 
to the risk of abduction (Wu, 1995).  There are 
two situations of international parental child 
abduction: the incoming abduction of children 
from abroad to Malaysia and the outgoing 
abduction, i.e. abduction of children from 
Malaysia to a foreign country.
The case of State Central Authority v 
Ayob (1997) 21 Fam LR 567 illustrates the 
difficulty faced by a left-behind parent if a 
child is abducted to Malaysia.  In the case of 
Loh v Kalliou, [2007] FamCA 444, the court in 
Australia refused to allow a child to be taken 
back to Malaysia by a Malaysian mother for 
a holiday.  The situations mentioned in State 
Central Authority v Ayob and Loh v Kalliou are 
clear examples demonstrating the difficulty of a 
left-behind parent when a child is abducted to 
Malaysia and the anxiety of a parent for a child 
to travel to Malaysia and never returned.
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ABSTRACT
A marriage that fails leaves behind a trail, a scar difficult to heal.  More often than not, children from that 
marriage suffer the most and become victims of the tug of war between the parents.  This fight between spouses 
gets even worst if the parent abducted his or her own child.  When this happens, the left-behind parent will 
be without remedy, especially if the child is abducted across national boundaries.  Even when a custody order 
is granted from court, the order is only valid within the respective country and not outside its jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the issue of recognition of foreign custody order is important when addressing international parental 
child abduction.  This is because the non-recognition of foreign custody order could lead to international parental 
child abduction and forum shopping to find a jurisdiction that would favour the parent who had abducted 
the child.  International parental child abduction is not a new phenomenon and in Malaysia, the case of Raja 
Bahrin, which happened about twenty years ago, is a brutal reminder of this phenomenon.  Thus, this article 
examines the Malaysians laws relating to international parental child abduction and whether these laws are 
adequate enough to curb the problem of international parental child abduction.
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The only international instrument for 
international parental child abduction applicable 
to the whole world is the 1980 Hague Convention 
on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (1980 Child Abduction Convention) 
of which Malaysia is not yet a member.  If a child 
is abducted to Malaysia, the provisions under 
the 1980 Child Abduction Convention are not 
applicable.  This means the domestic laws of 
Malaysia will govern parental child abduction.
The central rationale of the 1980 Child 
Abduction Convention is that it is the originating 
court that should have jurisdiction to determine 
custody disputes.  The 1980 Child Abduction 
Convention specifically aims at remedying 
wrongful removals and not the merits of a 
custody claim.  Its objective is the swift return 
of children (except in rare circumstances) to their 
country of “habitual residence” where a court of 
proper jurisdiction will determine the custody 
issues.  For example, the 1980 Child Abduction 
Convention provides reciprocal arrangements to 
ensure prompt return of children under rightful 
custody to the child’s habitual residence.
OBJECTIVE
This article examines the related laws applicable 
for incoming child abduction to Malaysia.  In 
this context, incoming abduction arises in a 
situation where a child is wrongfully removed 
or retained away from his or her country of 
habitual residence to another jurisdiction by a 
parent without the knowledge and consent of 
the left-behind parent.  This article also seeks 
to find whether the current laws in Malaysia are 
adequate enough to handle incoming abductions.
FOREIGN CUSTODY ORDERS 
IN MALAYSIA: THE COMMON 
LAW RULES
As shall be seen, one factor for parental child 
abduction is the common law rules which 
disregard foreign custody orders and thus 
create the risks of parental child abduction.  In 
other words, this encourages one parent who is 
unhappy with a custody decision to seek another 
jurisdiction with the hope of obtaining a more 
favourable custody order (Tan, 1995).  Such 
practice is known as forum shopping (Bell, 
2003).  There is no doubt the existence of other 
factors for international parental child abduction 
to happen.  Non-recognition of foreign custody 
orders is not the sole factor for parental child 
abductions.  Other reasons include the lack of 
confidence to the court system (Lyon, 1993), 
religious factor (Raja Bahrin & Wickham, 1997), 
bitterness of the custody dispute that causes 
abduction (Dyer, 2000) and often occurs when 
parents separate or begin divorce proceedings. 
RECOGNITION OF ORDERS IN 
MALAYSIA
A foreign judgment needs to be recognized 
in order to be enforceable.  Recognition of 
foreign judgments refers to the procedure, 
whereby a foreign judgment is accepted as a 
local judgment and has a legal binding effect. 
The purpose is usually to enforce the foreign 
judgment to compel compliance to the other 
party with that particular judgment.  A party may 
seek recognition of a foreign judgment without 
the intention of seeking its enforcement.  For 
example, the judgment may be presented in a 
second jurisdiction as a defence to an action, or 
the party may be seeking a declaratory judgment 
in the second court.
According to Clarkson and Hill (2006), the 
question to be asked therefore is not whether 
foreign judgment should be recognized and 
enforced but which judgment should be 
recognized and enforced.  The authors quote 
Slate in Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] Ch 
433, that the law is based on “an acknowledgment 
that the society of the nations will work better 
if some foreign judgments are taken to create 
rights which supersede the underlying cause 
of action, and which may directly enforced in 
countries where the defendant or his assets are 
to be found.”
Generally, the basis for recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments is either the 
theory of obligation or comity/reciprocity.  The 
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theory of obligation is that if the original court 
has jurisdiction in the actions duly determined, 
the judgment should prima facie be regarded 
as creating an obligation between the parties in 
the foreign proceedings and so be recognized 
and enforceable (Clarkson & Hill, 2006).  This 
basis of recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments was encapsulated by Blackburn in the 
case of Schibsby v Westenholz (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B 
155 on page 159, as follows:
“The judgment of the court of competent 
jurisdiction over the defendant imposes 
duty or obligation on him to pay the 
sum for which judgment is given, which 
the courts are bound to enforce.”
At common law, a judgment in personam 
from a foreign court will be entitled to recognition 
and enforcement if it is regarded as creating a 
debt between the parties, the debtor’s liability 
arising on an implied promise to pay the amount 
of the foreign judgment, and the judgment 
must be final and conclusive for a definite sum 
of money being a judgment from a court of 
competent jurisdiction which is consistent with 
public policy of the local court and ‘not tainted 
with collusion or fraud’ (Platto, 1989).
Judgments in rem “may affect the position 
of third parties” including the parties in the 
proceedings.  They involve mostly “the issue 
of status and arise in the context of family 
proceedings.”  The conditions for recognition 
of judgments in rem are that the judgment is 
from a court of competent jurisdiction, final 
and conclusive and on the merits (Clarkson & 
Hill, 2006).
According to Clarkson and Hill (2006), 
“the idea of reciprocity is where the courts in 
X should recognise and enforce the judgments 
of country Y, if mutatis mutandis the courts of 
country Y recognise and enforce the judgments 
of country.”  On the other hand, the theory of 
reciprocity requires reciprocal treatments for 
mutual enforcements between countries to 
recognize the judgments from their respective 
courts.  In Indyka v Indyka [1967] 2 All ER 
689, the court said that “reciprocity appears 
to mean - if you will recognise that we have 
this jurisdiction, we will recognise that you 
have a similar jurisdiction.”  As an example, 
within the European Union, reciprocity is the 
basis of recognition of foreign commercial 
judgments under the Brussels I Regulation and 
foreign family judgments (divorces and parental 
responsibilities orders) under the Brussels II 
Regulation (Clarkson & Hill, 2006).
Foreign judgments have no direct operation 
in Malaysia but may be enforceable under 
statutes (Khaira, 2007), or as a debt under the 
common law.  Certain foreign judgments that are 
recognized and enforceable under the legislation 
of Malaysia include judgments in commercial 
matters, maintenance orders, arbitral awards, 
probate and letters of administration issued by 
the Courts of Probate in the Commonwealth and 
also insolvency matters with Singapore.
The main legislation for the recognition of 
foreign judgments in Malaysia is the Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (Revised 
1972) (Act 99).  Act 99 makes provision for 
the registration and enforcement of judgments 
of foreign superior courts, where a reciprocal 
agreement has been entered into between a 
foreign country and Malaysia.  In addition, 
Act 99 also provides for recognition of foreign 
judgments from a reciprocating country by way 
of registration before it can be enforceable. 
The High Court Rules 1980 provides the 
procedures for registration of foreign judgments 
within the ambit of Act 99.  Foreign judgments 
from a superior court shall apply under the 
Act if the judgments are final and conclusive, 
monetary in nature and from a country or 
territory in the First Schedule of the Act.  Any 
foreign judgment coming under Act 99 shall be 
registered unless it has been wholly satisfied, 
or it could not be enforced by execution in the 
country of the original Court.  The countries in 
the First Schedule include the United Kingdom, 
Singapore, New Zealand and India.  If a judgment 
does not originate from a country declared in the 
First Schedule, the common law rules apply.
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THE COMMON LAW RULES ON 
FOREIGN CUSTODY ORDERS
In terms of recognition and enforcement of 
foreign custody orders, the common law rules 
apply as there is no legislation for reciprocal 
provision related to foreign custody orders 
in Malaysia.  The basic position at common 
law is that custody orders are not final and 
conclusive [McKee v McKee (1951) AC 352]. 
The circumstances of parents and children can 
alter (an often do), and as such, the orders are 
always open to revision.  The best interest of 
the child is always the paramount consideration. 
This, of course, gives rise to the central problem 
that a parent who is unhappy with a decision of 
the court may abduct the child to another country 
in the hope of obtaining a more favourable 
decision.  In short, the non-finality of custody 
orders can encourage forum shopping.
In Malaysia, Section 47 of the Law Reform 
(Marriage And Divorce) Act 1976 (Act 164) 
provides that in all matrimonial matters “the 
court shall…act and give relief on principles 
which in the opinion of the court are, as nearly 
as may be, conformable to the principles on 
which the High Court of Justice in England acts 
and gives relief in matrimonial proceedings.” 
In particular, Section 27 of the Civil Law Act 
1956 (Revised 1972) (Act 67) provides that “in 
all cases relating to the custody and control of 
infants the law to be administered shall be the 
same as would have been administered in like 
cases in England at the date of the coming into 
force of the Act, regard being had to the religions 
and customs of the parties concerned, unless 
other provision is or shall be made by any written 
law.”  The point is that though reference may 
be made to the law in England, religious and 
customs of the parties concerned must be taken 
into consideration.
The common law rules  of  pr ivate 
international law provide that the welfare of the 
child is to be the paramount consideration in any 
proceedings concerning children.  Malaysian 
courts have the discretion to re-open custody 
disputes on the basis that it is for the best interests 
of the child as the paramount consideration, 
as decided by the apex court of Malaysia in 
Mahabir Prasad v Mahabir Prasad  [1981] CLJ 
124, [1981] 2 MLJ 326.
In the international arena, the ‘best interest 
of the child’ is also the concern of the main 
international instrument on children widely 
ratified; the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC) 1989 provides 
that “in all matters concerning children, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.”  The courts in many jurisdictions 
are bound by statute to apply the best interests of 
the child test in matters related to children.  This 
is no exception to Malaysia.  Among the statutes 
are the Child Act 2001 (Act 611), Guardianship 
of Infants Act 1961 (Revised 1988) (Act 351), 
Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 
(Act 164), and Islamic Family Law (Federal 
Territory) 1984 (Act 303).  Section 88(2) of 
Act 164 (Civil) and Section 86 (2) of Act 303 
(Syariah) make it mandatory for the courts 
to consider the welfare of the child as being 
paramount, and subject thereto, the wishes of 
the parents and of the child.  This principle 
has consistently been applied in Malaysia 
as have been demonstrated by the judicial 
pronouncements in many cases.
The law on foreign custody orders in 
Malaysia is based on the common law rules 
in McKee v McKee (1951) AC 352 that were 
followed in Malaysia in Mahabir Prasad v 
Mahabir Prasad (Mahabir Prasad) [1981] CLJ 
124, [1982] 1 MLJ 189, [1981] 2 MLJ 326.  In 
Mahabir Prasad, the Federal Court of Malaysia 
decided that a Malaysian court does have 
jurisdiction to decide cases involving foreign 
custody even when a foreign court has granted 
a custody order.  The court was of the view 
that although regard may be made to a foreign 
custody order, “the matter is never res judicata. 
A custody order is not final and conclusive” as 
the best interest of the child is of paramount 
consideration.
In Mahabir Prasad, the father, who was 
a Malaysian citizen, had married an Indian 
national.  From the marriage, they had two 
infant daughters and stayed in Malaysia.  Upon 
breakdown of the marriage, the mother returned 
to India, while the children were with their 
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father in Malaysia.  The mother then applied for 
dissolution of the marriage and custody of the 
infants, which was awarded to the mother by 
the court in India.  The parties had previously 
entered into a deed of separation by which the 
custody of the infants was given to the father. 
The father then applied for custody of the infants 
at the High Court at Kuala Lumpur but was 
unsuccessful.  The Judge in the High Court held 
that the father was estopped from making the 
application as the decision of the court in India 
was conclusive as against him, and there was no 
evidence to show any change of circumstances 
to justify a re-consideration of the custody order 
granted by the Indian Court.  The father then 
appealed to the Federal Court of Malaysia.  The 
Federal Court decided that, though regard may 
be made to foreign custody order, the order 
is not final and conclusive, as the paramount 
consideration is the best interest of the child.
The Federal Court in Mahabir Prasad 
reversed the High Court’s decision and referred 
with approval the decision of the Privy Council 
in McKee.  McKee decided that in the questions 
of custody, the welfare and happiness of 
children are the paramount considerations to 
which even foreign custody order from a court 
of competent jurisdiction yield.  In McKee, the 
Privy Council held that though proper weight is 
to be given to the foreign order, it depended on 
the circumstances of each case.  This means the 
existence of a foreign court order is merely an 
element to be considered to the issue of custody 
because ‘the best interests of the child’ prevail.
Raja Azlan Shah in Mahabir Prasad said:
“It is the law of this country and as 
it is the law of India that the welfare 
and happiness of the infant must be 
the paramount consideration in child 
custody adjudication. Consequently, 
although our courts must take into 
consideration the order of a foreign 
court of competent jurisdiction, we 
are not bound to give effect to it if this 
would not be for the infant’s benefit. We 
cannot regard that order as rendering 
it in any way improper or contrary to 
the comity of nations if the courts in 
this country consider what is in his 
best interest.”
The Court further held that “a custody order 
cannot from its nature be final or irreversible.  It 
is only of persuasive authority.”  The court held 
that a change of circumstances could justify a 
reassessment of the matter.
Based on this decision, the case was remitted 
and fixed for a rehearing on the issue of custody 
of the children at the High Court.  However, 
after time-consuming and costly litigation, the 
rehearing was decided in favour of the mother 
on the basis that it was in the best interest and 
welfare of the children to live with their mother 
in India.  The father appealed but the appeal was 
dismissed in the Federal Court.
This litigation demonstrates the central 
weakness in the law established by McKee 
(Beumont & McEleavy, 1999).  If both the 
originating country (India) and the receiving 
country (Malaysia) apply ‘the best interests 
of the child test’, it is likely that the receiving 
country will endorse the original decision. 
The result will then be a pointless, lengthy 
and expensive litigation, and for the child, a 
traumatic experience.  Thus, it is suggested 
that since both countries, namely, Malaysia and 
India, apply the best interest test in their custody 
cases, a custody order from any one country, 
Malaysia or India, should be well accepted and 
recognized unless a change in circumstances.
However, it must be recognized that 
circumstances for children and their parents 
can change after a custody order, which is why 
custody orders in most countries are never final. 
This is also the rationale in McKee that though 
proper weight is to be given to a foreign order, 
it is dependent upon the circumstances of each 
case which may change and differ from the 
time when the foreign order was obtained.  The 
real issue, when there has been such a change 
of circumstances, is whether the courts of the 
originating or the receiving country are more 
appropriate to revisit the custody order and to 
decide whether the original court order be re-
opened for scrutiny.
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Apart from tedious litigation, the common 
law rules on foreign custody orders could defeat 
the purpose of comity between nations and 
respect of the laws and sovereignty of other 
countries’ culture and values (Ong, 2007). 
The rule that foreign custody orders can be 
disregarded, on the basis of ‘the best interests 
of the child,’ has created uncertainty and 
encouraged forum shopping.  This can lead to 
serious implications of parental child abduction. 
According to Tan (1993), the principle in 
Mahabir Prasad by following McKee ‘serves to 
promote kidnapping by a parent who is unhappy 
with the way one court has adjudged the merits 
of custody.’  This indirectly condones parental 
child abduction.  As such, it is suggested that 
a global solution is needed to overcome the 
problem of international parental child abduction 
in Malaysia in this regard.
While the decision in Mahabir Prasad 
remains good law, there have been important 
developments in the law relating to recognition 
of custody orders from a foreign jurisdiction 
through the introduction of the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens in custody disputes in Malaysia 
(Muhamad Said & Suhor, 2009).
SOME RELATED PROVISIONS ON 
CHILD ABDUCTION IN MALAYSIA 
WITHIN THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT
The legal provisions on child abductions in 
Malaysia are scattered in the Child Act 2001 
(Act 611) and the Penal Code of Malaysia 
(Revised 1997) (Act 574).  The provisions are 
mainly concerned with trafficking of children or 
abduction for illegal purposes.  Accordingly, it 
is a crime to abduct or kidnap a child from her 
or his lawful custodian.
Abduction and kidnapping are two serious 
offences under the criminal law of Malaysia. 
The main statute for criminal law in Malaysia is 
the Penal Code of Malaysia (Revised 1997) (Act 
574).  The offence of abduction or kidnapping 
upon conviction, carries the maximum 
imprisonment of 7 years and liable to fine. 
The term ‘abduction’ under the criminal law of 
Malaysia means when a person by force compels 
or by deceitful means induces a person to go 
from any place.  This article, however, refers 
to parental child abduction as kidnapping from 
lawful guardianship under Section 361, which 
is more relevant.  The Penal Code differentiates 
between abduction and kidnapping.  Kidnapping 
is provided for under Section 359.  There are two 
kinds of kidnapping, namely, kidnapping from 
Malaysia (Section 360) and kidnapping from 
lawful guardianship (Section 361).  Kidnapping 
from Malaysia includes kidnapping from a 
person who is legally authorized to consent on 
behalf of the kidnapped person.
For the purposes of this article and in light 
of the 1980 Child Abduction Convention, the 
term that will be used is abduction, which means 
the wrongful removal or retention of a child 
from the child’s country of residence to another 
jurisdiction by a parent without the consent or 
knowledge of the other parent.
Abduction from lawful guardianship or 
lawful custodianship is subjected to the law 
of child abduction in the courts of Malaysia. 
To establish a case of abduction from a lawful 
guardian or custodian, the law requires that the 
custody of the child has been conferred by virtue 
of any written law or by an order of a Court, 
including a Syariah Court Order.  “Lawful 
guardian” includes any person who is lawfully 
entrusted with the care or the custody of such 
minor or other person.  In the case of Syed Abu 
Tahir a/l Mohamed Ismail v Public Prosecutor 
[1988] 3 MLJ 485, Zakaria Yatim J held that “in 
considering the expression ‘lawful guardian’ in 
Section 361 of the Penal Code, the court must 
give it a meaning which accords not only with 
Section 5 of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 
but also with the explanation to Section 361 of 
Act 574.  The words ‘lawfully entrusted’, which 
appear in the explanation, must be construed 
liberally.  It is not intended that the entrustment 
should be made in a formal manner.  It can be 
done orally and is not even necessary that there 
should be direct evidence available about the 
entrustment as such.  From the course of conduct 
and from the other surrounding circumstances, 
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it would be open to the court to infer lawful 
entrustment in favour of the person in whose 
custody the minor is living and who is taking 
her care in all reasonable ways.  In this sense, 
parental child abduction would unlikely be 
applicable as the abductor is also a person having 
legal rights over the child.
Part VIII of Act 611 deals with trafficking 
and abduction of children.  Meanwhile, Section 
52 of Act 611 creates the offence of taking in or 
sending out a child whether within or outside 
Malaysia without any appropriate consent of 
the person having lawful custody, including the 
Syariah Court Orders.
Any parent or guardian who does not 
have the lawful custody of a child and takes 
or sends out a child, whether within or outside 
Malaysia, without the consent of the person who 
has the lawful custody of the child commits an 
offence and shall on conviction be liable to a 
fine not exceeding ten thousand Ringgit or to 
an imprisonment for a term not exceeding five 
years or to both.
The court may make a recovery order upon 
application by or on behalf of the person having 
a lawful custody to direct any other person who 
is in a position to do so to produce the child on 
request to any authorized person or authorize the 
removal of the child by any authorized person or 
require any person who has information as to the 
child’s whereabouts to disclose that information 
to the authorized person or authorize any police 
officer to enter into any premises specified in the 
order and search for the child, using reasonable 
force if necessary.  However, this provision 
is only applicable if the child is within the 
jurisdiction.  If the child is out of jurisdiction, 
extradition of the person who is in position to 
produce the child could be an option, but it may 
not ensure the return of the child (Lowe et al., 
2004).
Section 48 of Act 611 deals with unlawful 
transfer of possession, custody or control of a 
child by a person for any valuable consideration, 
and such a person shall on conviction be liable 
to a fine not exceeding ten thousand Ringgit or 
to an imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
five years or to both.  This is unlikely to be a 
provision applicable to parental child abduction.
The court is also given power, under Section 
101 of Act 164 and section 105 of Act 303, to 
issue an injunction to restrain the taking of a child 
who is under the lawful custody of a person out 
of Malaysia, failure of which shall be punishable 
and subject to contempt of court.  This shows 
that the act of taking away a child from his or 
her lawful custody is a very serious offence. 
The provision allows a father or a mother or any 
interested person to apply for an injunction to 
restraint the child from being taken away from 
Malaysia or permission to take the child away 
from Malaysia.  This application must be made 
to court and subjected to situations where there 
are pending matrimonial proceedings, where 
there is an agreement or an order of the court. 
In Sokdave Singh a/l Ajit Singh v Sukvender 
Kaur a/p Daljit Singh, the application by the 
father to restrain the child from being taken out 
of Malaysia was dismissed as the court was of 
the opinion that there was no likelihood of risk 
for the child to be abducted abroad.  The father 
in this case was assuming that the child might 
be taken out from Malaysia to follow his mother 
if she was offered work outside Malaysia.  This 
means the court requires strong evidence if one 
parent needs to apply under this provision.  This 
imposes a difficult situation for a parent from 
abroad in incoming abduction cases who has 
successfully obtained custody from Malaysia 
to take a child away from Malaysia to her/his 
country of residence if it is objected by the other 
parent.  This would then be a futile effort as the 
custody order is just a paper judgment and does 
not guarantee the return of the child to a country 
of residence.
It is interesting to note Section 83 of Act 
303 provides for how a right of custody is 
lost.  In that provision, the right of custody to 
the mother is lost if she changes her residence 
to prevent access to the father, except if taken 
to her place of birth.  This provision allows a 
divorced mother to take her child to her place 
of birth.  It has not been tested in court whether 
this could also apply to cases where the mother 
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is from abroad.  Alas, the provision to prevent 
removal of the child from Malaysia seems to be 
in conflict with Section 83.
An application for habeas corpus could 
also be made if a custody order has been granted 
to a parent but the other parent has abducted 
the children.  This provision requires a validly 
enforceable custody order to be applicable. 
Non-compliance with custody orders is also a 
contempt of court.
In the Syariah context, the Syariah court 
does not have a jurisdiction to create criminal 
offences, which comes within the jurisdiction 
of the Federation.  The Federal Constitution of 
Malaysia only empowers the State Legislature 
to create offences against the precepts of Islam 
and the prosecutions of these offences are to 
be held in the Syariah courts.  The criminal 
jurisdiction of the Syariah courts, as conferred 
by the Federal law, is to be found in Section 2 
of the Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 
1965 (Act 355).
Looking from a broader view, although 
there is no provision related to offences for 
parental child abduction, there is a possibility 
that the Syariah Court may legislate offences 
related to parental child abduction in the 
Syariah Courts.  This is based on some recent 
decisions in the Civil Court that Act 355 should 
be construed by applying the “subject matter 
approach” in criminal matters, as decided in 
the cases of The Islamic Council of Penang & 
Butterworth v Shaik Zolkaffily [2003] 4 AMR 
501, Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v 
Ketua Pengarah Penjara & Anor [1992] 2 MLJ 
241 and Mohamed Habibullah bin Mahmood v 
Faridah bte Dato Talib [1992] 2 MLJ 793.  The 
contention is because parental child abduction 
involves the elements of wrongful removal or 
retention by one parent from a legal custodian 
cum parent which custody was derived from 
matrimonial proceedings.
All these laws are applicable in the 
Malaysian context and require lawful custody 
to establish the offence of child abduction. 
According to Lowe (2004), extra caution 
is needed when parental child abduction is 
regarded as a criminal offence as ‘courts often 
show a marked reluctance to return the abductor 
to face criminal charges.’  According to Kirby 
(2010), further consideration is needed to 
categorize parental child abduction as a criminal 
offence, apart from the psychological impact to 
the abducted child.  The reason being that the 
abductor is the child’s own parent.
However as discussed above, obtaining a 
custody order does not secure the return of the 
abducted child as there is a restriction to prevent 
taking or relocating a child away from Malaysia, 
which leaves a parent who was given custody to 
be in an awkward and difficult situation.
PROCEDURES FOR THE RETURN OF A 
CHILD IN INCOMING ABDUCTION
For cases of incoming abduction to Malaysia, 
the left-behind parent can depend on three 
avenues, namely, informal diplomatic channels 
and assistance from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs with the cooperation from the police 
and immigration, re-abduction through the use 
of personal resources and finally, submission 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of Malaysia. 
The first could be an endless effort, the second 
is too dangerous, and the last is costly and 
time consuming.  As of now, Malaysia has no 
reciprocal arrangement on child abduction issues 
thus far.
There is also no specific procedure for 
the return of an abducted child.  Furthermore, 
Malaysia does not have an agency like the 
Central Authority, which was created under the 
1980 Child Abduction Convention, to handle 
abduction cases.  If assistance is required from 
the Malaysian authorities by individuals, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia and 
the foreign country will arrange it through 
diplomatic channels.
CONCLUSION
Parental child abduction does not necessarily 
occur in cases related to foreign custody orders 
as the sole factor.  Parental child abduction 
could happen even when there is no custody 
order.  However, non-finality in the foreign 
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custody orders creates the risk of parental child 
abduction, as decided in McKee followed in 
Mahabir Prasad.  In cases where children are 
involved, the best interests of the child have 
always been the paramount considerations.  This 
is also the position in Malaysia, in which the 
provision is incorporated in the statutes.
Based on the above examination of the 
Malaysian laws, it is obvious that these laws 
are rather inadequate to resolve the issue 
of international parental child abduction; 
as to where it stands today, it does not have 
any international cooperation or reciprocal 
arrangement with any country in terms of 
international parental child abduction.
Hence, it is vital to have a systematic and 
structured legal framework to curb international 
parental child abduction in the context of 
Malaysia.  As such, there is a need for a global 
solution which could promote and enhance 
international cooperations on the issue and 
ensure prompt return of abducted children to 
their familiar surroundings.
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INTRODUCTION
Malaysia has two parallel legal systems to 
govern matrimonial matters, namely, the Civil 
and the Syariah Courts. Generally, jurisdiction 
on child custody applications for civil marriages 
lies within the Civil High Courts and for 
Muslims within the Syariah Courts.  The Syariah 
Court is territorial in nature as its jurisdiction is 
within the powers of the states, not the Federal 
Government.  As a result, the Syariah Court 
decision in one state is not enforceable in another 
unless an application for a reciprocal order is 
made to the court.  This has caused problem to 
the enforcement of custody orders obtained from 
the Syariah Court.  In lieu of this, the government 
has set up the Family Support Division to help 
enforce Syariah Court orders and judgments 
related to family matters including maintenance 
and child custody at any proceeding stages.  The 
Division was launched on the 30th October 2008 
by the then Minister in the Prime Minister’s 
Department, Datuk Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi 
who said that Malaysia was the first Islamic 
country to make such a move.  Syariah Court 
has also initiated alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) by introducing ‘sulh’ (mediation) for 
matrimonial disputes including custody (Abdul 
Hak, 2008).  The provisions on sulh can be 
found in the Syariah Court Civil Procedure for 
example the Federal Territories Syariah Court 
Civil Procedure (Sulh) Rules 2004.  However, 
as mediation is voluntary, parties may forward 
actions further to court for determination.
Forum Non Conveniens in the Syariah Court of Malaysia
Suzana Muhamad Said and Shamsuddin Suhor*
Faculty of Law, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
43600 Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia 
*E-mail: sudin@ukm.my
ABSTRACT
Syariah Court is territorial in nature.  Matters that are heard in the Syariah Court are mostly matrimonial-related 
issues, albeit there are also property issues that have nothing to do with matrimonial claims for example hibah, 
waqaf and faraid. Incoming international parental child abduction is not considered within the Syariah Court 
purview. Nevertheless, there is a provision in the Islamic family law for instance under section 105 of the 
Islamic Family Law (Federal Territory) Act 1984 (Act 303) which gives power to the Syariah Court to restrain 
the taking of a child who is under the lawful custody of a person out of Malaysia, failure of which shall be 
punishable and subject to contempt of court but this provision would not be applicable to children abducted 
from abroad to Malaysia by their own parent (incoming abduction).  Since parental child abduction is initiated 
from disputes arising out of matrimonial matters, it is suggested that the Syariah Court be at liberty to hear 
matters related to international parental child abduction.  This paper examines the application of forum non 
conveniens in disputes concerning the international parental child abduction if occurs within the Syariah Court’s 
jurisdiction.  This paper proposed that the Syariah Court should take a step forward to adopt the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens in deciding child custody disputes that involve foreign elements.
Keywords: International Parental Child Abduction, Syariah Court, Malaysia, Forum Non- Conveniens, 
Foreign Custody Order
Suzana Muhamad Said and Shamsuddin Suhor
112 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. Vol. 20 (S) 2012
Mediation particularly involving the 
international parental child abduction cases 
should be encouraged.  However if the disputes 
could not be resolved and proceeded in court, the 
jurisdiction of the court may be challenged by 
one party, refusing jurisdiction of the court thus 
‘forum non conveniens’ may apply if the court 
accepted the argument tendered on such ground.
‘Forum Non Conveniens’ is a doctrine where 
the basic principle states that it is applicable if 
‘the court is satisfied that there is some other 
forum, having competent jurisdiction, which 
is the appropriate forum for the trial of the 
action…’ (Spiliada Maritime Corporation v 
Cansulex Limited [1987] AC 460, per Lord 
Goff of Chieveley, 476).  It is ‘to identify the 
court in which the case can be most suitably 
tried for the interests of the parties and the ends 
of justice’ (Clarkson & Hill, 2005).  Forum non 
conveniens is derived from commercial disputes 
and equally applicable in family cases as held 
by the House of Lords in De Dampierre v De 
Dampierre [1987] 2 WLR 1006 and in Malaysia 
is applied in the case of Herbert Thomas Small 
v Elizabeth Mary Small (Kerajaan Malaysia & 
Anor, interveners), [2004] 2 CLJ 541.  In Herbert 
Thomas Small v Elizabeth Mary Small (Kerajaan 
Malaysia & Anor, interveners) the court held 
that Australia is the forum with the most real 
and substantial connections involving Australian 
citizens and an Australian child who has no real 
and substantial connection with Malaysia, and 
that accordingly the Australian court would be 
the more appropriate or natural forum to hear 
the matter, being distinctly more suitable for the 
ends of justice than the Malaysian court.
The determining factors for applying forum 
non conveniens ‘is described as legion’ (Lowe 
et al., 2004) and includes ‘the child’s welfare, 
habitual residence of the child, efficiency, 
expedition and economy of the proceedings, 
availability and cost of legal representation and 
legal aid, availability of witnesses and cost of 
travel, ability of court to ascertain wishes and 
feelings of the child and independent reporting 
facilities’ (Lowe et al., 2004).
Essentially, the doctrine involves a two-stage 
test.  The burden of proof is on the defendant to 
show that there is another forum which is clearly 
or distinctly more appropriate.  Regard must 
be had to the connecting factors which point to 
one forum that has the most real and substantial 
connections.  If this is established, jurisdiction 
will stay or be declined unless (and this is the 
second stage) the plaintiff can demonstrate 
that justice could not be obtained in another 
jurisdiction (Clarkson & Hill, 2005).
OBJECTIVE
The objective of this study was to examine 
the application of the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens in the Syariah Court particularly in 
cases of incoming international parental child 
abductions to ensure swift return of the abducted 
children to the other foreign countries.  Incoming 
abduction in this paper refers to the abduction 
of a child from abroad to Malaysia.  For ease 
of reference, this article will look at the legal 
provisions applicable in the Federal Territories 
of Malaysia.
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN 
THE SYARIAH COURT
In any matters pertaining to children, the 
best interests of the child is of paramount 
consideration.  Best interests of the child is the 
doctrine used by most courts to determine a wide 
range of issues related to the general well-being 
of children and all aspects of his upbringing, 
religious, moral as well as physical, and is not to 
be measured in monetary terms (In Re McGrath 
[1893] 1 Ch 143 per Lindley LJ,148).  As to what 
is in the best interests of the child, Justice Lord 
Mac Dermott in J & Anor. v. C & Ors [1970] AC 
668 at pages 710-711 held that:
We think that it connotes a process 
whereby, when all the relevant facts, 
relationships, claims and wishes of 
the parents, risks, choices and other 
circumstances are taken into account 
and weighed, the course to be followed 
will be that which is most in the interests 
of the children’s welfare as that term 
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has now to be understood.  That is 
the first consideration because it is of 
first importance and the paramount 
consideration because it rules upon or 
determines the course to be followed.
In Mahabir Prasad v Mahabir Prasad 
[1982] 24 MLJ 283, the Federal Court held that 
the welfare of the child concerned as the first 
and paramount consideration.  The court further 
held that in order to decide on the question 
of the welfare of an infant as of paramount 
importance it is necessary to take into account 
such matter as the conduct of the parties, their 
financial and social status, the sex and age 
of the child, his wishes as far as they can be 
ascertained depending on the age of the child, 
the confidential reports which a social welfare 
officer may put up and whether in the long run 
it would be in the greater interest, welfare and 
happiness of the child to be with one parent 
rather than with the other.  In short, there are 
various relevant factors taken into consideration 
before the court decides on any child-custody 
issue but most importantly the best interests of 
the child will be the paramount consideration.
According to Ahmad Ibrahim (1977), 
“Under the Mohammedan law certain rules 
have been laid down regarding the custody of 
infants…it would be seen that even under the 
Muslim Law the general principle that governs 
the custody of infants is the welfare of the 
infants.”  Thus, the principle of the best interests 
of the child is equally applicable in the Syariah 
Court.
The Syariah Court is also bound by statute 
to apply the best interests of the child in 
custody disputes (Mohd Zin, 2005).  The family 
provisions pertaining to custody, applicable 
to Muslims as in the Federal Territories is the 
Islamic Family Law Act (Federal Territory) 
1984 (Act 303) and the provision that Syariah 
Court must apply the best interests of the child 
is section 86 of Act 303.  This provision is pari 
materia (similar) to the Law Reform (Marriage 
and Divorce) Act 1976 (Act 164) for custody 
applications in the Civil Courts.  Notwithstanding 
the rebuttable presumption that a child is best to 
be with the mother, the court nevertheless may 
at any time make an order of custody to a more 
qualified person with the objects which include 
child welfare.  The court while having the power 
to decide the change of custody, shall regard the 
undesirability of disturbing the life of the child 
and where there are more than one child of the 
marriage, the court shall consider the welfare 
of the child independently.  The court may also 
if necessary make an interim order to place the 
child in the custody of any person or institution 
or association enforceable until it makes an 
order of custody.  The court may also impose 
conditions to the custody order which shall 
entitle the custodian to decide on matters related 
to the upbringing and education of the child. 
Accordingly an order for custody may include 
the child living place,  education, temporary care 
and control of the child by those other  than the 
person given the custody, provide for the child to 
visit a parent deprived of custody, access rights 
and prohibition to take the child out of Malaysia.
FOREIGN CUSTODY ORDER IN THE 
SYARIAH COURT
There is no specific statutory provision related 
to jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts in matters 
concerning Muslims from abroad for recognition 
of foreign custody orders except for section 
108 of Act 303, which deals with recognition of 
marriages from abroad.  There is also no express 
provision in the Syariah Court Civil Procedure 
(Federal Territories) Act 1998 (Act 585) related 
to foreign orders obtained from abroad and vice 
versa.
As there is no case-law or legal provision 
on recognition of foreign custody orders in the 
Syariah Court, the analogy that could be drawn is 
by looking at a closely related case of a custody 
dispute involving foreign elements.  The only 
relevant reported case is the case of Norlela 
Mohamad Habibullah v Yusuf Maldoner [2004] 
2 CLJ 541.  In this case, the court decided that 
Muslims marriages in foreign countries that 
are not registered in Malaysia do not fall under 
the Syariah Court jurisdiction.  The court in 
Norlela was of the view that there was no express 
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provision and relied on section 6(2)(b)(x) of 
the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal 
Territories) Act 1993 (Act 505).  In this case, 
the father, a foreigner, kidnapped the child and 
took her out of Malaysia.  In a desperate effort, 
the mother applied for a custody order from the 
Civil High Court and obtained a custody order 
of the child.  The father applied to set aside the 
order.  The issue raised by the father was whether 
the Civil High Court had jurisdiction to hear the 
application for guardianship of the child since 
both parties professed the religion of Islam.
The court applied the ‘remedy approach’ 
and granted legal guardianship, custody, care 
and control of the child to the mother.  The father 
was ordered to return the child to the mother. 
The court further said that since the Syariah 
Court does not have inherent jurisdiction on the 
issue, there was no specific section which the 
applicant could resort to in the Syariah Court to 
get the child back.
One of the reasons the court has decided 
that the Syariah Court will not have jurisdiction 
is because the issue is not merely on custody 
or guardianship, but also the abduction of the 
child from her residence, which may be one that 
‘hinged on criminal actions.’  The court opined 
that the Syariah Court had no jurisdiction to hear 
a criminal matter of this sort.  This contention 
is open for debate as to the nature of parental 
child abduction: is it a criminal offence or a civil 
liability?  Looking at the Child Act and Penal 
Code of Malaysia, parental child abduction is 
also an offence chargeable in court.  Therefore 
the judgment in Norlela does have some basis. 
The criminal jurisdiction of the Syariah Court 
is limited.  A parental child abduction is a case 
related to custody which issues are within the 
jurisdiction of the Syariah Court.
The case of Norlela decided that jurisdiction 
in custody matters related to parental child 
abduction, lies within the Civil Court even 
when the parties were Muslims.  The court 
in Norlela was of the view that there was no 
express provision in the Syariah legislation and 
relied on section 6(2)(b)(x)Act 505.  On this 
point, it is submitted that the court was wrong 
to rely on that section as it was only a general 
provision.  A more related and specific provision 
is section 46(2) (b) (iii) of Act 505  on custody 
applications, read together with section 4 of Act 
303  and not section 46(2) (b) (x) of Act 505. 
Section 46(2)(b)(x) of Act 505 states that the 
Syariah Court shall have jurisdiction in other 
matters conferred by any written law whereas 
section 46(2)(b)(iii) of Act 505 deals with 
guardianship or custody of infants.
One of the requirements to have a locus in 
the Syariah Court is that one of the parties must 
be a resident within the locality of that Syariah 
Court.  If the applicant is a resident of Penang, 
within the meaning of the provision,  only then 
the Syariah Court in Penang has the jurisdiction 
to determine the issue of custody.  The word 
‘resident’ is defined in section 2 of Act 303 as 
‘permanently or ordinarily living in a particular 
area’. 
In Azizah Bte Shaik Ismail & Anor v 
Fatimah Bte Shaik Ismail & Anor [2004] 2 
MLJ 529 and Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati 
bte Sharibun & Anor [2007] 5 MLJ 101, the 
Federal Court held that the jurisdiction on 
custody disputes where both parties are Muslims 
lies within the Syariah Court even when there 
is no statutory provision based on Article 
121(1A) of the Federal Constitution.  These 
decisions of the Federal Court affirmed that the 
‘subject matter approach’ is to be applied when 
questioning the conflict of jurisdiction between 
the Syariah Court and the Civil Court when 
there is no express statutory provision related 
to the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court.  It was 
therefore established by the civil apex court that 
the Syariah Court shall have jurisdiction on any 
matters within its jurisdiction even when there 
is no express provision in the statute provided 
that the parties are Muslims.
Norlela has added confusion to the conflict 
issue in the Syariah Court jurisdiction.  However, 
this could be resolved as the current approach 
adopted by the apex court in matters concerning 
jurisdiction of the Syariah Court is to apply 
the ‘subject matter approach’.  Norlela is only 
persuasive.  The decision is not binding as 
the High Court is the court of first instance. 
Considering the decision in the apex court, it 
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is suggested that matters concerning the issue 
of custody including foreign custody orders are 
within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts 
provided the parties are Muslims.  This means 
the general rule is that when the parties are 
Muslims, the Syariah Court shall have the 
jurisdiction but not if one of the parties is a non-
Muslim, even if the subject matter falls within 
its jurisdiction as decided in the Federal Court 
decisions of Azizah Bte Shaik Ismail & Anor 
v Fatimah Bte Shaik Ismail & Anor [2004] 2 
MLJ 529 and Latifah bte Mat Zin v Rosmawati 
bte Sharibun & Anor [2007] 5 MLJ 101, as 
mentioned above.
Based on the above discussion and by 
acknowledging the fact that parental child 
abduction arises from a custody dispute, the 
Syariah Court should have jurisdiction if the 
‘subject matter’ approach is to be followed to 
hear foreign custody applications where the 
parties are Muslims.
INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL 
CHILD ABDUCTION AND THE 
SYARIAH COURT
Having discussed the issue of which court shall 
have jurisdiction, it is therefore relevant to 
visualize how the Syariah Court would handle 
foreign custody orders and parental child 
abduction cases.  Since Syariah Court is parallel 
to the civil Courts, its decisions are independent 
and the decisions of the Civil Court are not 
binding in the Syariah Courts.  As such, the 
approach in the Syariah Court may be different 
from that adopted in the Civil Court as the issue 
is always about conformity of Islamic law.
As Syariah Court is territorial in nature, 
there is a provision in the states’ legislation that 
the jurisdiction of the Syariah Court is only 
applicable to persons ‘resident’ in the respective 
state.  For example Act 303 provides that the 
Syariah statute is applicable “to all Muslims 
living in the Federal Territory and to all Muslims 
resident in the Federal Territory who are living 
outside the Federal Territory.” This means the 
Syariah Court will refuse jurisdiction on any 
dispute concerning a person not a resident 
within its local jurisdiction.  The ‘resident’ 
provision gives Syariah Court the power to 
refuse jurisdiction.  One of the parents must 
be a resident within a particular state to enable 
jurisdiction in the custody dispute of that state. 
Habitual residence of the child or the question of 
the most real and substantial connections to the 
child is not the basis for refusal of jurisdiction 
as applied in the Civil Court.  However the end 
result is similar to that of the Civil Courts as the 
Syariah courts will not determine the issue of 
custody for lack of jurisdiction. 
There may be a possibility for the Syariah 
Courts to handle international parental child 
abduction cases in the future, based on various 
efforts including harmonization of the law and 
upgrading of infrastructure and resources.  The 
question then arises whether the Syariah Court 
in Malaysia would apply forum non conveniens 
and order a swift return of the child.  The answer 
to this question would well depend on which 
country the child would be returned to and how 
the courts of that country would apply the best 
interests of the child test.
Islamic law determines the best interests 
of a child rather differently from the non-
Islamic Western countries.  The differences 
include  the upbringing of a child which is 
divided into 3 categories: the guardianship of 
the infant, the education and wealth of the child 
and the upbringing of the infant by the mother 
subject to some exceptions (Arshad, 2007). 
There are instances that custody is given to 
another qualified person as the welfare of the 
child is always the paramount consideration in 
child custody disputes in the Syariah Courts 
of Malaysia.  In the cases of Nooranita bt 
Kamaruddin v Faeiz b Yeop Ahmad, [1990] 7 
Jurnal Hukum (JH) (1) 52 and Wan Abdul Aziz 
v Siti Aishah [1975] 1 JH 47, [1977] 1 JH 50, 
the Syariah Court granted custody to the father. 
These exceptions were made with the best 
interests of the child in mind.  In most Western 
countries there is no presumption as to custody 
based on the gender of the custodian and the 
age of the child.In predicting the response of the 
Syariah Courts, it might be helpful to consider a 
hypothetical case of an incoming abduction of 
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a child habitually resident in England.  A strong 
factor that could persuade the Syariah Court 
to send the child back to England could be a 
determination of how the English courts would 
resolve custody disputes involving Muslims.
The general principles in the child law in 
the United Kingdom are provided under the 
Child Act 1989 (UK).  The cardinal principle 
is that the child’s welfare shall be the court’s 
paramount consideration to determine any 
question related to the upbringing of the child. 
The checklist of what is ‘welfare of the child’ 
includes ‘any characteristics of the child which 
the court considers relevant’.  Accordingly, the 
child’s background ‘could include the religious 
upbringing of the child’(White et al., 2008).
In the case of B v El-B (Abduction: Syaria 
Law: Welfare of Child) [2003] 1 FLR 811, FD, the 
court in England decided that Syariah law is not 
incompatible with the welfare of the child.  The 
main issue in the case was whether the Syariah 
law on custody was to be respected by English 
courts in the international child abduction cases. 
The court decided that it would be wrong to 
suggest that the application of Muslim law was 
inappropriate as the parents were Muslims and 
this was the cultural background of the children. 
The case distinguished Re JA (Child Abduction: 
Non-Convention Country) [1998] 1 FLR 231 
because in the later case the family had lived in 
England for a substantial period.  The child in Re 
JA (Child Abduction: Non-Convention Country) 
had been living in England while in B v El-B, 
the children were previously living in Lebanon 
before being brought to England.  In the case 
of Re E (Abduction: Non-Convention Country) 
[1999] 2 FLR 642, the Court of Appeal held that 
‘the application of Muslim law to Muslim family 
was appropriate and acceptable and a solution in 
accordance with local law was capable of being 
in the best interests of the child.’ The case of Re 
S (Change of Names) (Cultural Factor) [2001] 
3 FCR 648 further  illustrates the willingness 
of the courts in England to accept Islamic law 
which, in this case, the court allowed both the 
application of the mother to bring up the child in 
the Muslim religion and the circumcision of her 
son under the Islamic law.  The child in this case 
was born to a Muslim mother and a Sikh father. 
Prior to B v El-B (Abduction: Syaria 
Law: Welfare of Child, in the case of Osman v 
Elasha [2000] Fam 62, Thorpe LJ commented 
that “the further development of international 
collaboration to combat child abduction may 
well depend upon the capacity of states to respect 
a variety of concepts of child welfare derived 
from differing cultures and traditions.”  This 
case shows how a court in England is receptive 
to other concepts of child welfare.  All the cases 
discussed above recognized that Islamic law is 
not incompatible with the principles of the best 
interests of the child.  However, the House of 
Lords in Re J (A Child) (FC) [2005] UKHL 40 
preferred the case of Re JA (Child Abduction: 
Non-Convention Country) to that of Osman v 
Elasha. 
It is interesting to note that in Re J (A Child) 
(FC ) the English court agreed that “It would 
be wrong to say that the future of every child 
who is within the jurisdiction of our courts 
should be decided according to a conception of 
child welfare which exactly corresponds to that 
which is current here.  In a world which values 
difference, one culture is not inevitably to be 
preferred to another.  Indeed, we do not have any 
fixed concept of what will be in the best interests 
of the individual child.”  The court further stated 
that, “Our concept of child welfare is quite 
capable of taking cultural and religious factors 
into account in deciding how a child should be 
brought up.  It also gives great weight to the 
child’s need for a meaningful relationship with 
both his parents.”  Baroness Hale of Richmond 
further stated that ‘where the connection of the 
child and all the family with the other country 
is so strong that any difference between the 
legal systems here and there should carry little 
weight’.  This is a very promising judicial 
approach which shows that the court in England 
is not arrogant to accept differences in conflict 
of cultures and religion.  This also enhanced the 
current suggestion to the possible application 
of religious law in the UK (Williams, 2008). 
Therefore, there is a need for ‘greater knowledge 
and greater recognition of Islamic personal law’ 
in the English courts (Morris, 2005).
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APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN 
THE SYARIAH COURT
Forum Non Conveniens refers to a discretionary 
power of the courts to refuse jurisdiction over 
matters where there is a more appropriate 
forum available to the parties (Muhamad Said 
and Suhor, 2009).  It allows the court discretion 
to decline or stay jurisdiction when the forum 
selected by the plaintiff is clearly inappropriate 
(Hickling and Wu, 1994).  In Malaysia, Forum 
Non Conveniens is accepted in a custody 
dispute in the case of Herbert Thomas Small v 
Elizabeth Mary Small (Kerajaan Malaysia & 
Anor, interveners), [2004] 2 CLJ 541, [2004] 2 
MLJ 629.  The doctrine is applicable especially 
when it involves foreign nationals who are not 
substantially connected to Malaysia.
If the Syariah Courts were to apply forum 
non conveniens in cases involving foreign 
elements, it would abdicate to determine custody 
disputes.  This creates an issue if a child is 
to return to a non-Islamic country where the 
Islamic law is not applicable.  The assurance 
given by the House of Lords in Re J (A Child) 
(FC) that the courts in England is capable of 
giving due consideration to the upbringing of 
the child by taking cultural and religious factors 
into account, should bestow confidence at the 
approach to be adopted in England, in future 
custody cases that relates to religion and culture 
and whether the courts in England would apply 
the best interests of the child from the Syariah 
perspective.
It is important to note that in terms of 
custody, the Syariah Courts of Malaysia, 
despite the presumption that mother is the best 
custodian for an infant child, have the statutory 
duty to apply the best interests of the child as the 
paramount consideration.  This means that even 
though there is a rebuttable presumption that 
a mother is the best person as custodian of an 
infant child and the question of age and gender 
of the child are matters taken into consideration, 
the principle of the bests interests of the child is 
always the paramount consideration.
The statutory provision to apply the best 
interests of the child as paramount consideration 
in the Syariah Court regardless to the rights 
of the parents, indicates presumably that the 
Syariah Court will also decide to return an 
abducted child if it is in the best interests of 
that child.  This includes the contention that 
it is for the best interests of the child to return 
to his or her familiar surroundings in cases 
involving parental child abduction and foreign 
nationals.  In other words, a decision to return 
a child does not involve a judge in choosing 
between the different conceptions of a child’s 
interests adhered to in different jurisdiction. 
Based on the above English cases, the Syariah 
Court should have confidence to accept other 
jurisdiction.  Even though it may be the best 
available alternative, difficulties may exist for 
both systems if this is compromised.
While the adoption of this approach by 
the English courts makes it easier to return a 
child to England, other countries might not be 
so “enlightened” to do so as this is a matter 
of policy and discretion of the courts in each 
respective country.  In this regard, there is a 
probability that the Syariah Courts may feel 
hesitant to order swift return of the child if it 
appears that the other country disregards the 
Islamic law.  This requires the Syariah Court to 
hear the merits of the case and therefore defeat 
the purpose of a summary return of the abducted 
child.  However, it is suggested that if a swift 
return of a child is in the best interests of him/her, 
the Syariah Court may give due consideration.
The difficulty to strike a balance of 
accepting differences between countries with 
Syariah based and non-Islamic countries 
requires much needed effort and understanding 
of these differences.  The problem makes it more 
appealable to have a global solution.  Perhaps, in 
the context of the Syariah Courts of Malaysia, 
a bilateral agreement could help overcome the 
ambiguous outcome of assumption whether or 
not the other courts would comply/conform to 
the Islamic law when the issue of the return of 
an abducted child arises for example the UK-
Pakistan Judicial Protocol on Children Matters 
which was agreed between the United Kingdom 
and Pakistan on children matters.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above discussions, it is proposed 
that the Syariah Court considers adopting forum 
non conveniens in the incoming international 
parental child abduction cases as this is in the 
best interests of the child.  The Forum non 
conveniens abdicates the court from deciding 
on issues related to custody disputes where the 
child has no real and substantial connection with 
Malaysia.  By applying forum non conveniens, 
the court could ensure swift return of the 
abducted child to his/her normal surroundings 
(habitual residence), thus minimize the trauma 
of the child being in a strange land with strange 
people and facing  the language barrier.  Perhaps 
the suggestion in this article that the Syariah 
Court applies forum non conveniens in the 
incoming international parental child abduction 
would also encourage other countries as a 
reciprocal initiative between nations.  This is 
to ensure swift return of the abducted children 
in cases involving Muslims children abducted 
from Malaysia to other foreign countries.  It 
is acknowledged that there is  difficulty when 
it comes to the implementation.  However, for 
the best interests of the child, this seems to be 
the best available method thus far.  This could 
also promote Syariah Courts in the international 
arena.
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INTRODUCTION
Islamic financing instruments need a pragmatic 
direction for expansion in tandem with the 
development of Islamic finance generally.  Home 
ownership constitutes most of the financing 
needs for the obvious reason that home is a basic 
necessity for human life.  Muslim customers 
especially would prefer that Islamic banking 
and finance observe the general rule in ensuring 
that there is no contravention of any Shari’ah 
principles in the transactions; for example, all 
transactions must be free from the elements of 
usury, dubiousness and gambling.
At the beginning of its development, 
the notion or application of the sales concept 
dominated the basic features of Islamic financing 
generally.  Recently, an innovative Islamic 
financial concept employing partnership 
contracts and leasing are explored and developed 
in order to provide more options to the customers. 
Many literatures suggest that Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah (a diminishing partnership) is 
a better option available for home financing 
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ABSTRACT
The Islamic financial system globally has witnessed a tremendous growth in terms of demand, acceptance 
and development.  The variety of products offered is to meet the ever sophisticated consumers’ demand and 
economic changes.  For home financing, the application of sales concept under al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil (sale with 
deferred payment) contract is widely used in countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei even though most 
of the Middle East scholars have rejected it.  Nevertheless, al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil contract is heavily criticised 
for its conceptual and practical problems particularly related to the inconsistencies of the sales concept used 
for financing purposes.  On the other hand, Musharakah Mutanaqisah (diminishing partnership) contract is 
another innovation that offers a viable alternative which is based on partnership and leasing.  The objective of 
this article is to analyse the strength and practical problems of Musharakah Mutanaqisah contract in Islamic 
home financing.  The study revealed that the partnership foundation of Musharakah Mutanaqisah contract 
may add to the diversification of the Islamic financial products and attend more to the consumers’ needs 
and interests globally.  The strength of the concept lies on revenue sharing between the parties, namely the 
financier and the customer who proportionally share their profits and risks as agreed in the contract.  However, 
practical problems may arise in determining rental rate and risks distributions which the financiers would adapt 
according to their interests.  Ultimately, any Islamic financing packages may need to be made compatible with 
the prevailing practices of the conventional financing and conceptually, that may attract more controversies.
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compared to those applying the sales concept 
such as al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil (sale with deferred 
payment).  Therefore, Musharakah Mutanaqisah 
instrument should be promoted as a viable 
alternative for Islamic home financing.
This paper concurs theoretically that 
Musharakah Mutanaqisah is to be recognised 
as a formidable mode of home financing, which 
is more consistent with the Maqasid Shari’ah 
(the general purposes of Shari’ah) (Meera & 
Abdul Razak, 2005).  Musharakah (partnership) 
concept emphasises on the revenue sharing 
of profits and risks among the parties in the 
contract. However, this paper will highlight 
some of the practical problems revolving around 
the application of Musharakah Mutanaqisah 
especially related to the general tendency of the 
financiers in determining the rental rate and the 
risks distribution.  A brief account of comparison 
with some other modes of financing especially 
related to sale in al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil and the 
concept of leasing in Ijarah will be made.  This 
paper will specifically draw attention to the 
challenges how well the concepts may cope with 
the realities of business and commerce.
MURABAHAH CONCEPTS IN 
FINANCING TRANSACTIONS
There are many innovations in the field of Islamic 
financing which provide funding facilities for 
home buyers.  The concept of Murabahah, a 
sale concept (also known as, cost-plus financing) 
is used widely in the Islamic modes of home 
financing.  Under the Murabahah concept, 
payment is done based on the resale value made 
by the financier (the seller) including the profit 
margin agreed by both buyer (the customer) 
and seller.  The purchase and selling price, the 
mode of payments and its tenure, other costs 
and the profit margin for the financier are stated 
at the time the agreement of sale is concluded. 
The sales concept of Murabahah in financing 
transactions is not against Shari’ah  so far as it 
does not violate any basic principle laid down 
by the Holy Qur’an, the Sunnah or the consensus 
of the Muslim jurists particularly related to the 
injunction against the imposition of interests. 
However, in practice  Murabahah may be subject 
to many conceptual and practical problems.  In 
the context of home financing, Murabahah is 
applied especially in the form of Istisna’ (i.e., 
sale with deferred product/subject matter of the 
contract) and al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil.
Istisna’ is a purchase order contract of 
an asset where a buyer will place an order to 
purchase an asset that will be delivered in the 
future. In other words a buyer will require a seller 
or a contractor to deliver or construct the asset 
that will be completed in the future according to 
the specifications given in the sale and purchase 
contract. Both parties of the contract will decide 
on the sale and purchase prices as they wish and 
the settlement can be delayed or arranged based 
on the schedule of the work completed (ICM 
Task Force, 2004). Istisna’ is similar to al-Bay’ 
Bithaman Ajil transaction as both are sale based 
transactions but differ in the deferment aspects 
where Istisna’ refers to the deferment of the 
subject matter of the contract while al-Bay’ 
Bithaman Ajil concerns on the deferment of 
the payment. However,  Istisna’ offers greater 
future structuring possibilities for trading and 
financing. This instrument is suitable for Islamic 
banks to finance construction and manufacturing 
projects (Lewis and Hassan, 2007). However, 
for home financing, Istisna’ requires the bank 
to assume the role of a house builder, with its 
associated risks apart from being a financier. 
Hence, many banks may be unprepared to 
assume both roles.
The contract of al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil is a 
popular form of Murabahah particularly used 
in home financing in Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Brunei. Al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil consists of several 
principles employed in the Islamic financing like 
sale based, interest free, deferred payment and 
long term financing (SAC, 2006). Nevertheless, 
the current practice of al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil 
as the main facility for home financing is 
surrounded with some conceptual and practical 
problems. The prevailing condition is that, many 
housing projects are incomplete therefore the 
houses offered for sale are normally not yet in 
existence.  The basic condition  of the subject 
matter of a valid contract namely the commodity 
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should exist at the time of contract may be 
subject to challenges. When such a property 
is still under construction it means the subject 
matter which is a condition for the validity 
of the contract of sale is not met. The Islamic 
jurists,  Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim  view 
the selling of the non-existent subject matter is 
allowed However, their opinion is based on the 
near certainty of delivery. The arising question 
is whether the application of al-Bay’ Bithaman 
Ajil financing in Malaysia passed the test of 
certainty of delivery (see ibn_abdullah, 2010). 
Apart from the issue of non-completion, an under 
construction property may also pose other risks, 
such as late delivery which commonly occurred 
in the property industry, where the risks and costs 
are mostly borne by the buyer; In cases where 
the buyer is in default because he or she refuses 
to continue paying for an undelivered house. 
According to al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil contract, 
the bank may request the full payment of the 
purchase price together with the agreed profit 
which is not fair to the customer (Kamaruddin, 
2007; Mohamed, 2008).
The modus operandi of al-Bay’ Bithaman 
Ajil is the bank will purchase the property and 
thereafter sell the property back to the borrower 
at a profit.  The profit appears as a difference 
between the purchase price paid by the bank 
and the sale price.  The current practice of 
al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil therefore resembles a 
financing facility since bankers and financiers 
have adopted al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil to finance 
the customers (Tan, 2010).  Since al-Bay’ 
Bithaman Ajil is a type of Murabahah, it is in 
contrast with the original condition referring 
to the early practice during the Prophet time, 
where Murabahah was a trade facility (Arifin, 
2008).  As one commentator puts it, the validity 
of financial Murabahah is disputed by many 
scholars as it releases them from the associated 
problems such as stock keeping, marketing 
and other incidental risks related to trade.  The 
seller is supposed to keep the goods together 
with the associated risks before a resale can be 
made at a profit to the buyer.  This is not feasible 
for a purely financial Murabahah transaction. 
Morover, al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil is a home 
financing facility which is applied on  both the 
property under construction  and the completed 
ones.   In addition, the prevailing risks in the 
home financing concerning the abandoned 
or incomplete projects is that any associated 
risks are mostly borne by the customers.  This 
development has caused many scholars to 
question the validity of financial Murabahah 
under Shari’ah (Arifin, 2008).
The Murabahah price is fixed for the 
delivery of the complete house at the price 
inclusive of the agreed profit reflecting the rate 
with the period for deferred payment. In the 
event of default by the borrower (the buyer), 
the question is whether the banker is allowed 
to claim for the full amount of unearned 
profit.  If Murabahah or al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil 
transactions are treated as trading facilities, 
the banks therefore are entitled to the full 
purchase price which is stated in the agreement. 
However, allowing this would cause hardship 
to the customer.  In contrast, the practice of 
conventional financing would impose interests 
only up to the date on which the customer (the 
buyer) had committed a default.  The question 
raised is that; should the profit be calculated in 
accordance to the date on which the customer 
had committed an event of default?
Authorities from decided cases suggest 
that claiming for unearned profit should not 
be allowed.  In Affin Bank Bhd v Zulkifli bin 
Abdullah [2006] 3 MLJ 67,  Abdul Wahab Patail 
J held that Islamic banks are merely entitled to 
claim the sum due to them on the date of the 
default and further profit on a daily rate basis 
instead of claiming the full sums outstanding 
of the purchase price.  This question was again 
answered in a similar tone by the same learned 
judge in Bank Muamalat Malaysia v Suhaimi 
bin Md Hashim [2007] 1 MLJ 275.  The 
learned judge again reiterated that banks when 
foreclosing on property due to the default by 
the borrower could only claim the amount profit 
due on the date of default.  Earlier, in Dato Hj 
Nik Mahmud Bin Daud v Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad [1996] 4 MLJ 295, it was held that al-
Bay’ Bithaman Ajil is not a trade facility because 
it does not involve any transfer of ownership 
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but only a right to a registrable interest.  The 
court did not actually assert to the extent that 
the execution of the property sale agreement 
and the property purchase agreement is a mere 
disguise of sale transaction.  Nevertheless the 
court said that they merely constituted part of the 
process required by Islamic banking procedure 
before the bank customer could avail him of the 
financial facilities provided by the bank under 
the al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil principle.  The learned 
Hamid Sultan bin Abu Backer J.C. asserted that 
“abhorrent to the notion of justice and fair play 
when compared and contrasted with the secular 
banking facilities” if the payment of unearned 
profit is allowed, it constitutes a ‘glaring 
injustice.’  The judgments in Affin Bank Bhd 
v Zulkifli bin Abdullah [2006] 3 MLJ 67; and 
Malayan Banking Bhd v Marilyn Ho Siok Lin 
[2006] 7 MLJ 249 were followed. In Malayan 
Banking Bhd v Ya’kup Oje & Anor [2007] 6 MLJ 
389, Hamid Sultan Abu Backer J.C. stated that:
If a contract between the contracting 
parties becomes an instrument of 
injustice, a judge cannot ignore 
the unfairness and insist on strict 
adherence to the letter of the contract. 
Hence, a judge is empowered to set 
aside a contract when the fact discloses 
gross unfairness on one of the parties 
as the Islamic system is a just and 
equitable system that promotes close 
relationship between the banks and 
the customers based on co-operation 
and the equitable sharing of risks and 
rewards.
An interesting observation may be made 
from the above development. Theoretically, 
the conventional banking and financing is 
prohibited because the imposition of interest is 
considered a kind of commercial exploitation. 
Unfortunately, it is evident in the above al-
Bay’ Bithaman Ajil contracts that the profit 
rate payable by the customer to the bank may 
be higher than the payable rate if reverted to 
the conventional banking (Arifin, 2008). In the 
conventional system, customer has to pay only 
the outstanding principal amount and earns 
interest at the time when the early settlement 
is made.  The unearned interest is normally 
waived by the financier.  Contractually, however, 
the customer in Islamic financial system has to 
settle the total outstanding selling price in a case 
of early settlement (Abdul Razak, et al., 2008).
Islamic bank normally gives rebate to its 
customer who makes early settlement.  However, 
giving rebate is made at the discretion of the 
Islamic banking institution.  The doubt as to 
whether the customers are eligible to receive 
rebate when they make an early settlement 
still persists.  Any perception of uncertainty 
and unfairness from this system may cause the 
consumers to turn to a more orderly conventional 
financing.  In order to stay competitive, the 
problems should be rectified.  Therefore, in order 
to promote certainty and overcome confusion 
in the granting and computation of rebate by 
Islamic banking institutions, a clause on promise 
to provide ibra’ to customers who settle their 
debts earlier than the stipulated period was 
introduced (SAC, 2006).  Ibra’ is a discount 
amount given either when the customer pays 
the loaned sum earlier, or when the customer 
defaults in his repayments.   Without any clear 
clause in the agreement, ibra’ or discount which 
is given at the discretion of the banks may 
become uncertain.
However, SAC acknowledged that there 
is a view that there should be no fixed rule 
as to discount to be stated in the agreements 
concerning al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil contracts. 
This issue is however considered by the SAC’s 
in that incorporation of such clause promising to 
give ibra’ to customers in the Islamic financing 
agreement is permissible by Shari’ah (Mohd 
Nor, 2008).  Doing this however may cause such 
an al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil instrument equivalent 
to the conventional financing, namely profit 
amount payable is an interest equivalent under 
the conventional financing system where the 
profit rate tracks the market interest rate (Meera 
& Abdul Razak, 2005).
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MUSHARAKAH MUTANAQISAH: THE 
ALTERNATIVE MODE OF FINANCING
Following the controversies surrounding 
the inconsistencies of al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil 
as a mode of Islamic home financing, an 
innovative Islamic financial concept employing 
partnership contract and leasing was developed 
(Mohd Nor, 2008).  Shari’ah scholars had 
introduced the diminishing or declining 
partnership (Musharakah Mutanaqisah) which 
is underpinned by the more equitable concept 
of Musharakah as a method of financing.  The 
partnership concept (Musharakah) is used, and 
this literally means a partnership between the 
entrepreneur and investor who contribute to the 
capital (such as assets, technical and managerial 
expertise, working capital, etc.) of the operation 
in varying degrees and agree to share the returns, 
as well as the risks, in proportions as agreed by 
them in advance (ICM Task Force, 2004).
Musharakah is a traditional yet pragmatic 
instrument which can keep pace with the ever-
advancing need for modern speedy transactions. 
Musharakah has set some broad principles 
which can accommodate numerous forms and 
procedures.  A financing package incorporates 
Musharakah can be acceptable to the Shari’ah 
as far as it does not violate any basic principle 
laid down by the Holy Qur’an, the Sunnah or the 
consensus of the Muslim jurists (Usmani, 2005).
The traditional Musharakah concept if 
used for financing would involve the bank as a 
permanent partner in a particular venture.  This 
departs from the main business of a bank as 
financier and it may find this unattractive.  A 
hybrid concept which integrates the concept of 
Ijarah (leasing) is therefore introduced.  Ijarah 
(leasing) is an instrument originally designed 
for financing an asset or equipment.  Basically, 
the contract is over a manfaah (benefit) or the 
right to use the asset or equipment.  The lessor 
leases out an asset or equipment to the client at 
an agreed rental fee for a pre-determined period 
pursuant to the contract (ICM Task Force, 2004). 
The ownership of the leased asset remains in the 
hands of a lessor.  This feature is not appealing 
to many house buyers who look forward to 
the full ownership of the property eventually. 
For the purpose of Musharakah Mutanaqisah, 
the contract of Ijarah mawsufah fi zimmah 
(forward lease) is adopted in cases of house 
under completion.
Musharakah Mutanaqisah is a combination 
of two contracts namely partnership and leasing. 
Under Musharakah Mutanaqisah contract, the 
financier and the customer share the ownership 
of the property.  The customer will make 
payment in two phases; a rental payment for 
the part of the property owned by the financier 
and a buy-out of the part of the ownership by 
the customer.  The bank’s share in the equity (in 
this regard the property) is diminished each year 
through partial return of capital while at the same 
time, the portion of the property owned by the 
customer increases, until he owns completely the 
property before the contract is terminated (ICM 
Task Force, 2004).  The bank receives periodic 
profits based on its reduced equity share that 
remains invested during the period.  The SAC 
defines Musharakah Mutanaqisah as a contract 
of partnership between a financier and a recipient 
of financing (the customer) to own a property in 
which one of the partners (the financier) gives 
the right to the other partner (the customer) to 
buy his equity share of the asset either by one 
payment or several payments based on agreed 
conditions (SAC, 2006).
One of the issues arises is whether a 
combination of more than one contract in an 
agreement is allowed for financing purposes. 
Partnership and leasing require two different 
contracts and they are combined under a 
Musharakah Mutanaqisah instrument.  The 
Shari’ah principle has made it clear that a 
combined agreement and made conditional to 
each other is not permissible.  According to 
the SAC resolution, under paragraph 36, the 
Council in its 56th meeting held on 5th February 
2006/7th Muharram 1427 resolved that;
The financing product structured 
based on Musharakah Mutanaqisah 
contract is permissible. Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah being a  contract 
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recognised in Islamic muamalat is 
the underlying reason. However, 
certain conditions are imposed in 
implementing such a Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah contract.  The contracting 
parties may combine the two contracts 
of musharakah and ijarah in one 
document of agreement, provided 
that both contracts are concluded 
separately and clearly not mixed 
between each other (SAC, 2006).
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF 
MUSHARAKAH MUTANAQISAH
The Musharakah Mutanaqisah concept also 
has its own operational problems. The works of 
Meera have highlighted these problems using a 
hypothetical calculation of the implementation 
of Musharakah Mutanaqisah contract.  The 
main problem is related to the determination 
of the rental rate that the customer is required 
to pay. Rental rate is normally based on the 
market rental value.  Factors such as location 
and time may be vital even though most likely 
the rate is always  increases.  This may cause 
burdensome on the part of the customer to pay 
the ever increasing yet uncertain amount of 
rent year after year while the bank would find 
it cumbersome as well to keep track with the 
changing rate (Meera & Abdul Razak, 2009). 
In this context, the interest rate which relates to 
the base lending rate (BLR) is more practical 
in offering more certainty and transparency.  In 
this regard, the rental rate should be replaced 
with the interest rate which is floating based 
on the market interest rate.  However, Shaikh 
Nizam Ya’quby and Muhammad Taqi Usmani 
have warned that the benchmark normally 
used in the interest-based transactions should 
not be used in the Islamic transaction to avoid 
resemblance with an interest-based transaction 
(Asharq Al-Awsat, personal communication, 
January 22, 2010).  Majority of the financial 
institutions in Malaysia which offer Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah Islamic financing packages showed 
that they offered their financing packages based 
on a rental rate which fluctuates according to the 
movement of the interest rate.  Some banks may 
use the expression such as Islamic Base Rate 
(IBR) or Profit Rate for this purpose which is 
essentially floating based on the movement of 
the Base Financing Rate (BFR).  At the same 
time, a fixed rate package for home financing 
normally for a longer term (about 10 – 20 years 
of tenure) may be offered as another option. 
Similarly, a combination of fixed and variable 
rate may also be offered ( see Malaysiacentral.
com) However, if BFR is not used, the offered 
packages may resemble the former contract of 
al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil instrument and give rise 
to the problems related to it.  Meera and Abdul 
Razak proposed that instead of depending on the 
interest rate, a house price index may be used for 
the purpose determined by the Malaysian House 
Price Index (Meera & Abdul Razak, 2009).
Another interesting issue is the risk 
distribution and the costs sharing.  For example, 
legal fees for the legal documentations involved 
are to be borne by the buyer including the 
processing fees, legal fees, stamping and 
transfer fees and possible penalty charges. 
Under Musharakah Mutanaqisah, the sharing 
principle means the contracting parties should 
share these costs.  A typical Islamic financing 
agreement may state exactly that the customer 
will bear all these costs.  In promoting the 
Islamic financing schemes, however, financial 
institutions may offer to pay the legal fees on the 
legal documentation as part of their marketing 
package.  This is normally dubbed as Zero Entry 
Cost (ZEC) in the banks’ adverts.
Following the controversies surrounding the 
application of al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil contracts, 
a few Malaysian Banks which offer Islamic 
banking services have shifted to Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah (Mohd Nor, 2008) whilst many 
retain the al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil packages. 
Musharakah Mutanaqisah may address certain 
concerns which give rise to disappointments 
among the banks and customers.  Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah should be the best option available 
for the dilemma faced by the customers when the 
project is incomplete since the sharing of risks 
and profits principle may protect the customers 
from continuing paying the instalments for 
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an undelivered house.  Unfortunately, this is 
normally not the case.  In practice, the financier 
may insert a clause which excludes them from 
the liabilities arising from a house financing 
under the Musharakah Mutanaqisah instrument 
including that caused by an abandoned project. 
The clause may make the buyer/customer liable 
if he or she refuses to continue payment because 
that non-payment constitutes an event of default 
which triggers a breach of contract.
On the other hand, Musharakah Mutanaqisah 
may eliminate certain operational issues such as 
related to the claiming of unearned profits in 
the event of default by the customer.  The issue 
related to uncertainty of how much rebate is 
payable also does not arise.  Many conceptual 
issues arising under al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil may 
be able to be overcome.  This is due to the fact 
that Musharakah Mutanaqisah contract is a 
diminishing partnership and not sale based.  In 
fact, the leasing element in its payment structure 
secured fair risk to both parties in the event of 
default.
During the early introduction of the 
concept of Musharakah Mutanaqisah, a straight 
application of the instrument was only possible 
through cooperative societies.  The lending and 
financing using Musharakah Mutanaqisah was 
adopted by a number of Islamic financial services 
providers, which predominantly cooperative-
type models including the Islamic Housing 
Cooperative (Canada), Ansar Cooperative 
Housing (Canada) and the Ansar Housing 
Limited (U.K) whose purpose was to cater the 
need of Muslim customers in home financing 
(Meera & Abdul Razak, 2005).
Even though the concept is now widely 
adopted and practiced by the commercial 
banks, they still hesitate to offer Musharakah 
Mutanaqisah according to its original virtues. 
In practice, the home financing instruments like 
Musharakah Mutanaqisah and al-Bay’ Bithaman 
Ajil are structured to be similar operationally to 
the conventional system as part of the attempts 
by the bankers to make it viable yet friendly 
and attractive to the widest range of customers. 
The common strategies adopted by the banks 
in offering their products of home financing 
packages are to suit various kinds of customers’ 
needs.  Various financing packages are available 
for different individuals’ needs depending 
on their nature of income, either regular or 
flexible.  For example, certain customers may 
seek financing to meet their temporary financial 
problems.  A first-time homebuyer prefers a 
low initial repayment. On the other hand, if 
someone is upgrading his or her current home 
or buying property as an investment, there is a 
possibility of early settlement or a lump sum 
to be made at the end of the tenure.  These are 
the considerations that many banks  have when 
offering their financing packages (BNM and 
the Association of Banks in Malaysia, 2011). 
Each of this may find its way translated into 
Islamic financing packages offered along with 
the conventional packages.
The resemblance of al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil 
and Musharakah Mutanaqisah, or in fact, any 
Shari’ah-compliant home financing instruments, 
with the conventional financing packages 
therefore cannot simply be overruled.  They were 
invented akin to financing facilities.  Financiers 
would stress on the profitability of the financial 
packages they offer for their own sustainability. 
In the end, a customer may find that whether the 
instrument is Musharakah Mutanaqisah, al-Bay’ 
Bithaman Ajil or a conventional loan, the amount 
payable is more or less the same and they bear 
similar risks, especially when the prevailing 
interest rate is used as a benchmark (Meera 
& Abdul Razak, 2009; Osmani & Abdullah, 
2010).  As one commentator puts it, Islamic 
banks may mask themselves by  merely using 
Arabic terminologies but retain the methods of 
operation and tools of the conventional banks 
(Arifin, 2008).
CONCLUSION
Islamic compliant financing packages should 
address consumers’ needs and interests so 
that they should not be perceived as more 
exploitative and unfair to the customers.  A strict 
application of al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil has shown 
that such contract  may allow the earning of full 
payment prematurely in the event of default by 
Hasani Mohd Ali, Ruzian Markom and Jasri Jamal
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the customer or if the customer sought an early 
settlement.  Unfortunately, the solutions put in 
place are not necessarily consistent with the 
Shari’ah either.
Any Islamic compliant concepts to be used 
in financing at the same time must be as far as 
possible compatible and at par with the existing 
practices of conventional financing. This is the 
greatest challenge for the Islamic financing 
instruments in order to stay competitive.  Any 
arbitrage opportunities arising from the perceived 
generosity in the application of Islamic concepts 
may be adjusted by the banks to meet their own 
interests.  The banks are profit oriented whose 
businesses are to earn profit from the financing 
activities. Therefore, Musharakah Mutanaqisah 
which is purely based on the sharing of revenues 
and risks may not be appealing to the majority 
of these financiers.
As discussed above, in either situation, this 
may expose inconsistencies with the principles in 
the Shari’ah.  There is a practical limit each time 
the Islamic finance can offer side by side with the 
conventional system especially in addressing the 
challenges posed by the need to strike a balance 
between market pragmatism on the one hand and 
complying with Shari’ah requirements on the 
other (Osmani & Abdullah, 2010).  Some jurists 
opine that the resemblance of the two systems is 
not healthy within the context of Islamic finance 
development (Meera & Abdul Razak, 2009; 
Osmani & Abdullah, 2010).
The high expectation is therefore on the 
shoulder of ‘Shari’ah Advisory Council’ (SAC) 
established under sec 56 of the Central Bank of 
Malaysia Act 2009.  The council sole purpose 
is to be a specialized committee in the field of 
Islamic banking to speedily ascertain the Islamic 
law on financial matters so as to command 
the confidence of all in terms of the sanctity, 
quality and consistency of the interpretation and 
application of Shari’ah principles pertaining to 
Islamic finance transactions.  A recent anomaly 
arises with respect to the scope of authority 
of this council.  Each bank offering Islamic 
products needs a Shari’ah Advisory Body 
(SAB) as required by the Islamic Bank Act, 
essentially in ensuring Shari’ah compliance. 
The new Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 
provides that the Islamic banks are to seek 
the advice of the Shari’ah Advisory Council 
(SAC) of the BNM; and it is mandatory for the 
Islamic banks to comply with the advice given 
by the SAC.  This will ensure that Shari’ah 
compliance is always strictly observed and 
adhered by the Islamic banks with the advice of 
the SAC.  The close relationship with SAC can 
also facilitate shorter timeframe in endorsing 
any new products in IBF (Engku Ali, 2008). 
However, the recent judgment by Mohd Zawawi 
Salleh J in Mohd Alias Ibrahim v. RHB Bank 
Bhd & Anor [2011] CLJ JT(2) may cast some 
doubts for a secure future direction of the Islamic 
finance system generally.  While acknowledging 
the advisory power of the council, the SAC is 
merely required to make an ascertainment and 
not determination of Islamic laws related to any 
questions on Islamic financing issues (para 85 
and 87-88).  Any disputes related to the validity 
of the instruments or contract used in a particular 
transaction is a judicial decision and traditionally 
is exercised by the courts (para 102, 105 and 
106).  This means there is no finality in terms of 
the validity of any of the instruments introduced 
in the Islamic finance system until the court 
confirms.  Therefore, the question of whether a 
resilient legal environment for Islamic finance 
has been appropriately put in place continues.
Al-Bay’ Bithaman Ajil has been criticised 
for its incompatibility with the existing system 
of neither Islamic finance nor the conventional 
one.  The implementation of the partnership 
concept in Musharakah Mutanaqisah is another 
test of how pragmatic is the Shari’ah principle 
alongside the conventional system, taking into 
consideration the limited viability and the power 
of authority concerned in paving the way for its 
future direction.  Therefore, the issue of SAC of 
course requires a different analysis of its own.
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